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The underlying cause of people stopping their search prior to the theoretical optimal 
solution in commonly found sequential search problems, often known as the secretary 
problem, is as yet undetermined. In the secretary problem, an immediate decision must be 
made from offers that are presented one at a time in a random sequence without re-call. The 
factors that might cause the early stopping bias were examined in a series of experiments. In 
Experiment One, I experimentally investigated the effect of time search cost in a version of 
the secretary problem framed as a house-selling context and found that, if each additional 
search involved a pre-announced time delay, people shortened the search. In Experiment 
Two, I found that if there were a house-selling context, people searched more optimally than 
with no context, even without house information. Experiment Three extended the findings 
from Experiment Two, framed the secretary problem as either a house-selling or a secretary-
hiring task, and found evidence suggesting that regret aversion was a cause of the early 
stopping bias. Experiment Four investigated group decision making and found that groups 
chose less optimal prices than the aggregate performance of individuals. In Experiment 
Five, I examined the effect of an incentive structure that rewarded only finding the optimal 
prices and found that people did indeed make more optimal decisions in this treatment. 
Overall, these findings suggest that when we make sequential search decisions in life, 
exhausting and exploring all offers is never optimal, time spent can never be regained, nor 
can the rejected offer. Taking note of the context and gathering information prior to making 
decisions does lead to better results. Settling for offers other than the best can save time and 
effort, and the earnings will not be much different than when only aiming for the best.   
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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THE SECRETARY PROBLEM 
When Alan Turing invented the very first computer, the machine was designed to go 
through all the possible scenarios, in the hope of solving the Germans’ coded messages 
during World War II. Today, computers are confined by time and space, just like human 
beings are, and it is no longer feasible to solve problems using this approach, not even for a 
machine that can work tirelessly around the clock. As modern-day problems become more 
and more complex, for problems where the necessary information is lacking or has an 
excessive amount of possibility, algorithms have been programmed into computers to help 
solve these problems efficiently and effectively, one of which is the optimal stopping rule 
(Christian & Griffith, 2016). This optimal stopping rule is derived from a recreational 
mathematics problem called the secretary problem. The secretary problem has attracted a 
good deal of attention since it was first brought to our general attention by Martin Gardner. 
Called the game of googol, it was first published in the February 1960 Martin Gardner 
column of mathematics games in Scientific American (Gardner & Mathematical 
Association of America, 2009). According to Gardner, the game was devised in 1958 by 
John Fox of the Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company and Gerald Marnie of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. See Ferguson (1989) and Freeman (1983) for 
historical reviews. The secretary problem is also known as the game of googol (Gardner & 
Mathematical Association of America, 2009), the marriage problem (Lindley, 1961) and 
several other synonyms. The most basic formulation of the problem is often referred to as 
the classical secretary problem or the standard secretary problem. It is defined as follows: 
suppose a manager wants to hire a secretary, and the manager receives a bonus only when 
she hires the very best candidate. The manager is only allowed to hire from a given list of 
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people. She knows exactly how many people are on the list before the interviewing process, 
and the candidates she interviews are presented randomly one at a time. During the 
interviewing process, she has to decide right away whether to hire the candidate, and it is 
not possible to re-call candidates rejected earlier. If she has not hired any candidate before 
the end, she must hire the last candidate. How does she maximise her chances of receiving 
this bonus? 
1.2 THE OPTIMAL STOPPING RULE 
The secretary problem is a form of the sequential decision-making problem that we 
face quite often in everyday life. Most of the research in sequential decision-making 
problems involves the investigation of optimal search, and how and why people are unable 
to choose optimally. A statement about "insufficient search" or "over search" would only be 
meaningful with respect to a theoretical optimal. The optimal strategy in making decisions 
for the classical secretary problem is a stopping rule; this states that the manager should 
reject the first r − 1 candidates (let candidate M be the best applicant among these r − 1 
candidates) to learn about the distribution of the candidates’ quality, so the first r − 1 
candidates serve as the information set, and she then selects the first subsequent candidate 
that is better than candidate M. The optimal stopping rule is therefore suggesting that the 
manager learn about distribution in the information set, does not accept anyone regardless of 
their quality and only consider accepting a candidate after having interviewed (rejected) 
everyone in the information set. This seemingly complicated problem turns out to have a 
simple, even elegant, solution. For an arbitrary r, the probability that the best candidate is 








The goal is to find the probability that candidate 𝑖 is selected and is the best, otherwise no 
bonus is earned, as per the assumption of the classical secretary problem. The secretary 
problem is a case of a dependent event, where the probability of the first event occurrence 
influences the probability of the second event, and so on. The probability of selecting the 
best candidate depends in part on the probability of the best candidate being presented in 
the information set, which in turn depends on the size of the information set. If the 
information set is too large and contains a large proportion of the candidates, the 
probability of selecting the best is reduced, given that all candidates in the information set 
are rejected. If the information set is too small, the manager does not receive adequate 
knowledge about the distribution, and the probability of finding the best candidate is also 
reduced. The key issue then is: how large should the information set be? 
The multiplication rule of probability states:  
P(A∩B) = P(B | A) × P(A)⋅ 
(The notation P(B | A) means "the probability of B, given that A has happened."),  
so,  
𝑃(𝐴)  =  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡  
𝑃(𝐵)  =  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑  
𝑃(𝐵 | 𝐴)  =  𝑃(𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 | 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡)  









×  𝑃(candidate 𝑖 is the best)  
Figure1.1 will be helpful to visualize the problem.  
 
 
Figure 1.1. The illustration of the secretary problem. 
The probability of candidate і being the best among the n candidates is 
1
𝑛
 because each 
candidate is equally likely to be the best. This leads to Equation 3: 
𝑃(𝑟)  =  ∑ 𝑃(𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 | 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖 𝑖𝑠 the best 
𝑛
і = 1
) ×  
1
𝑛
 .         
Then the probability that candidate i is selected, given that candidate i is the best, can be 
broken up into two different sums. First, if the best candidate is presented in the first r − 1 
candidates (i is 1 through to r − 1), the selection process will always reject the best 
candidate, and therefore the probability of candidate i being selected and being the best is 
equal to zero. The first sum is therefore a zero, for each i from 1 through to r − 1 as 
expressed in Equation 4. The limits on the second sum in Equation 4 is because for each 
candidate, starting with our stopping point r, continuing to the last candidate n (which are 
the candidates in the selection set) the manager needs to identify the probability of not 
choosing a candidate before the best candidate i presents, but after the r − 1 candidates. 
(That is to say, there may be a candidate better than M but before we get to the best at 
candidate i.) The selection process stops after she chooses a candidate, so she needs to find 
i 
 







the probability of not choosing a candidate before the best presents. The probability can be 
calculated using the number of target candidates divided by the total number of candidates. 
𝑃(𝑟) = [∑ 0 + ∑ 𝑃
𝑛
𝑖=𝑟
(𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑖 − 1 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑟
𝑟−1
і=1
− 1 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 | 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖 𝑖𝑠 the best )] ×  
1
𝑛
   
There are i − 1 total candidates between the start and the best candidate i. The probability of 
selecting a candidate after the r − 1 candidates and before the best candidate i is  
(𝑖 −  1)  −  (𝑟 −  1)
𝑖 −  1
. 
Therefore, the probability of not choosing a candidate after rejecting r − 1 candidates and 
before the best candidate i is 
1 −  (
𝑖 −  𝑟
𝑖 −  1
)  =  (
𝑖 −  1
𝑖 −  1
)  −  (
𝑖 −  𝑟
𝑖 −  1
)  =  
𝑟 −  1
𝑖 −  1
. 
So, for i = r though to n 
𝑃(𝑟)  =  ∑
𝑟 −  1






               
Since r is just a constant number and i is a variable, r − 1 can move outside the sum 
brackets,  
𝑃(𝑟) =  
















When taking the limit to infinity and making n arbitrarily large, the values of 1 remain the 
same and become comparatively too small to matter. If n is large, we can approximate it by 
the integral function below [i.e., (10)], with x = r/n and t = i/n.  
This gives us (writing lnx = loge x): 
 =  𝑥 × [ln(1)  −  ln(𝑥)]  =  𝑥 × [0 −  ln(𝑥)] =  − 𝑥 ln𝑥. 
To maximize the probability of this function, take the derivative of the function with respect 
to x and set it to 0.  
So,  
lnx = 1 




Euler's number, e, is a mathematical constant equal (approximately) to 2.7182. This gives, 
𝑃(𝑟)  =  
1
𝑒
 =  
1
2.7184
 =  0.3679 ≈ 37%  
and r = n/e.  
This optimal stopping rule may fail in two ways. The first way is that the best 
candidate may be in the information set. However, this may not be the most critical issue if 
one chooses a very small information set. The manager will never find anyone better than 
this and is thus finally forced to accept the nth candidate. If n = 20 and r = 7, the probability 
of having to select a twentieth candidate who is not optimal is a high 0.35. (The total 
probability of selecting the twentieth candidate with this strategy is about 0.38, as the 







stopping rule might fail is that the first candidate encountered from position r onwards who 
is better than the best in the information set may not be the best candidate in the remainder 
of the set, i.e., the overall best. The probability of this occurring for n = 20 is 0.266  
(1 − 0.35 − 0.384). 
1.3. THEORETICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL WORK ON THE EXTENSIONS OF THE CLASSICAL 
SECRETARY PROBLEM 
Simon (1956) suggested a bounded rationality approach to making sequential search 
decisions in everyday life even before the secretary problem was brought to researchers’ 
attention. Instead of optimising the expected outcome as in traditional economic theory, 
people set an aspirational level and are satisfied once the aspirational level is achieved. Such 
an approach allows decision makers to effectively achieve a variety of needs in situations 
where the optimal strategy is unknown to the decision maker, that is, there is no need for a 
utility function to be postulated. For example, when a rat forages for food, it learns to 
choose time-conserving paths that lead to sufficient food for survival rather than paths 
which might attain the maximum amount of food but potentially risk survival in the process. 
Theoretical analyses have been conducted with variations of the classical secretary 
problem. The assumptions of the classical secretary problem are limiting for many decision-
making scenarios in life, and, especially, the assumption that only selecting the absolute best 
is a positive result. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, a manager may still gain utility 
from alternatives other than the best (Bearden, Rapoport, & Murphy, 2006). Hiring, say, the 
second-best secretary available would often be good enough and yield positive utility from 
the work the secretary provides. There are very few, if any, examples of real-life situations 
where only the best choice produces utility. Findings from incorporating such an 
assumption might not apply in the real-life settings. Secondly, in real life, it is not usually 
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clear what the best choice would have been. If you do not interview the best secretary, you 
will never know there really was one who was better than your choice.  
In the attempt to address the limitation of the assumption that only the best yields a 
payoff, the assumption has been relaxed in various ways. The version of the secretary 
problem that relaxed the payoff structure is often referred to the generalised secretary 
problem (Bearden & Murphy, 2000). Mucci (1973) and Yeo and Yeo (1994) provide 
theoretical grounds for how to derive the optimal stopping rule, when monotone payoffs  
w1 ≥ w2 ≥ …. ≥ wn are assigned to the best n candidates; for example, when choosing the 
best candidate receives the highest payoff, choosing the second best receives the second 
highest, and so on. This stopping rule then becomes a multithreshold rule. The classical 
secretary problem is a special case of the generalised secretary problem when w1 = 1 and 
wn = 0 for all n > 1 (Bearden & Murphy, 2007). After the first threshold of the information 
set and prior to reaching the second threshold, the manager should accept a candidate who is 
the best seen so far. If no one fits the criteria, after the second threshold, she needs to lower 
her standard and accept either the best or second-best candidate that she has interviewed 
before reaching the third threshold, and so on. Bearden, Rapoport and Murphy (2006) 
provide a numerical example of this solution for the case of 50 candidates, with a payoff of 
16 for choosing the best, 8 for the second-best, 4 for the third-best, 2 for the fourth-best and 
1 for the fifth-best candidate. The optimal stopping rule suggests that the manager should 
reject the first 17 candidates; i.e., the first 35%, and only choose the best seen so far (every 
interviewed candidates) between candidates 18 to 35. If this fails, accept the candidate who 
is either the best or second-best candidate that interviewed so far between candidates 36 to 
43. If this still fails, she should choose either the best, second- or third-best candidate 
interviewed so far between candidates 44 to 47.  
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Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) presented optimal solutions for the problem when a 
payoff of 1 can be earned once the manager chooses either the best or second-best 
candidate, and she receives nothing otherwise. They found the maximum probability of 
receiving the payoff when n → ∞ is actually 0.574. This optimal stopping rule has two 
thresholds. The first is to reject the first 0.347 × n candidates, then choose the next best seen 
so far until she reaches the 0.667× nth candidate. If this fails, after 0.667× n candidates, she 
should choose the best or second-best candidate interviewed so far. For example, in the case 
of 100 candidates, she should reject the first 35 candidates, and only accept the best 
candidate between candidates 36 to 67. From candidate 68 and onwards, she should choose 
either the best or second-best candidate among the interviewed candidates.  
Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) also studied the problem when the manager is allowed 
to accept two candidates, and a payoff is earned when either candidate is the best. They 
found the first decision to accept should be made after rejecting the first n divided by e to 




candidates. As n → ∞, the maximum probability of finding the best candidate with two 
decisions is approximately 59%. For example, if there are 50 candidates to choose from, the 
first decision should be made between candidate 13 and 19; that is, the first information set 
is 12. The second decision is made after candidate 19. Both candidates are accepted only if 
the candidate is the best seen so far. Tamaki (1979) also allows the acceptance of two 
candidates, but they need to be the best and second-best candidates. This version of the 
optimal stopping rule rejects the first 0.229 × n candidates. After 0.607 × n candidates, 
either the best or second-best candidate seen so far are chosen. With an example of 50 
candidates, for the first decision, the best candidate between candidates 13 to 31 is accepted. 
As for the second decision, the candidate is accepted who is either the best or second best 
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among all interviewed after candidate 31. When n → ∞, the maximum probability of 
earning the payoff is approximately 22.5%.   
Lindley (1961) derived the optimal stopping rule for choosing the candidate with the 
minimum expected ranking of the candidate, where the best candidate has a ranking of 1; 
Moriguti (1993) constructed an algorithm for computing the optimal thresholds for this 
extension. In the case of 25 candidates, the manager should reject approximately the first 
one third of candidates, that is, 8 candidates. Then she should select a candidate only if the 
candidate is the best seen so far up to candidate 13. If no candidate has been selected, from 
candidates 14 to 16, the manager should accept a candidate only if that candidate happens to 
be either the best or second best of those interviewed so far. If that still fails, then the best, 
second- and third-best candidate between candidates 17 and 19 are accepted, and so on.  
The cost of a search is another variation that is often considered, as search cost is 
inevitable in any sequential search decision. Introducing costs associated with the 
consideration of each choice have been examined in various studies (Yeo, 1998; Zwick, 
Rapoport, Lo & Muthukrishnan, 2003). Yeo (1998) theoretically set up a version of the 
secretary problem in which he introduced a fixed, per-candidate interview search cost with 
positive payoffs from selecting any of the k best candidates. The payoffs increase with the 
quality (and thereby rank) of the candidate. The problem is then to find the optimal stopping 
rule and use it to evaluate the probabilities of success and search length given the 
distribution of the quality of candidates interviewed. Yeo used numerical methods to arrive 
at the conclusion that, in such a setup, as the search cost increases, it is optimal to decrease 
search activity. Zwick, Rapoport, Lo and Muthukrishnan (2003) used a simulation to 
identify the size of the information set for three different per-unit search costs: $0, $0.1 and 
$0.3, in which there was some probability of re-calling previously rejected candidates (not 
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just the most recently rejected, but any previously rejected). The manager would only earn a 
payoff when the best candidate is selected. In the case of 20 candidates, the information set 
was found to be 13, 10 and 6 candidates for the respective unit search costs given above; 
these information sets also yielded the highest predicted payoff.  
In addition to the theoretical investigation of the secretary problem, there is also 
prior experimental work. Theoretical investigation produces an optimal stopping rule to 
variants of the secretary problem. The optimal stopping rule does not predict where the 
optimal candidate lies, only a strategy that maximises the probability of finding the optimal 
candidate. Experimental research examines how people conduct searches and compares that 
with the theoretical predicted optimal search, both in the classical problem and its 
extensions. Often in experimental research, the theoretical derived optimal stopping rule is 
applied to the experimental design to obtain the predicted optimal amount of search that 
people should conduct. A general empirical result for the secretary problem is that people 
tend to stop their search too soon, sometimes even stopping their search within the 
theoretical information set (e.g., in the experiment of Zwick et al.; 2003). 
Seale and Rapoport (1997) studied the secretary problem by incorporating the 
classical assumptions: a known number of candidates were presented randomly one at a 
time without re-call, and the participant only earned a payoff from selecting the best 
candidate. Seale and Rapoport found that their participants stopped the search too early, and 
they suggested that time search cost might be the reason for early stopping. There was no 
monetary search cost (henceforth monetary cost) in Seale and Rapoport’s 1997 experiment, 
but the participants still needed time to search each candidate, and there were 100 potential 
candidates presented per trial. The classical optimal strategy is no longer applicable to 
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compare to participants’ behaviours with time search cost (henceforth time cost). Perhaps 
they maximised their payoff when the endogenous time cost was taken into account.  
Other variants of the secretary problem have also found early stopping. For example, 
Seale and Rapoport (2000) presented a candidate population of unknown size, and the 
participants were asked to select the top-ranked candidate possible, without knowing the 
number of candidates available in the selection pool. They reported that the participants stop 
their search earlier than the theoretical optimum predicts. The theoretical information set 
was obtained using simulation and it predicted that, in the case of 40 candidates, it is 
optimal to reject 15% of the candidates, that is, six candidates, before considering whether 
to accept. Bearden, Rapoport and Murphy (2006) tested a variant of the secretary problem 
with a payoff scheme that depended on the ranking of the candidate selected. Six positive 
payoffs were available: participants received $25 for selecting the best candidate, $13 for 
the second-best candidate, $6 for the third-best, $3 for the fourth, $2 for the fifth and $1 for 
the sixth, with n = 60 candidates available in the selection pool. The results also showed that 
the participant tended to stop searching too soon compared with the theoretically predicted 
optimum. The theoretical optimum predicted for the first information set was 35%, as 
mentioned previously, which is slightly lower than the optimum the classical solution 
predicts.  
Zwick, Rapoport, Lo, and Muthukrishnan (2003) investigated the secretary problem, 
allowing re-call of a previously rejected choice, in searching for apartments with a certain 
probability that the apartments were still available. In addition to allowing for re-calling a 
previously passed-over apartment, Zwick et al. studied the effect of monetary search cost 
using a 2 × 2 design with the two factors being the size of the apartment set and whether 
there was a search cost in searching for another apartment (0.3 cents for a 20-apartment 
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treatment and 0.1 cents for the 60-apartment treatment). The participants received a payoff 
of $10 if they selected the overall best. The results show that participants stopped their 
search sooner with a search cost than with no search cost. However, the participants were 
considered as searching for too long compared with the predicted optimal result they 
obtained from simulation, where the effect of search cost was incorporated. As previously 
mentioned, their simulation results suggest a smaller information set with an increase in 
search cost. However, the participants in the cost treatments searched for longer than the 
simulation predicted under the search-cost conditions.  
1.4 MY EXPERIMENTS 
In total, this dissertation presents the results of five experiments that present 
different but related manipulations of variables in the secretary problem. Each is presented 
in its own chapter below, and each chapter begins with an introduction relevant to that 
chapter. What follows in this section is a quick overview of the themes of these chapters and 
does not present a complete rationale for the studies presented in them. 
Previous experiments have consistently found that people behave suboptimally in 
making sequential search decisions. The underlying causes for early stopping behaviour are 
still unknown. It is possible that the endogenous time search cost, as suggested by Seale and 
Rapoport (1997), is the cause, and was not accounted for in the theoretical analysis and yet 
time cost is inevitable in any type of searching, and just like any other resource, time is 
scarce and limited. The cost of time is often measured using a monetary value, for example, 
the opportunity cost of time. The more time we spend on searching, the higher this cost. A 
higher cost suggests a lower payoff. If we aim to maximise our overall payoff, as 
economists propose, reducing cost is a sensible and appropriate way to behave. In this 
dissertation, I examine whether the time cost has a similar shortening effect to monetary 
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cost. If time cost also shortens a search, then stopping prior to the theoretical predicted 
optimal stopping position would be an optimal behaviour by itself in an attempt to reduce 
time cost. I have also conducted a simulation to derive the optimal stopping rule for my 
design. The experimental and simulation findings are reported in Experiment One (Chapter 
Two). 
In addition to time search cost, the effect of context has also not been considered in 
the optimal theorem and yet it is a well-documented finding that decisions change 
systematically based on how the context is framed (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; 
McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky, 1982).  Moreover, there are pieces of experimental 
evidence which suggest that people make better decisions when the task is presented in a 
context rather than without (e.g., Sugiyama, Tooby, Cosmides, 2002; Cosmides, Barret & 
Tooby, 2010; Griggs & Cox, 1982). To derive the best solution for every context, the 
human brain has evolved to think through the context while making decisions. A context 
may assist the activation of existing schemas that contain effective strategies constructed 
from previous, similar experiences. This allows us to make judgements and decisions in an 
effective and efficient manner, without having to construct a solution from scratch every 
time we encounter the same or similar experiences. Thus, the effect of context can 
potentially be another cause of the suboptimal behaviour found in sequential decision 
making. Experiment Two in Chapter 3 was therefore designed to examine the effect of 
context.  
Besides the time cost and context effects, cognitive biases – for example, 
overconfidence and regret aversion – may also cause people to choose suboptimally. 
Chapter Four reports a study (Experiment Three) of whether these biases affect stopping 
behaviour. Overconfidence is one of the most predominant biases found in human decision 
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making (e.g., Moore & Small, 2007; Swann & Gill, 1997). This cognitive bias describes the 
tendency of a person’s subjective confidence in their judgements or abilities to be 
systematically and persistently higher than their objective accuracy. Overestimating one’s 
own ability in making optimal decisions, or believing one has sufficient knowledge when 
one does not, can result in insufficient searching. As in the secretary problem, the decision 
maker does not know the distribution of the candidates' quality prior to making decisions. 
The optimal theorem requires an information set to gather information on the distribution 
prior to accepting a candidate. Overconfidence might, therefore, lead to the shortening of 
the information set and observation of fewer candidates overall. Similarly, avoidance of the 
feeling of regret could potentially be another cause for observing fewer than the optimal 
number of candidates. While the secretary problem does not allow re-call of the previously 
rejected candidates, if one turns down a candidate and nothing better is offered later, the 
manager knows that she has passed over a better candidate, and this is likely to produce the 
feeling of regret (see Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982 on regret theory). But, if she 
accepts a candidate early on, then she will not subsequently find out about the later, better 
candidate that is yet to come, and there will be less regret. In the attempt to minimise or 
eliminate regret, the manager is likely to shorten the amount of the search.  
Many sequential search decisions are made in a group in our daily life; for example, 
buying houses are often decided by couples or family members. Experiment Four (Chapter 
Five) examined whether group decision making eliminates the early stopping behaviour 
found in individual decision making. Critical decisions are often made by groups, assuming 
that groups make better decisions than individuals. However, theoretical research into group 
decision making is inconclusive as regards its performance. The wholistic theory predicts 
that a group makes a better decision than an individual due to an interaction between group 
members, and results in the whole being greater than the sum of the individuals (see Stasser 
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& Birchmeier, 2003 for more details). Alternatively, the reductionist proposes that the group 
is at best only equal to the sum of its parts if group interaction goes smoothly, otherwise, a 
group’s performance will be less than the sum of what each individual member can achieve, 
due to reasons such as the Ringelmann effect (Ringelmann, 1913). Take solving the 
secretary problem as an example: if one group member knows how to make the optimal 
decision, the group could solve the problem successfully and the group could outperform 
most of the individuals in it. Furthermore, the other group members could influence the 
decision and steer the decision away from the optimal. Group members normally discuss 
their preferences and exchange opinions about the problem at each stage, until they reach a 
consensus decision among the group members. It is possible that the group can make worse 
decisions due to the polarising effect or to social loafing. The polarising effect refers to the 
way that decisions tends to shift towards the extreme after group discussion (e.g., Moscovici 
& Zavalloni, 1969; Bray & Noble, 1978). For example, Myers and Bishop (1970) found that 
a group of prejudiced American high school students polarised their attitude to become 
more prejudiced after group discussion. Therefore, if two group members are regret-averse, 
they may become more regret-averse after discussion. People could search less with a 
regret-aversion tendency; they could shift towards a shorter search after discussion than they 
would have done if they had made individual decisions. Furthermore, no single member is 
fully responsible for the final decision; this makes social loafing in a group possible. 
Ingham, Levinger, Graves and Peckham (1974) showed that people were less motivated 
when working in a group. Therefore, some group members may not exert the same amount 
of effort in solving the problem as they would when working alone.  
It is a common belief that exerting more effort can result in a higher performance. 
This is why monetary incentives are often offered in the workplace and laboratory. 
However, effort-motivating incentives are often found to be ineffective in tasks that require 
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more skills to perform. The way to best motivate performance in skill-dominant tasks 
remains unknown. Experimental research has found that people often use information from 
the situation and environment to work out how they are expected to behave. For example, 
when people are served food with a large bowl, they consume more food compared with 
when they are served with a small bowl (Wansink & Cheney 2005; Wansink, Van Ittersum 
& Painter, 2006). It is possible that the monetary incentive structure operates in a similar 
way. Experiment Five (Chapter Six) experimentally examines whether an incentive 
structure that might signal a higher expectation of one's ability to perform a task can lead to 
an increase in performance. Note that if one exerts more effort by conducting more searches 
– for example, 20 searches – one will not necessarily choose a better candidate than an 
individual who searches less – for example, with only 10 searches. As the optimal theorem 
of the secretary problem dictates, the key to maximise the probability of finding the optimal 
xxx is knowing the size of the information set. Therefore, exerting more effort, that is, more 
searches alone, without knowing the size of information set does not necessarily result in 
finding a better candidate.  
For the purpose of consistency, the word “offer” refers to the choices available to 
the participants during the experiment, and it will be employed for the remainder of the 
dissertation, so as to avoid confusion from different experimental set-ups and designs. For 
example, in the house-selling frame treatment, “offer” refers to the price offer available. In 
the hiring-employee frame, it is referring to the candidates. In the “no context” frame, it 
refers to numbers presented to the participants.  
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2. THE EFFECT OF TIME COST ON SEARCH 
BEHAVIOURS: EXPERIMENT ONE. 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the situation of selling a house, where the seller reviews one offer at a time 
to buy and must decide whether to accept or reject the standing offer, without knowing what 
the subsequent offers will be. The decision cannot be re-called, meaning that if an offer is 
rejected, the seller cannot change his mind and accept this offer later on. How can the seller 
find the highest offer? Since it is unlikely that the first offer is the highest, it may be 
reasonable to reject the first few offers to learn about their distribution. While a seller might 
have some knowledge about the real estate market in general, each house has its 
specificities; the aggregate price level may not convey enough information regarding 
buyers’ values for a particular house. The search process of reviewing and rejecting offers is 
costly and time-consuming. Monetary search costs have been shown to shorten the search in 
various contexts, but not much is known about the effect of time search costs. Since time is 
also a scarce and valuable resource, it is crucial to understand the effect it has on sequential 
decision making. Search theory predicts that an increased search cost of any type will lead 
to a shorter search (McCall, 1970; see also Yeo, 1998). Empirical literature provides 
evidence that, as the (monetary) search cost (henceforth, monetary cost) increases, people 
do indeed search less (e.g., Zwick, Rapoport, Lo & Muthukrishnan, 2003). But what if, 
instead of incurring a monetary search cost (henceforth, monetary cost) people have to 
devote their time to search for better alternatives? Search models typically do not stipulate 
how different types of costs influence the length of search activity. For example, McCall 
(1970) stated that the length of search activity depends on the opportunity cost of time, 
which could be approximated by the perceived wage rate (see Lippman & McCall, 1976; 
Goldman & Johansson, 1978 for more details on theoretical framework), suggesting that 
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time and monetary costs are theoretically equivalent. Theoretically, an increase in the time 
search cost (henceforth, time cost) should decrease the search activity, just as an increase in 
the monetary cost would. However, apart from its different nature, the time cost is also 
specific in that it is usually not known ex ante and has to be inferred as the search 
progresses. In this chapter, I test whether an increase in the time cost does result in less 
searching and whether monetary cost shortens the search in the secretary problem, as 
predicted by search models and previous studies. The contribution can, therefore, be viewed 
as extending the empirical analysis of search behaviour to the domain of time.  
Is there any existing evidence that would suggest that people behave differently 
when time and money are at stake? Behavioural literature does provide such evidence in 
various domains. For example, Gino and Mogilner (2014) found that people are less likely 
to cheat in a mathematical task when primed with a time-related construct than when primed 
with money. Okada and Hoch (2004) demonstrated that people are more risk-seeking when 
investing their time than when their investment is monetary. In a similar fashion, people are 
more prone to the sunk-cost fallacy with past monetary investment than with time (Soman, 
2001). However, it has also been shown that a scarcity of time and a scarcity of money can 
impact people in similar ways (Mullainathan & Shafir, 2013). A scarcity of money makes 
poor farmers focus their mental effort on saving, neglecting the risk of adverse 
circumstances and not buying enough insurance (e.g., against drought or flooding), even 
when the insurance is subsidized so as to be affordable (Giné, Townsend, & Vickery, 2008). 
A similar tunnelling effect is displayed when the scarcity concerns people’s time. For 
example, people who are experiencing scarcity of time drive and talk on the phone 
simultaneously and neglect the risk of hazardous driving (Strayer, Drews, & Crouch, 2006). 
The tunnelling effect refers to people focusing on things that they experience a shortage of 
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(e.g., money, time or food), while ignoring potential issues that might result from activities 
mitigating said shortage (Mullainathan & Shafir, 2013).  
Given that some studies suggest time and money affect people’s decisions 
differently, whereas in other domains their impact could be similar, the implications of time 
cost for sequential decision making are not obvious. In Experiment One, I examine whether 
the presence of time cost shortens sequential search. In particular, I embed the explorations 
in the house-selling frame described in the method section (also known as the secretary 
problem) in which the participants earn payoffs based on the offers they accept. In contrast 
to the classical secretary problem (see Ferguson, 1989, for a discussion), which assumes 
people derive utility only from the optimal offer, this experiment allows people to earn 
money also from suboptimal offers (Bearden, Rapoport, & Murphy, 2006); that is, people 
obtain utility (earn money in the experiment) based on the true value of the offer, instead of 
zero payoffs when anything other than the best offer is selected.  
Job search is another prominent example of sequential decision making. McCall 
(1970) gives an analogous prediction to Yeo (1998) regarding the effect of search cost on 
job search. In McCall’s model, the job seeker knows the distribution of wage offers, the 
search is unlimited, and there is no re-call. He receives one randomly selected wage offer at 
a time and decides whether to reject or accept it. If the offer is accepted, the search ends and 
the job seeker receives a wage equal to the offer. The job seeker thus considers the current 
wage offer against the prospects of being unemployed and receiving his outside option 
(representing unemployment compensation, welfare payment, and/or leisure benefits) and 
facing the search cost again in the next round(s) to obtain a new draw from the wage 
distribution. McCall shows that a relatively high cost compared to the wage offer 
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encourages the job seeker to limit his search, holding everything else constant. In the 
extreme, it might even mean that the job seeker prefers to remain unemployed. 
Job search models share several assumptions with the secretary problem, including 
the random presentation of job offers and no re-call. Their other features, such as knowledge 
of the distribution of offers and an unbounded search horizon, do not coincide with the 
classical secretary problem. However, despite the difference in assumptions between the job 
search and secretary problems and the resulting difference in decision-making 
environments, laboratory experiments studying job search also find that participants stop 
searching too soon (e.g., Cox & Oaxaca, 1989; Cox & Oaxaca, 2000). Cox and Oaxaca 
(2000) experimentally tested the job search behaviour with known and unknown wage 
distribution, finding that people terminate their search early in both cases. In the treatment 
with known distribution, the participants knew exactly the distribution of the offers that 
were drawn. In the treatment with unknown distribution, the participants had information 
about the two possible distributions where the offers were drawn. The offers were sampled 
with replacement, there were 10 offers available in each round, but a maximum of 20 
periods was allowed to accept an offer. This provides a possibility of re-calling a previously 
rejected offer by design. Their results showed that the extent of search was in fact similar in 
these two cases.  
Both the job search model and the secretary problem give similar theoretical 
predictions regarding the effect of search cost. The result that monetary cost in the secretary 
problem shortens search is well documented in both theoretical and empirical literature. To 
the best of our knowledge, the effect of time cost, which is theoretically equivalent to 
monetary cost, has not been tested experimentally, although the time cost of searching is 
unavoidable in a sequential search; but, because of its different nature, one might question 
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whether its effect is also behaviourally equivalent to monetary cost. The main contribution 
of this paper is therefore in identifying how different search costs influence search 
behaviour.  
2.2 METHODS 
2.2.1 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
The experimental task is framed as selling 10 houses; one house in each round. A 
description of a house, consisting of the floor area, the number of bedrooms, the suburb and 
the year the house was built in, is presented at the beginning of the round, prior to any price 
offer. To enhance the link between the experiment and the outside-the-lab world, the house 
descriptions presented to participants were taken from houses sold in 12 different suburbs in 
Christchurch, New Zealand during October 2014. All information was obtained from the 
Quotable Value Limited database (qv.co.nz). In each round, a participant can review up to 
20 price offers for the given house. The price offers are presented one at a time. Once a 
price offer is presented, the participant decides whether to reject the offer or whether to 
accept it. Once the decision is made, there is no re-call. If the participant has not accepted an 
offer prior to the final (20th) offer, the participant is forced to accept the final offer, 
regardless of its value. The actual price offer sequences are presented in Appendix 2.C. 
The experiment consisted of four treatments implemented in an across-subject 
design, varying the search cost. In the no search cost treatment (henceforth no cost), the 
price offers were presented without any search cost being imposed, neither time nor money. 
In the monetary search cost treatment (henceforth monetary cost), each participant had to 
pay 20 experimental currency units (ECUs) to obtain each new offer. The monetary cost 
was cumulative, that is, the more offers the participant obtained, the more monetary cost had 
to be paid in total. For example, if a participant accepts the 20th offer for a house, the total 
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monetary cost is 20 x 20 ECUs compared with no cost. There are two time cost treatments, 
announced time cost treatment (henceforth announced time cost) and unannounced time cost 
treatment (henceforth unannounced time cost). In the announced time cost treatment, the 
participants were instructed with a five second time delay prior to presenting each offer. 
There was no such instruction in the unannounced time cost treatment; the unannounced 
time cost treatment had identical instructions to the no cost treatment. To make a parallel 
comparison between monetary and time costs, the treatment of announced time delay was 
introduced, as the existence of monetary cost must be pre-announced in the experiment to 
avoid deceiving the participants. 
However, in everyday life, time costs (waiting times) are usually not announced ex 
ante. To make a parallel comparison with an actual house-selling scenario, the treatment of 
unannounced time delay was included, where the participants were not informed about the 
time delay in the instructions but had to learn about it through experience as the experiment 
progressed. In the unannounced time delay treatment, the time cost had to be individually 
inferred. This design thus makes the experiment less likely to find a treatment effect due to 
the time delay incurred with each additional search, making it a conservative test of the 
conjecture that time cost operates in the same way as monetary cost.  
In both time search cost treatments, each participant had to wait five seconds before 
a new offer was displayed on the screen. The time cost was also cumulative, the more offers 
the participant searched through, the longer was the wait in total. For example, if a 
participant accepted the 20th offer for a house, the additional time cost is 20 × 5 seconds = 
100 seconds, compared with no cost. Therefore, a five second time delay can cumulatively 
yield a significant waiting time.1 This was indeed the case as the unannounced time cost 
                                                 
1 Initially, I ran a 10-second delay session that lasted three hours, but many participants dropped out of the 
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treatments session in this experiment lasted on average 15 minutes longer (approximately 
one hour and 10 minutes) than the no cost treatment (approximately 55 minutes). The 
announced time cost lasted on average one hour. The monetary cost treatment lasted 10 
minutes less than the no cost treatment.  
One hundred and eighty-eight undergraduate students from the University of 
Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand participated in the experiment. Forty-eight 
participants participated in the no cost treatment, forty-four in the monetary cost treatment 
forty-three in the unannounced time cost treatment and fifty-three in the announced time 
cost treatment. The participants were selected randomly from the database using the ORSEE 
recruitment system (Greiner, 2015). The participants earned 12.2 New Zealand dollars 
(NZD) on average. In the no cost and the two time cost treatments (unannounced and 
announced), all experimental earnings have been exchanged into NZD at the announced 
exchange rate (The details are in the Appendix 2.A–B). For the monetary cost treatment, the 
payoff is the house’s accepted price and subtracting the cumulative monetary search cost; 
more details are in Appendix 2.C. The payoff protocol was single-blind, meaning that the 
experimenter was able to track participant decisions to their identity. The search task was 
implemented using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). 
After arriving at the lab, the participants were randomly assigned to a cubicle and 
read the instructions (provided in Appendix 2.A–C) at their own pace. Any questions were 
answered in private. The experiment began with two practice rounds, followed by 10 paid 
rounds. To allow comparisons between participants, the same 10 random sequences, 
generated prior to the experiment, were employed for each participant in each session (see 
                                                 




Appendix 2.D for details). Each sequence was generated from a normal distribution using 
the actual mean house price in each suburb, with an upper and lower limit of two actual 
standard deviations. No data are available for actual house price distributions in NZ suburbs, 
but the distribution is likely to tail off at both ends as the normal distribution does and a 
uniform distribution does not: very cheap and very expensive houses are rare. Actually the 
distribution is unlikely to be important: Kahan, Rapoport and Jones (1967) tested search 
behaviour with different underlying distributions and found no effect on participant 
decisions, the price offers were presented in ECUs. The participants were informed that 
their pay in NZD would be based on their cumulative payoffs from all 10 rounds, with an 
exchange rate of 1000 ECUs = 1 NZD. 
One might think that having more time in the cost treatment with an additional five-
second delay prior to presenting an offer could yield better decisions. This design addresses 
this issue by not imposing a time limit on participants’ decisions in any of the treatments; 
that is, they could take as long as they needed to evaluate each offer presented to them. For 
an example of how time pressure can affect decisions see Kocher, Pahlke and Trautmann 
(2013). 
2.3. SIMULATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
What is the optimal stopping rule in this variation of the secretary problem? To 
derive a prediction for the impact of search cost on search behaviour, I conducted a 
simulation to evaluate the performance of different stopping rules in each treatment. Each 
simulation compares the payoffs resulting from 20 different stopping rules (as there was a 
maximum of 20 offers), which contain all possible stopping positions (i.e., the nth offer in a 
given sequence that has been accepted; where 1 ≤ n ≤ 20). Each simulation cycle generates a 
set of 20 random offers from a standardized normal distribution, using the mean and 
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standard deviation for each house from the values used in the experiment. Once a set of 
offers has been generated, the offers are (implicitly) ordered from the highest to lowest and 
assigned a rank within this particular order. These offer values and the rank for each offer 
are recorded to test the performance of each stopping rule. The simulation runs separately 
for each house with 2 million iterations (Zwick et al., 2003, ran 10,000 iterations in their 
simulation). The simulation shows results from testing the decision rule by generating 20 
different sets of random numbers and running it for 2 million iterations (more details on 
simulation procedurals are presented in Appendix 2.D.) To compare the performance of 
stopping rules across treatments, I ran the simulation using search cost of 0 (representing the 
no cost treatment) and 20 ECUs (representing the monetary and time cost treatments). In 
general, the opportunity cost of time depends on the wage rate a participant can earn. The 
experiment is parameterized to yield a maximum payment of NZD 14 per hour. Using the 
implemented exchange rate (NZD 1 = 1000 ECUs), a 5-second delay thus equals 
approximately 2 cents (NZD 14/3600 seconds) or 20 ECUs.  
I compared the performance of all stopping rules for all treatments by using the 
average payoff (in ECUs) they yield. The average payoff represents the mean value earned 
from accepting an offer according to a given stopping rule, net of the cumulative search 
cost. The average payoff statistic indicates which stopping rule yields the highest payoff.  
It is almost trivial to see that due to the accumulation of search costs every stopping 
rule, except for “Accept the first offer” yields a higher payoff in no cost compared to the 
treatment with cost (Figure 2.1). The average payoff in treatments with cost is statistically 
significantly lower than in no cost (p < .001) according to both Mann-Whitney and the t-
tests presented in Table 2.1. According to the simulation, the stopping rule that prescribes 
“Accept the next highest offer after seeing 4 offers” yields the highest payoff at no cost. In 
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the cost treatment, the optimal stopping rule is to always “accept the first offer.” The 
simulation thus suggests that in this environment, it is optimal to stop the search sooner (i.e., 
accept an earlier offer) when the search is costly as compared to a situation when it is not. 
This is due to the cumulative nature of the search cost which, given this parameterization, 
causes the overall payoff to decrease if one searches for more than one offer.  
Table 2.1 
Simulation summary statistics and between treatments statistical tests  


























Note: SD refers to standard deviation. *0 ECU refers to no cost treatment, 20 ECU refers to 




Figure 2.1. The average payoff for all stopping rules in the cost is equal to 0 ECU and 20 
ECU (for both time and monetary) treatments. The filled bar represents 0 ECU and the 
blank bar is 20 ECU. 
In addition to the simulation findings, Table 2.2 lists the net payoffs (resulting from 
all possible decision rules) for the 10 actual sequences of offers used in the experiment. As 
presented in Table 2.2, the optimal stopping rule that yields the highest net payoff when 























yields the highest net payoff is stopping rule 1. This displays very similar result to the 
simulation. 
Table 2.2  
Summary prediction results of net payoff (ECUs) after applying the stopping rules to the 
sequences in the experiment when there is 0 ECU and 20 ECUs (for both time and 
monetary). The average net payoff (in ECUs) is the mean value earned from accepting an 
offer according to a given stopping rule net of the cumulative search cost. 
                                                Variable Average Net payoff (ECU) 
Decision rule 0 ECU 20 ECU  
Pick first offer 454.7 434.7 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 1 662.9 525.7 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 2 735.2 522.3 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 3 722.8 378.9 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 4 756.2 370.3 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 5 761.1 373.2 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 6 775.4 344.4 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 7 793.0 352.0 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 8 763.4 292.7 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 9 780.8 308.1 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 10 582.5 139.6 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 11 582.5 139.6 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 12 630.1 183.2 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 13 609.6 183.2 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 14 446.1 7.7 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 15 446.1 7.7 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 16 446.1 7.7 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 17 446.1 7.7 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 18 446.1 7.7 
Pick last offer 407.7 7.7 
Average 612.4 229.7 
45 
 
In line with previous research and the simulation results. I hypothesised that (1) 
participants will shorten their search when there is a monetary search cost, and people 
search longer when there is no search cost imposed; (2) assuming that the effects of 
monetary and time cost are qualitatively equivalent (given my calibration), the amount of 
search when there is a monetary cost should be the same as in the case when there is a time 
cost (presented as time delay), when time cost is also pre-announced; (3) in line with the 
theoretical assumption that monetary and time costs are qualitatively equivalent, I 
conjecture that imposing a time delay before a new offer is presented will cause the 
participants to search less than in the case where there is no such delay, just like monetary 
cost would, regardless of whether time cost is unannounced (3a) or announced (3b); (4) it is 
possible that without prior announcement of a time delay, it may require some learning 
before participants adjust their search behaviour with the presence of a time delay; 
therefore, the amount of search when there is an unannounced time delay may be more than 
when there is a prior announcement. 
2.4 RESULTS 
In light of the simulation results, I examined participants’ behaviour in four ways. 
First, the stopping positions for all four treatments were computed to determine whether 
introducing time (both unannounced and announced) or monetary cost leads to shorter 
searches. Second, I examined the relationship between the observed stopping positions and 
payoffs to establish whether it is optimal to shorten a search if it involves time (either 
unannounced or announced) or monetary cost (I performed the analysis with and without 
subtracting the opportunity cost of time from the final payoffs). The participants are 
assumed to be aiming to maximise their expected payoffs after cost in this experiment 
(therefore, risk-neutral decision makers). Third, I examined the effect of learning in the 
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amount of search conducted in the first and second half of sessions. Four, I examined the 
factors that influenced participants’ decision to accept an offer using regression analysis. 
There are three dependent variables: first, the amount of search exerted in the task 
for different treatments, that is, the position in the sequence where the participant accepts 
the offer (henceforth stopping position) is evaluated; second, the prices they selected, that is, 
the cumulative sum of 10 chosen prices obtained by accepting the offers (henceforth total 
chosen price) is used; third, the amount of money they earned after cost, the sum of 10 
chosen prices subtracting the cumulative search cost (henceforth net payoff). The offer and 
the net payoff are both presented in ECUs. The results relating to these three dependent 
variables are shown in Table 2.3 (Panels A, B and C respectively). 
Table 2.3 
Experiment summary statistics and between treatments statistical tests. 
Panel A. Stopping position  
Average 
(SD) 
Tukey Post Hoc test*** Analysis of Variance 
 






No cost(1) 11.6 
(2.8) 









.21(1) <.001(3) .27(4) 





<.001(1) <.001(2) <.001(4) 





<.001(1) .27(2) <.001(3) 
     
Sequence optimal before cost* 13.1 
  





Panel B. Total chosen price (ECUs)  
Average 
(SD) 
Tukey Post Hoc test*** Analysis of Variance 
 
 






No cost(1) 7338.8 
(580.7) 









.98(1) <.001(3) .98(4)      
Monetary cost(3) 6732.3 
(899.2) 





1.0(1) .98(2) <.001(3)      
Sequence optimal (before cost)* 9228 
  




Tukey Post Hoc test*** Analysis of Variance 
 






No cost(1) 7338.9 
(580.7) 









<.001(1) .60(3) .51(4)      
Monetary cost(3) 5459.2 
(777.6) 





<.001(1)  .51(2) 1.0(3)      
Net sequence optimal** 7807.0 
   
*The average actual optimal price/position from the sequences used in the experiment prior 
to search cost; averaged across 10 sequences. 
** The average optimal price/position from the sequences used in the experiment after 
search cost; averaged across 10 sequences. 
*** This is the result of pairwise comparisons between two treatments, the small numbers in 
parentheses indicate the treatment compared to. 
Note. SD shows the standard deviation. df refers to the degree of freedom. 
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2.4.1. STOPPING POSITIONS  
To test the hypotheses, I computed the average stopping position for each participant 
across all 10 rounds and compared them between treatments. I observed that participants did 
indeed stop their search earlier in the cost treatments time (both unannounced and 
announced; hypothesis 3a &3b) and monetary costs (hypothesis 1) than in the no cost 
treatment, with the average stopping positions being 10.4, 9.6, 6.4 and 11.6, respectively. 
Thus, on average (averaged across the unannounced and announced time cost treatments) 
the participants search through approximately two fewer offers if the time cost was involved 
and five fewer offers while paying the monetary cost – detailed results were reported in 
Table 2.3 Panel A. The participants in the no cost treatment stopped sooner than in the 
average sequence optimal before cost; the stopping position of the actual optimal offer from 
the sequence employed in the experiment. Both time and monetary cost treatments stopped 
later than the sequence optimal after cost; the stopping position of the highest price 
subtracting the cumulative search cost of each offer.  
Analysis of variance found a significant main effect between the average stopping 
positions; results are reported in Table 2.3 panel A. Tukey HSD post hoc tests showed that 
participants in the no cost treatment chose to stop at a significantly later position than the 
monetary cost (p < .001; hypothesis 1) and announced time cost (with p < .001; hypothesis 
3b) treatments. There was no significant difference found between the no cost and 
unannounced time cost treatments (p = .21; hypothesis 3a). However, the Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test, reported in Table 2.4, detected the difference to be close to statistically 
significant (p = .06). The announced time cost treatment (p < .001, hypothesis 2) had a 
significantly longer search than the monetary cost treatment. Also, there was no significant 
difference found in the amount of search between unannounced and announced time cost 
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treatments (p = .27, hypothesis 4). However, the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, reported in 
Table 2.4, detected the difference to be statistically significant (p = .04). 
2.4.2 OPTIMAL DECISION-MAKING EVALUATION 
To illustrate the impact of search cost on participant’s payoffs, I compared the 
realized participants’ payoffs between treatments. I did so by (a) comparing the total chosen 
prices (ignoring the monetary value of time and the monetary cost spent on searching), and 
(b) after subtracting search costs.  
TOTAL CHOSEN PRICE (ECUS) 
Participants in time cost (averaged across the unannounced and announced, M = 
7365.5) selected the highest total chosen price (ECUs) on average compared to the no cost 
(M = 7338.8) and monetary cost (M = 6732.3), also see Table 2.3 Panel B. Tukey HSD post 
hoc tests confirmed that the monetary cost participants chose a significantly lower total price 
than no cost participants (p < .001). There was no significant difference found between no 
cost and the two time cost treatments (unannounced, p = .98; announced, p = 1.00). Similar 
differences were also found with the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test and reported in Table 2.4. 
NET PAYOFF 
Next, I compared the average net payoffs, which were calculated by taking the chosen price 
for each house and subtracting the monetary value of total time delay experienced to reach 
that offer in the time cost treatments (in both unannounced and announced). For example, if 
the 19th offer was accepted and its value is 500 ECU, the payoff equals 500 ECU − (19×20 
ECU) = 120 ECU, as the participant had to wait for 19 × 5 seconds (and the opportunity 
cost of 5 seconds is 20 ECU as explained earlier). In the monetary cost treatment, if the 19th 
offer is accepted and its value is 500 ECU, the net payoff equals 500 ECU − (19 × 20 ECU) 
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= 120 ECU. So, for the same offer in the same position, both time and monetary cost 
treatments yielded the same net payoff.  
Participants in the monetary cost (M = 5459.2) treatment earned a higher net payoff 
than the time cost treatments (averaged across the unannounced and announced time cost, M 
= 5387.0). Tukey HSD post hoc tests confirmed significant differences between the no cost 
and the three cost treatments (all with p < .001), see Table 2.3 Panel C for more details. 
Similar differences were also found with Kolmogorov–Smirnov test. These results are 
reported in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4 
Summary of statistical findings for the comparison between the no, unannounced time, 
monetary, and announced time cost treatments.  
No cost and monetary cost (hypothesis 1) 
Variables Treatments Average 
(SD) 
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test   
Z p  
Average stopping 
position of 10 
rounds 
No cost 11.6 
(2.8) 
3.1 < .001 






No cost 7338.8 
(580.7) 
2.3 < .001 
Monetary cost 6732.3 
(899.2) 
  
Net payoff  
(ECU) 
No cost 7338.9 
(580.7) 
4.6 < .001 






Monetary cost and announced time cost (hypothesis 2) 
Variables Treatments Average 
(SD) 
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test   
Z p 
Average stopping 
position of 10 
rounds 
Monetary cost 6.4 
(3.5) 









Monetary cost 6732.3 
(899.2) 






Net payoff  
(ECU) 








No cost and unannounced time cost (hypothesis 3a) 
Variables Treatments Average 
(SD) 
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test   
Z p 
Average stopping 
position of 10 
rounds 



















Net payoff  
(ECU) 
No cost 7338.9 
(580.7) 









No cost and announced time cost (hypothesis 3b) 
Variables Treatments Average 
(SD) 
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test   
Z p 
Average stopping 
position of 10 
rounds 



















Net payoff  
(ECU) 
No cost 7338.9 
(580.7) 






Unannounced time cost and announced time cost (hypothesis 4) 
Variables Treatments Average 
(SD) 
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test   
Z p 
Average stopping 







































2.4.3 EVIDENCE OF LEARNING 
A repeated-measures ANOVA with treatments (no, unannounced time, monetary 
and announced time cost) as a between-subjects factor and halves (First vs. Second) as a 
within-subjects factor, detected a significant effect of halves, F(1,184) = 6.63, p = .01, 
MSerror = 3.95, partial eta-squared = .035. The interaction effect between stopping position 
in halves and treatments was not significant, F(3,184) = 2.07, p = .11. Tukey HSD post hoc 
tests comparing the average stopping positions between the first and second half of the 
session showed no significant difference in no cost (p = .32), unannounced time cost (p 
= .99), monetary cost (p = 1.0) and announced time cost (p = .10). The amount of search 
remains consistent throughout the session in all treatments; there was no evidence of further 
shortening the amount of search after learning time delay in unannounced time cost. Figure 




Figure 2.2. The half session average stopping position in the first (round 1–5) and second 
half (round 6–10) of the session for the no-cost, unannounced time cost, monetary cost and 
announced time cost treatments. 
2.4.4 REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
I next analysed potential factors influencing participants’ search behaviour using 
multiple regression. Table 2.5 Panel A represents the results in predicting stopping 
positions, and the results for predicting chosen prices are presented in Table 2.5 Panel B. In 
all four treatments, the last rejected offer prior to acceptance was significant in predicting 
the participants’ stopping position. In the no cost and time cost treatments (unannounced 







































But, the reverse was true in the monetary cost treatment. Also, in the no cost and the time 
cost (unannounced and announced) treatments, the higher the price they rejected in the 
sequence, the sooner the participants stopped. Yet, in the monetary cost treatment, the 
higher the price they have rejected, the longer they searched. For all four treatments, when 
participants have accepted higher prices in the previous round, they conducted more 
searches in the current round. For the unannounced time cost treatment, the longer the 
participants searched in the previous round, the less they searched in the current round. But, 
the reverse was true in the monetary cost treatment.   
Interestingly, one highly significant factor was found in predicting the price that the 
participant chose in all four treatments. The highest seen offer was the best predicting factor 
in the no cost and time cost (unannounced and announced) treatments. The participants 
chose higher prices when they had seen a higher price from the previously reviewed 
sequence. Yet, the last rejected offer prior to acceptance was the only significant factor in 
predicting chosen price in the monetary cost treatment. When there was a monetary cost, 
people made decisions from a shorter term perspective (the most recent rejected price) than 





Coefficients of multiple regression for the tested factors in the no-cost, unannounced time 
cost, monetary cost and announced time cost treatments. 
Panel A. Stopping position as the predicting variable 
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Panel B. Chosen price as the predicting variable 






























































Note. Coef. refers to the standardized coefficient of the tested factors. 
2.5. DISCUSSION 
I investigated the effect of time and monetary cost on search behaviour. The 
implemented sequential search task was framed as selling houses, which in everyday life is 
a time-consuming process. I first conducted simulations to show how (monetary) search cost 
should lead to a shorter search in my experimental setting, and which, if participants 
considered the opportunity cost of time, should have a similar effect to time cost. The 
experiment confirms the simulation results as the participants did indeed search less when 
the monetary search cost was introduced as an experimental manipulation (hypothesis 1). 
People also conducted less search when there was a monetary cost than a time cost 
(hypothesis 2). When incurring a time delay, people searched less than in the no cost 
treatment when there was a prior announcement of the delay (hypothesis 3b) but not when 
there was no such announcement (hypothesis 3a). However, when comparing the amount of 
search between announced and unannounced time delay, the statistical tests yielded both 
significant and non-significant findings (hypothesis 4). This suggests that the search 
behaviour may be influenced by the time search cost even without having announced it prior 
to the search. 
I observed that participants in the time and monetary cost treatments stop their 
search later than the simulation suggests. This may not be surprising in the unannounced 
time cost treatment, given that participants had to infer the time delay through experience. 
Despite this conservative design feature, a result is observed with the Kolmogorov–Smirnov 
test that is close to statistically significant. (The simulation was based on being fully 
informed about the existence and magnitude of the announced time cost). However, there 
was no evidence of learning and further shortening the search in the unannounced time cost 
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treatment, as there was no significant difference in the stopping position between the first 
and second half of session in all treatments. The shortening effect was indeed stronger when 
the delay was pre-announced at the beginning of the experiment, and yet it was still smaller 
than the simulation predicts.  
There are at least two potential underlying causes for the difference between the 
observed amount of search of time and monetary costs. First, the perceived value of 
participants’ time might not equal their actual opportunity cost of time (the way I calculated 
it and used in the time cost treatments). Some previous research also reports that money and 
time are processed differently (Lee, Lee, Bertini, Zauberman & Ariely, 2015). A 10-second 
delay treatment was conducted prior to the 5-second delay treatment, and over half of the 
participants dropped out of the experiment in that session. People who stayed for the whole 
session had the average stopping position of 6.9. This potentially suggests that people treat 
time and monetary costs in different ways. When time cost is too much to afford, people 
refuse to pay it instead of trying to minimise it the way they would with monetary cost. 
Second, the implemented framing of selling houses might have interacted with the 
perception of time cost (and its monetary value as calculated in the monetary cost 
treatment). This second explanation is in line with the demonstrated finding that different 
frames can elicit systematically different decisions (see, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), 
and in some cases, people make better decisions with frame than without (see Experiment 
Three for reference). Housing is usually associated with positive images (e.g., comfort, 
security, childhood memories) and when something is being perceived more positively, it 
may also be perceived as more important, something more worth doing; that is, the halo 
effect (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Kahneman, 2011), hence they may be more inclined to 
invest more time, therefore search longer than they would if only the experimental payoffs 
were taken into account, as in the simulation.   
59 
 
3. A HOUSE-SELLING CONTEXT IMPROVES 
DECISION MAKING FROM A SEQUENCE OF 
OFFERS. EXPERIMENT TWO.  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Information, experience and knowledge are meaningless without considering the 
context. For example, the decision to drive 50 kilometres per hour can be either hazardous 
or cautious. It may be hazardous to drive at a speed of 50 kilometres per hour in bad weather 
and it may be cautious to drive at the same speed on a sunny day. Previous research has 
shown that decisions are sensitive to how the context is worded or framed (e.g., Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981; McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky, 1982; Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987; 
Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, & Smith, 1994; Dufwenberg, Gächter & Hennig-Schmidt, 
2011). Framing a context is known to have an effect that makes people’s decisions or 
behaviour change systematically, based on the description given. The question is: Do people 
make better decisions in a context? For example, they might solve more problems. There is 
evidence that framing improves decisions in various tasks (e.g., Griggs & Cox, 1982; 
Sugiyama, Tooby, Cosmides, 2002; Cosmides, Barret & Tooby, 2010). This ability to make 
better decisions under context can be explained by the dual-processing theory. Dual-
processing theory proposes that most daily decisions are made by associating a new 
situation with existing knowledge in similar experiences, rather than forming new 
knowledge and information for each new experience (Kahneman, 2003). Therefore, people 
can use existing schemas that contain effective strategies constructed from previous 
experiences to make decisions. However, it is not clear how much information is necessary 
to activate this process. In this experiment, I test whether providing a house-selling context 
in a variant of the secretary problem does result in better decisions than without the context. 
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The contribution can be viewed as extending the empirical analysis of the context-framing 
effect to the domain of schema activation.  
A schema is a system of organising and perceiving new information, which is then 
encoded as the default assumptions of the world. Schemas forms mental structures that 
describe how the world works, and how we interact with the world (see Bower, & Cirilo, 
1985; Dimaggio, 1997; Narvaez & Bock, 2002, for more details). For example, when 
someone holds a schema that maximising profit is the best approach for making decisions, 
he or she will consistently re-apply this schema in various economic decisions. Since every 
decision is made within a context, it is therefore, crucial to understand the link between the 
information needed in a context and the implications for decision making.  
Is there any existing evidence that would suggest that people make better decisions 
in a context? Behavioural literature does provide such evidence in various domains. For 
example, Griggs and Cox (1982) found that people were more likely to solve a reasoning 
problem correctly when framed as a drinking-age problem than as an abstract, context-free 
problem. Similar results were obtained by Pollard and Evans (1987). The same reasoning 
problem is also more likely to be solved correctly when framed as a social exchange 
problem than as an abstract, context-free problem (e.g., Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1992; Cosmides & Tooby, 2005; Cosmides, Barret & Tooby, 2010). In a similar 
fashion, Eger and Dickhaut (1982) found that accounting students performed better in a 
probability judgement task that was framed in an accounting context than as an abstract, 
context-free problem.  
Although different contexts can lead to different decisions, the issue of how much 
information in a context is necessary to change behaviour remains unknown. In this chapter, 
I experimentally examine whether the presence of a simple context without descriptions also 
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facilitates better performance. This experiment can therefore provide evidence of whether a 
context without description does indeed lead to better decisions by the participants, and 
empirically supports the result of Pollard and Evans (1987; albeit in a different type of task) 
that the description of a context does not facilitate better decisions. However, no previous 
studies have considered the effect of context on the secretary problem or any other 
sequential decision-making task. 
The human brain is often thought to be the result of an evolutionary process to 
resolve problems and enhance survival back in the Stone Age as hunter-gatherers 
(Cosmides, Tooby, 1992). The brain enables a collection of cognitive mechanisms that 
guide our behaviour and decision making. For example, cooperation is found in both babies 
and chimpanzees (Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello, 2006), altruistic behaviours in babies at 
14 months of age (Warneken & Tomasello, 2007), as is the concept of object permanence in 
infants (Baillargeon, & DeVos, 1991) and monkeys (Churchland, Chou & Lisberger, 2003). 
These mechanisms are likely acquired through evolution to better solve problems and 
survive. To bear in mind the context while making a decision is possibly one of these 
mechanisms. Consider this scenario: Approximately 500,000 years ago, a Homo sapiens is 
resting in the bush after a long day of work and sees a shadow of a rock with a long rope 
attached. What is the likely response? Options are (1) Keep resting, (2) Escape from the 
bush. The Homo sapiens who decides to escape has taken into account the context when 
making that decision; predatory animals are often found in the bush, and they tend to first 
hide to observe the target before attacking. Those who do not consider the context, would 
not make the decision to escape, and they would be less likely to survive and pass down 
their genes. Yet, even now, there is no definite theory explaining the effect of context 
framing; nor does the mathematically derived optimal decision rule account for the effect of 
context in making decisions. The gap between theory and actual behaviour, that is, stopping 
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prior to the theoretical optimal, may be because the optimal decision rule fails to account for 
the effect of context. 
3.1.1 DIFFERENT DECISIONS UNDER DIFFERENT CONTEXT FRAMES 
A long line of research has found that decisions change under different context 
frames (e.g., Levin & Gaeth, 1988; Duchon, Dunegan & Barton, 1989; Gamliel & Peer, 
2010). An early study of the issue is that of Kahneman and Tversky (1984), who explored 
how different phrasing with the same outcome affected people’s preference in hypothetical 
life-and-death decision-making scenarios. The decision was presented to participants either 
with positive framing, for example, 2 of 3 people would live or with negative framing, 1 of 
3 people would die. They found that although the outcome was the same in both scenarios, 
most people preferred the positively framed scenario that presented as how many people 
would live instead of die.  
Dual-processing theory has been proposed by numerous researchers to explain why 
different decisions result from how the problem is framed (e.g., Kahneman, 2003; Evans, 
2008). These dual-processing theorists propose that the decision-making process relies on 
both intuitive/heuristic and analytic/executive processes. System one involves implicit 
(unconscious) processing that uses intuitive and heuristic forms of reasoning that operate in 
most of our everyday reasoning and decision making. It is a domain-specific and 
contextualised, fast, and automatic response requiring very little effort. System two involves 
explicit (conscious) processing; these analytic/executive operations tend to be slow, 
controlled, serial and effortful (De Neys, 2006). The context framing effect can be caused 
by different decision-making schemas belonging to system one.  
Some schemas are activated chronically due to the regular contact of environmental 
context (Bargh, Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988). For example, when an individual learns from 
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repeatedly looking for a car-parking space that is closest to the destination, he or she learns 
that a certain way facilitates finding the best parking space, and other ways do not. These 
schemas are activated involuntarily. They are formed from previous experiences and are 
then used to organise or integrate new information (see Bower, & Cirilo, 1985; Dimaggio, 
1997; Narvaez & Bock, 2002, for more detailed discussion on schemas). Once schemas are 
formed, they operate constantly in the brain and are activated by stimuli that resemble the 
stimuli that were present when the schema was first created (see Higgins & Chaires, 1980 
Narvaez, & Bock, 2002 for more detail). To return to the previous example. If the 
experiences of finding car-parking spaces couple with experiences in searching for the best 
car to buy within a given price range, the brain may form a fuller mental model of how to 
make sequential search decisions generally. This may then be activated when a similar 
situation, for example, finding an apartment, arises. Heider and Simmel (1944) found 
evidence to support the hypothesis of re-applying existing schema to explain a new 
experience. In their experiment, the participants watched a short animated film. The film 
had a motionless large square with a door that opens and closes in one side. First, a big 
triangle appeared inside the square, then a small triangle and circle appeared. As the door 
flapped open and shut, the geometric figures slid around the screen. After ninety seconds or 
so, the small triangle and the small circle disappeared, and the big triangle breaks down the 
big square.2. 
After the participants watched the animated film, they were asked to describe what 
they saw. Only 3 of 114 participants reported seeing geometric shapes moving around a 
screen. The majority reported a narrative and attributed agency and intent to the shapes: for 
example, a romance story between the small triangle and the small circle, the big triangle is 
                                                 
2 The complete film can be watched on YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = VTNmLt7QX8E 
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the angry parent who wants to separate them, and so on. This experiment demonstrated that 
people can explain a new situation using a similar, existing mental structure or schema. 
Although we may feel we are experiencing novelty every day, the novelty is perceived and 
interpreted by existing schemas without consciously processed in the brain (Wegner & 
Wheathey, 1999).  
3.1.2 EVIDENCE OF MAKING BETTER DECISIONS WITH CONTEXT.  
Just as a schema can be activated through the same or a similar stimulus encountered 
in previous experiences, making decisions in a context allows us to effectively resolve 
problems and make decisions without starting from scratch every time. Experimentation on 
the Wason selection task demonstrates how context framing enhances people's ability to 
solve problems. The Wason selection task is a logic puzzle to test deductive reasoning. The 
participant is presented a set of four cards placed on a table, where each card has a number 
on one side and a letter on the other side. The visible faces of the cards show A, D, 4 and 7. 
Which card(s) must you turn over in order to test the truth of the proposition that if a card 
has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on the other side?  
Only 5 % of the participants were able to solve the context-free problem correctly 
(Johnson-Laird & Wason, 1970). A drastic increase in accuracy is consistently reported in 
versions of the task that involve a social exchange to detect cheaters (e.g., Cosmides, 1989; 
Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Cosmides & Tooby, 2005; Cosmides, Barret & Tooby, 2010), 
cross-cultural experiments with the SchiWiar of Ecuadorian Amazonia (Sugiyama, Tooby, 
Cosmides, 2002), and as a drinking-age problem (Griggs & Cox, 1982). Griggs and Cox 
reported that when people were asked to solve the problem as a drinking-age problem, 73% 
of them were able to solve it correctly. In this form of the problem, the task framed the 
problem as a police officer who is ensuring drinking-age regulations are being followed in a 
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bar. The participants were presented with 4 cards, each with information about one person 
in a bar. One side of a card tells a person's age and on the other side is what the person is 
drinking. The task is to identify the card(s) that violate this rule: If a person is drinking beer, 
then the person must be over 19 years of age.  
3.1.3 HOW MUCH INFORMATION DO WE NEED TO ACTIVATE EXISTING SCHEMA?  
Pollard and Evans (1987) argued that two different aspects that change between the 
context-free problem and the context-framed problem can potentially contribute to better 
performance. For example, the drinking-age problem provides content (drinks and age), as 
well as the context or scenario (policeman checking patrons’ age in a bar), within which this 
content is relevant. Pollard and Evans (1987) demonstrated experimentally that both the 
relevant content and context of the drinking-age problem were necessary to facilitate an 
increase in accurate responses. However, they suggested that context may be a stronger 
contributor to people’s performance than content.  
3.1.4 HYPOTHESIS 
The following experiment was set up to examine how much information is necessary 
to facilitate better decisions. To the best of my knowledge, whether information in a context 
is required to elicit better decision making has not been tested experimentally, although the 
context is presented in every decision. Nor, to my knowledge has the effect of context 
framing been explored in the secretary problem. For this experiment, the manipulated 
variable is the degree of context from an issue encountered in everyday life. The basic task 
provides a house-selling context in which the participants earn payoffs based on the offers 
they accept, and the offers are presented sequentially. Measures of how good the decision is 
can then be based on the stopping position and total earnings. I assume that the participants 
are risk-neutral decision makers and that they aim to maximise their expected payoffs. The 
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first hypothesis, formulated with reference to experiments on the Wason selection task, is 
that people make better decisions when presented with a context than without. 
Theoretically, this would be because having a context allows one to better assess the 
situation and access existing schema constructed from a similar experience, for example, 
selling a car or even buying and selling a house in real life. When there is no context 
available, the person experiences difficulty in determining what schema to apply and the 
chance of applying an inappropriate schema is increased. Thus, treatments with a house-
selling context are expected to produce higher total earnings and closer to the optimal 
amount of search than the no context treatment. 
Furthermore, it is possible that having a fairly complete description of the house – 
for example, floor area, number of bedrooms, the year the house was built – is also critical 
in making better decisions, and yet such information could also be confusing and 
distracting, resulting in misuse of the information. Some of the house information could be 
perceived by the participants to play a bigger role in determining the house value than other 
information. In line with Pollard and Evans (1987), I hypothesise that having content does 
not facilitate better decisions. Thus, the total earnings and stopping position are expected to 
be the same in the two house-selling context treatments: those with and without the house 
description. 
Overall, in line with previous research, I hypothesised that (1) people make better 
decisions with a house-selling context than in the treatment with no context; (2) quality of 
decisions when presented in a house-selling context with house information is no different 




3.2 METHOD  
3.2.1 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The experiment aimed to analyse the effect of context on search activity in a 
sequential decision-making task. The experiment consisted of three treatments implemented 
in an across-subject design, varying the context of the task. The available price offers were 
identical throughout all the treatments. More details on the price offers are presented in 
Table 3.1. In the house with information treatment (henceforth house with info), the 
experiment is framed as a selling-house task (the house with info treatment is also reported 
in Experiment One as the treatment with no cost), the selling house instructions read as 
follows (also see Appendix 2.A): 
“You will participate in 10 scenarios, in which you will be selling houses. In each 
scenario, you will be asked to decide whether to accept or reject a price offer for a particular 
house. You will be given a brief description of the house that will be followed by a series of 
price offers. The price offers are randomly generated by the computer and available one at a 
time. Once a price offer is presented, you can either accept or reject it. If you accept the 
price offer, the house will be sold at the price you accepted. All sales are final. If you reject 
the price offer, the offer will disappear; you cannot go back to the previously rejected offer. 
In total there are 20 price offers available for each house; if you have not accepted an offer 
prior to the 20th offer, you will be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the final) offer. Therefore, 
make your decisions carefully. There is no time limit on how long the price offers will be 
available for, so take as long as you need to evaluate each offer.” 
There were two practice rounds followed by 10 paid rounds. A description of a 
house, consisting of the floor area, the number of bedrooms, suburb, and year the house was 
built, was presented prior to the price offer in the house with info treatment. Each round 
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featured a different house description, and a different randomized sequence of price offers. 
The details of mean and standard deviation of the price offers are provided in Table 3.1. All 
the house descriptions used in the experiment were taken from houses sold in October 2014 
in 12 different Christchurch suburbs. This information was obtained from the Quotable 
Value Limited database (qv. co. nz).  
The house frame treatment (henceforth house frame) employs an identical 
instruction to the house with info treatment, except that no description of the houses was 
presented prior to the price offers (also see Appendix 3.A.)  
In the no context treatment (henceforth no context), the experiment description 
instructions explained that the task was to choose a number, without any selling-house 
framing, description, or indeed mention, of a house. The instructions for the no context 
treatment were as follows (Also see Appendix 3.B):  
“You will participate in 10 rounds. In each round, you will be asked to decide 
whether to accept or reject a number. The numbers are randomly generated by the computer 
and available one at a time. Once a number is presented, you can either accept or reject it. If 
you accept the number, you receive the amount represented by the number (in experimental 
currency units, as will be explained below). All decisions are final. If you reject the number, 
the number will disappear; you cannot go back to the previously rejected number. In total 
there are 20 numbers available; if you have not accepted a number prior to the 20th number, 
you will be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the final) number. Therefore, make your decisions 
carefully.” 
The no context treatment also had two practice rounds and 10 paid rounds. 
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All sequencing and numerical information was identical across the three treatments. 
Thus, only ten randomised sequences of numbers were employed in the entire experiment; 
Table 3.1 shows detailed information on the sequences employed.  
Table 3.1 
Data for the price offer sequences employed in the experiment.  
Variable Sequence optimal Predicted optimal Min. Average 
price 
SD 
Round Position Price Position Price 
1 8 848 8 848 276 509.6 165.4 
2 10 875 8 818 2 469.2 284.4 
3 10 708 10 708 207 437.6 147.2 
4 20 733 20 733 267 518.5 145.5 
5 13 578 10 484 186 331.2 114.4 
6 10 1574 9 1400 89 714.3 447.4 
7 19 581 19 581 197 369.2 128.1 
8 3 966 20 541 250 636.4 234.4 
9 14 1740 12 1264 105 756.4 396.2 
10 4 625 20 553 250 440.4 101.3 
Average 11.1 922.8 13.6 793.0 183 518.3 216.4 
Notes. Sequence optimal position = the position at which the highest price presents in the 
sequence employed; Sequence optimal price = the highest price value in each round, also 
the maximum; Predicted optimal position = the stopping position predicted by the optimal 
stopping rule – the stopping rule that yields the highest earning, see Appendix 3.C for more 
details; Predicted optimal price = the price at the position predicted by the optimal stopping 
rule, refer to Appendix 3.C for details. Min. = the lowest price in each round. Average price 
= the average price in the sequence employed for each round. SD = the standard deviation 
of 20 price offers in each round.   
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3.2.2 PROCEDURES AND PARTICIPANTS 
One hundred and thirty-seven students from the University of Canterbury in 
Christchurch, New Zealand participated in the experiment, which was run at New Zealand 
Experimental Economics Laboratory (NZEEL). A total of 46 students participated in the no 
context treatment, 43 and 48 students participated in the house frame and house with info 
respectively. A session lasted on average forty-five minutes and the participants earned 
NZD12.1 on average. The average earning in the no context frame is NZD11.8, both house 
frame and house with info receive NZD12.3. The total price chosen by the participant in 
ECU is then converted into New Zealand dollars using the conversion rate of 1000 ECU to 
1 New Zealand dollar and is explained in the written instructions. The payoff protocol was 
single-blind, meaning that the experimenter was able to match participant decisions to their 
identity. The remaining procedural details were identical to Experiment One.  
3.3 RESULTS 
First, I considered the average results obtained from the experiment. The average 
results examined the two dependent variables that assess the quality of the decision making. 
Then I examined whether people improved their decisions over time, by comparing the 
decisions in the first and second half of the session. Finally, I deduced correlation results 
between the search activities and the chosen prices.  
There were two dependent variables. First, the amount of search exerted in the task 
for different treatments, that is, the position in the sequence where the participant accepts 
the offers (henceforth stopping position) was evaluated. Second, the amount of money they 
earned, the cumulative sum of 10 chosen prices obtained by accepting the offers (henceforth 
total chosen price) was used. The price offer/number is presented in ECU. The results 
relating to these two dependent variables are shown in Table 3.2 (Panels A, B respectively). 
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Table 3.2  
Experiment summary statistics and between treatments statistical tests. 
Panel A. Stopping position   
Average SD Tukey Post Hoc 
test*** 
Analysis of Variance 
 








9.8 3.6 .07(2) .015(3) 4.3 
(2, 134) 
9.4 .015 .06 
House 
framing(2) 
11.2 2.8 .07(1) .60(3) 
      
House with 
info(3) 
11.6 2.8 .015(1) .60(2) 
      
Sequence optimal* 11.1 
      
Predicted optimal** 13.6 
      
Panel B. Total chosen price (ECU)  
Average SD Tukey Post Hoc 
test*** 
Analysis of Variance 
 








6880.3 750.0 .005(2) <.001(3) 8.1 
(2, 134) 
.00003 <.001 .11 
House 
framing(2) 
7269.5 361.4 .005(1) .84(3) 
     
House with 
info(3) 
7338.9 580.7 <.001(1) .84(2) 
      
Sequence optimal*  9228.0 
      
Predicted optimal**  7930.0 
      
*Sequence optimal refers to the actual optimal position/price from the sequences used in the 
experiment, more details in Appendix 2.D. (Average column 2 in Table 3.1 shows the 
stopping position, average column 3 in Table 3.1 shows the average price for 10 houses.) 
** This is the predicted result from applying the optimal decision rule presented in 
Appendix 3.C. (Average column 4 in Table 3.1 shows the stopping position, average 
column 5 in Table 3.1 shows the average price for 10 houses.) 
*** This is the result of pairwise comparisons between two treatments; the small numbers in 
parentheses indicate the treatment compared to. 
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Note. SD shows the standard deviation, df refers to the degree of freedom. 
3.3.1 OPTIMAL DECISION-MAKING EVALUATION 
STOPPING POSITION 
Participants in the no context treatment chose to stop at a significantly earlier 
average position (M = 9.8) than those in house frame (M = 11.2) and house with info (M = 
11.6). Tukey HSD post hoc tests showed a significant difference between no context and 
house with info treatment (p = .015, hypothesis 1), and a finding that was close to 
significant between no context and house frame (p = .07, hypothesis 1). There was no 
significant difference between house frame and house with info (p = .60, hypothesis 2). 
(Similar results were obtained from non-parametric test, Kolmogorov–Smirnov test; see 
Appendix 3.D.) Thus, participants invested in fewer searches when no context was given. 
As a result, no context stopped their search approximately 1.3 positions prior to the 
sequence optimal position (M = 11.1), which is approximately 11.7% less. In contrast, the 
house frame and house with info treatments on average were only approximately 0.3 
positions more than the sequence optimal position, which is only approximately 2.7% away 
from the optimal (Table 3.2 panel A).  
TOTAL CHOSEN PRICE (ECU) 
Participants in house with info selected the highest total chosen price (ECU) on 
average (M = 7338.9) compared with those in the house frame (M = 7269.5) and no context 
(M = 6880.3) frame. On average, the house-selling context treatments (averaged across 
house frame and house with info) yielded approximately 80% of the maximum total price 
(which is the sum of the highest price in 10 rounds), and no context earned approximately 
75%. Analyses of variances showed a significant main effect of treatment on the average 
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total chosen price, as shown in Table 3.2 Panel B. Tukey HSD post hoc tests confirmed 
significant differences between the total chosen price in the no context and the other two 
treatments (the house frame: p = .005, and house with info: p < .001, hypothesis 1). There 
was no significant difference between house frame and house with info (p = .84, hypothesis 
2). (Similar differences were also found with the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test; See Appendix 
3.D.) 
3.3.2 DOES CONTEXT FRAMING EFFECT LAST? 
STOPPING POSITION 
Next, to examine the duration of the context framing effect, decisions on the first 
half (rounds 1–5) of the session were compared to the second half (rounds 6–10) of the 
session. First, I computed the average stopping position for each participant across the first 
half and second half of the session and compared the results across the treatments (no 
context, house frame, and house with info). Results are presented in Table 3.3. Analysis of 
variance results showed that there was a significant main effect between the average 
stopping positions in the halves (first or second), and the frames (no context, house frame or 
house with info). Participants in the second half of the session stopped significantly earlier 
than in the first half. There is also a statistically significant (p = .007) interactive effect 
found between the frames and session halves. This result indicates that the inferior decisions 
of people without context increases rather than decreases in the long term. The results are 





Figure 3.1. The average stopping position averaged across participants in the first half of 
session (rounds 1–5) and the second half of session (rounds 6–10) in the no context, house 














































Summary of statistical findings for the session halves and the treatments.  
 
  Analysis of Variance   
F df MS error p Partial ƞ2 
Stopping 
position 




5.1 2, 134  .007 .07 
Total chosen 
price 




1.6 2, 134  .21 .02 
Note. df refers to the degree of freedom 
TOTAL CHOSEN PRICE 
The total chosen prices for each participant across the first half (rounds 1–5) and 
second half (6–10) of the session were computed and compared across treatments (no 
context, house frame, and house with info). Results are graphically presented in Figure 3.2. 
Analysis of variance results showed that there is a significant main effect between the total 
chosen price in the session halves (first or second), and the frames (no context, house frame 
or house with info), but the interaction effect was not significant (p = .21). Results are 





Figure 3.2. The average total chosen price averaged across participant in the first half 
(rounds 1–5) and second half (6–10) sessions in the no context, house frame and house with 
info treatments. 
3.3.3 PEARSON CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
Pearson correlation analysis was used to examine the relationship between the 
average stopping positions, the total chosen prices and the optimal prices count. The average 
stopping positions were obtained by averaging 10 stopping position across each participant 
within treatments. The total chosen prices were obtained from each participant by adding up 
the 10 prices they selected. The optimal prices count was obtained by adding the number of 





































In general, there is a positive and significant correlation between the number of 
rounds in which the optimal price is selected and the total chosen price for all three 
treatments (r = .57, p < .001). This is expected because the optimal price is the highest price 
in each round, and selecting more rounds of optimal price should result in choosing higher 
total prices. There is a large positive and significant correlation between the length of the 
search and the chosen price (r = .61, p < .001), as well as the optimal price count (r = .24, 
p = .005). The longer the participants searched, the more optimal prices they selected. The 
longer the participants searched in the experiment, the higher their chosen prices. They 
make more optimal decisions with more searches. However, individual correlation analysis 
for each treatment shows this is not always true in the treatments with context frame (house 
frame, r = .12, p = 44, house with info, r = .56, p < .001 respectively). Only the house with 
info treatment shows a significant positive correlation.  
3.4 DISCUSSION 
This study investigated the effect of context on sequential search decisions. The 
implemented sequential search task was framed as selling houses, which is a significant life 
decision. The experiment confirms hypothesis 1, as the participants indeed chose higher 
prices and were closer to the optimal amount of search when the house-selling context was 
introduced as an experimental manipulation. This result was consistent with the conjectured 
explanation that having a context can potentially activate existing schemas that enhance the 
decision-making ability, which is commonly observed in previous reasoning task 
experiments.  
One might think that, without a context, people would conduct a longer search, 
which allows them to collect sufficient information prior to making decisions. However, this 
was not found in this experiment. There are several possible underlying reasons. First, 
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perhaps, people are more emotionally attached to houses, therefore more willing to conduct 
more searches. Second, people may expect buying and selling houses to take longer. Third, 
people may behave more randomly (after applying inappropriate schemas) without a 
context, and hence do not explore different possibilities properly. 
Furthermore, this experiment also confirmed hypothesis 2 that the descriptive 
information did not add value to the effect of context. Perhaps people already stored this 
information and knowledge in their mental structure or schema, and activating the schema 
allowed access to this information. In any case, simply stating the context of the decision 
seemed sufficient to facilitate performance.  
There was a long-lasting effect of making inferior decisions when there was no 
context. People without a context moved still further away from the optimal amount of 
search in the second half of the session and consistently chose lower prices. There are at 
least two potential underlying causes for making inferior decisions when there is no context. 
First, without a context, system one is unable to effectively associate a new experience with 
existing knowledge and strategies that we have obtained from past experiences in a similar 
situation. This means participants would need to come up with the strategy in the 
experiment through trial and error; hence the larger variation found in their search 
behaviours (see the standard deviations in Table 3.2). Second, people do not know the 
quality of their decisions until they have reviewed all the offers, and yet they cannot go back 
to the previously rejected offers. This makes it difficult to identify an effective strategy 
during the experiment, particularly when there is no context.   
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4. WHY DO PEOPLE SEARCH TOO LITTLE? NOT 
ENOUGH TIME, OR TRYING TO AVOID 
REGRET? EXPERIMENT THREE. 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study investigated why people make suboptimal decisions of early stopping in 
the sequential search problem. I also investigated whether individuals choose according to 
the “classical” optimal stopping rule in this sequential search problem when the decision-
making situations are framed as selling houses or hiring secretaries, and how these decisions 
are affected by adding a time delay. I also investigated whether regret or overconfidence 
causes the early stopping behaviour. 
Decisions regarding buying or selling a house are something that people have 
experienced in their lives or may do so. People do not have the opportunity to learn the best 
way of making these decisions. The consequence of mistakes in making decisions regarding 
houses can be long-lasting and severe. Investigating how people make decisions in selling 
houses and examining the underlying rationales for making suboptimal decisions can help 
improve the quality of decisions and of wellbeing. As mentioned previously, time search 
cost is a critical part of any sequential search problem, as it is unavoidable in any type of 
search activity. However, the underlying causes for early stopping might not always be the 
time search cost involved; there can be other, more psychological costs, such as regret or 
overconfidence.  
4.1.1. FEELING OF REGRET  
It was stated in the general introduction that employing the classical stopping rule, 
or indeed any stopping rule that separates an information set of candidates from a set of 
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available offers, can fail in two different ways. For example, in the secretary problem, 
failure may occur because one misses out on a good candidate who is encountered in the 
information set or because one chooses a suboptimal candidate early during the rejection 
phase. The cost of the two errors can be objectively determined, but there is also a 
subjective factor which suggests that the first type of failure might incur a higher 
psychological cost: the feeling of regret.  
The feeling of regret as a psychological factor in decision making has been studied 
extensively (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002). Regret is a cognitive and emotional state of 
feeling sorrow and loss from what could have been achieved (Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der 
Pligt, & de Vries, 1996). Ritov and Baron (1995) investigated experimentally the feeling of 
regret after participants made decisions in different frames. Their results suggest that the 
participants experienced a higher level of regret over an action that resulted in negative 
outcomes compared with inaction with the same negative outcomes, and that was because 
taking an action can be perceived as a cause of such negative outcomes. This leads to the 
next question: whether the feeling of control influences the feeling of regret. The answer 
seems to be no. Researchers found that whether people have control over an outcome makes 
little difference to the feeling of regret they experienced (Connolly, Ordóñez, & Coughlan, 
1997; Zeelenberg, van Dijk & Manstead, 1998). While the feeling of regret is viewed as a 
consequence of making a decision, anticipation of regret is found to also affect decisions 
(Simonson, 1992). According to regret theory (e.g., Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982), 
when decision makers are given the outcomes of the alternative offer that they have passed 
over, they are more likely to anticipate the feeling of regret, and this anticipation of regret 
influences their decisions prior to making them. People alter their future decisions based on 
a feeling of regret, but current decisions are based on whether they anticipate regret.  
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People are found to anticipate regret when they expect they will be able to compare 
the outcomes; for example, a good versus bad outcome, from passing over an option 
(Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004). Zeelenberg and Pieters investigated regret in two kinds of 
lotteries: The National State Lottery and the Postcode Lottery in Netherlands. The National 
State Lottery is a traditional lottery where people purchase a lottery ticket that is assigned a 
random number. Alternatively, one's postcode becomes the ticket number in a Postcode 
lottery (where the country has very precise postcodes). Thus, people who did not purchase a 
ticket in the Postcode lottery may still find out that they would have won if they had played. 
The results show that people anticipated a higher level of regret in the Postcode Lottery 
where they can find out about the positive outcome when not playing, compared with the 
National State Lottery. As this research shows, the level of anticipated post-decisional regret 
that people can experience is influenced by the ability to compare the outcomes, and it 
further influences decisions on purchasing lottery tickets.  
Ultimately, people want to minimize regret when making decisions, including both 
regret and anticipated regret. If one turns down a candidate and nothing better is offered 
later in the secretary problem, the manager will be aware that she has passed over a better 
candidate. If she accepts a candidate early on, then the manager will not subsequently find 
out about the later, better candidate that is yet to come. Thus, these two possible sub-optimal 
decisions may not have the same psychological effect. The first will produce more 
anticipated regret than the second. After rejecting a few candidates, a decision to pass over 
more candidates is much more likely to produce anticipated regret than a decision to accept 
(cf. Loomes & Sugden, 1982; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997). 
People can anticipate regretting their decision and adjust their behaviour accordingly 
by choosing earlier and reducing the size of the information set. In addition to this general 
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prediction, consideration of regret leads us to make a more specific one. Under the classical 
stopping rule, if the best candidate is in the information set, the manager is forced to choose 
the final candidate. On average this final candidate will indeed be average – less good than 
half of the candidates already seen – and this could be expected to produce a high level of 
regret. I therefore predicted that there should be great reluctance to choose this candidate 
and that the probability of this happening experimentally should be considerably less than 
predicted by the classical stopping rule: approx. 0. 37% if n → ∞. 
4.1.2. FEELING OF OVERCONFIDENCE  
Another possible psychological cause for choosing sub-optimally is overconfidence. 
The overconfidence bias is a tendency in which individuals’ subjective confidence in their 
judgments or abilities is systematically and persistently higher than their objective accuracy 
(Pallier et al. 2002). Keren (1997) attributes overconfidence to two possible causes: 
cognitive and motivational. Kahneman and Tversky (1996) claimed that overconfidence 
bias is a cognitive bias, because people often rely on judgmental heuristics to make 
decisions. The motivational source indicates that overconfidence serves as a self-motivating 
mechanism in that it fulfils ones needs to believe in one’s efficacy to make progress.  
Studies have long shown that people are frequently overconfident about their 
physical talent (Moore & Small, 2007), occupational expertise (Haun, Zeringue, Leach, & 
Foley, 2000), and social skill (Swann & Gill, 1997). Consequently, overconfidence can have 
detrimental effects on performance and decision making. Excess entry/trading in the 
financial market (Trinugroho & Sembel, 2011) and company failure (Camerer & Lovallo, 
1999) are some of the major issues that have been reported as being associated with 
overconfident decision making.  
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In regard to understanding the effects of overconfidence, it is vital to identify what 
constitutes overconfidence. A study by Hilton et al. (2011) suggested that overconfidence is 
not a single construct, but rather built up of multiple constructs. There are two major aspects 
underlying the concept of overconfidence: miscalibration and positive illusion. 
Miscalibration is a type of cognitive bias that explains the tendency to overestimate the 
accuracy of people’s knowledge (Michailova, 2011). Typically, in studies on calibration, 
participants are asked to answer a series of general knowledge questions by choosing from 
two or more possible answers and to state their confidence of being correct for each answer 
between 50% (for two options) and 100%. Calibration is calculated by taking the percentage 
of questions a participant has answered correctly minus the participant’s average confidence 
in the answers to these questions. Individuals are believed to be accurately calibrated if, 
over time, the percentage confidence responses by the participant match with the actual 
accuracy (Adams, 1957). Still, people consistently demonstrate overconfidence with their 
miscalibration; the proportion of accurate answers is significantly lower than the proportion 
estimated by the participants. For example, Oskamp (1962) studied the diagnosis of clinical 
psychologists and found a major discrepancy between the level of confidence (53%) 
expressed by clinical psychologists and their diagnosis accuracy rate (28%). Furthermore, 
their confidence in their decisions grows with experience, and results in further deviation, 
while their accuracy remains the same. Miscalibration was measured by Deaves, Lüders and 
Luo, (2009) through a general knowledge task. For each general knowledge question, the 
participants estimated the upper and lower bounds of the 90% confidence interval in which 
the actual numerical answer would fall. Overconfidence was calculated by taking the 
percentage of times that the confidence intervals contained correct answers. A well-
calibrated individual will have 90% of the correct answers falling inside this interval; the 
lower the percentage, the higher the overconfidence.  
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The second predominant dimension of overconfidence was studied in the context of 
positive illusion, which includes the better-than-average effect, illusion of control and 
unrealistic optimism (Skala, 2008). Hilton et al. (2011) found that positive illusion is 
correlated with unrealistic optimism, the illusion of control and the better-than-average 
effect, and also predicted miscalibration in probability evaluation tasks. The better-than-
average effect refers to the belief that one is better than the average population, and that one 
overestimates the chance of experiencing positive outcomes (Alicke & Govorlin, 2005). The 
most commonly known study that demonstrated the better-than-average effect is the self-
report driving skill study. Svenson (1981) found that 82 percent of undergraduate students 
ranked themselves as safe drivers and belonging to the top 30 percentile of the safest 
drivers. Similar findings were found by Sümer, Özkan and Lajunen, (2006) when the 
general public was tested. The illusion of control is the inclination of people to exaggerate 
their control over the outcomes of the event, even when one has no influence over them 
(Thompson, 1999). The illusion of control relates to unrealistic optimism and contributes to 
the psychological bias that is found in mentally healthy individuals, known as “positive 
illusion” (Johnson et al., 2006). For example, some might believe they have a lower 
probability of having cancer than other people, even if they have no control over whether 
they will have cancer or not. Studies showed that the probabilities of desirable events are 
overestimated by optimists, even in the cases when they have no control (Griffin & Brenner, 
2004). Kahneman and Riepe (1998) established that undergraduates perceived themselves to 
be less likely to be diagnosed with cancer or cardiovascular disease before the age of 50 
than their roommate. The positive illusion is then further strengthened in stressful and 
competitive situations, for example, financial trading. Fenton-O'Creevy et al. (2003) 
examined illusion of control in traders using computer-based trials. The participants were 
given an index for their trading performance and asked to rate their success, without 
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knowing that their index was randomly assigned. Their actual performance is inversely 
related to their propensity for the illusion of control. The traders with a higher level of the 
illusion of control performed worse than the traders with a lower level of the illusion of 
control.  
The effect of psychological costs in a sequential search problem has not yet been 
examined. This study was structured around two of the common framings of the generalized 
secretary problem that people encounter in everyday life – housing and employment 
decision making – to examine whether regret and self-confidence influence decision 
making. The selling-houses experiment provided a frame for participants to make a decision 
as a seller. They were given a task to sell houses one at a time. They faced a series of 
random price offers on the house, and they were asked to either accept or reject the offer. 
The aim was to choose the highest price offer for the house. The hiring frame asked 
participants to behave as a staff in a recruitment company. Their task was to choose a 
secretary for several companies. The procedure was similar to the selling house experiment.  
Experiment Three compared the decisions made with the predictions of the classical 
stopping rule, both in general and for particular sequences of price offers and candidates. I 
examined the effect of time search costs by varying the delay between the different offers 
(henceforth, the offer is referring to both the price offers for the selling-house frame and 
candidates for the hiring-secretary frame). Overall, I hypothesised (1) in line with the 
previous research, people would choose earlier offers than predicted by the classical 
stopping rule; (2) in line with the consequences of regret, contrary to the predictions of the 
classical stopping rule, there would be very few forced decisions of the last available offer; 
(3) in line with the finding from Experiment One, that the effect of adding an extra delay 
would make participants tend to accept earlier offers as simulation results predict; (4) that, 
86 
 
overall, the participants would perform sub-optimally on a range of different measures,(5) 
that the self-confidence of the participants would be related to their search behaviours. 
People with overconfidence should believe they have adequate knowledge in making the 
decision; that is, they should overestimate their ability to make the decision, and thus search 
less. The optimal stopping rule in the secretary problem contains an information-gathering 
stage, which allows decision makers to learn about the distribution prior to making the 




A total of 71 people from the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, participated 
individually in the experiment, 33 people in the low-delay treatment and 38 in the high-
delay treatment. They were recruited by advertisements both on a Facebook webpage and 
posters on campus. The participants either receive a $10 supermarket voucher or two first-
year psychology course credits as an incentive. They were within an age range from 18 to 
50 years old, and the median age in the range was 21 years. The experiments lasted on 
average one hour. 
4.2.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
PART 1 
The experiment consisted of two parts, the first of which was the computerized task, 
the second the self-confidence evaluation task. For the computerized task, the participants 
were given instructions about the first of the two frames, house selling, used in the 
experiment. For the house-selling experiment, the initial instructions were: 
87 
 
“You are a real estate agent in Christchurch city, and your job is to sell houses. You 
will be given a brief description of the house and a series of price offers. The price offers 
will be presented in a random sequential order. Once a price offer is presented, you can 
either reject or accept an offer. The house will be sold at that price if you accept. Once the 
decision to reject or accept the offer is made, it cannot be re-called. There are a total 20 
offers available; if you have not accepted an offer prior to the 20th offer presented, you will 
be forced to accept the final offer.” 
There were two practice rounds and then ten experimental rounds. Each 
experimental round (of a possible 20 offers) featured a different house description, and a 
different randomized sequence of prices; moreover, the mean and standard deviation of the 
house price offers differed between the rounds. The house descriptions showed the suburb 
where the house was located, its floor area, the number of bedrooms and year the house was 
built. The house description used in each round was taken from houses sold in October 2015 
in 12 different Christchurch suburbs. The information was obtained from the Quotable 
Value Limited database (qv.co.nz). The random sequence used for the housing frame was 
generated using the median house price in each suburb, with an upper and lower limit of 2 
standard deviations and using a normal distribution. Each participant was presented with the 
same randomized sequence. (See Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for details of the sequence). 
For the secretary-hiring frame, the instructions read: 
“You are on the staff of a recruitment company. Your job is to hire executive 
assistants. You will be given a description of the company, and a series of candidates with 
an overall score will be provided to help with the decision making. The candidates will be 
presented in a random sequential order. Once a price offer is presented, you can either reject 
or accept the candidate. The position will be filled by the candidate if you accept. Once the 
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decision is made it cannot be recalled. There are a total of 20 candidates available. If you 
have not accepted a candidate before the 20th, you will be forced to accept the final 
candidate.” 
Again, there were two practice and ten experimental rounds, and the means of the 
overall score varied between rounds and with slightly different positions. The job 
description shows the annual salary the vacancy is offering – for example $48,000, $28,000; 
the location of the job – for example regional clinics, an advertising agency; the position 
vacancy – for example, medical secretary, personal assistant. The job description was 
obtained from seek.co.nz in Oct 2014. The descriptions of the candidates emphasized 
different qualities. The randomized sequence of scores was different for the different 
rounds, but the same for all participants. The competency scores within each round were 
each based on the mean and they varied according to a normal distribution limited to two 
standard deviations on either side. (See Table 4.1 and Table 4.3 for more detail.) 
All participants performed in both the house-selling and secretary-hiring rounds. 
Half of the participant performed the house-selling rounds first, followed by the secretary-
hiring rounds. The other half of the participants performed the secretary-hiring rounds first, 
followed by the house-selling rounds. The participants were randomly assigned to either 
condition. Different randomized sequences were used for the house-selling and secretary-
hiring frames. No feedback was given at any stage in the experiment. 
Participants performed their entire experiment under one of two delay treatments. In 
the low-delay treatment, there was a constant 1-second delay after a participant rejected an 
offer and before the next one was presented. In the high-delay treatment, this delay was 1 
second, 2 seconds or 5 seconds, with an equal chance of each delay. The randomized 
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sequences used were identical and presented in the same order in the two delay treatments. 
Thirty-three participants were in the low-delay and 38 in the high-delay treatment.  
PART 2 
The second part of the experiment consisted of four sections. The first was a general 
knowledge quiz, which consisted of 21 general knowledge questions regarding New 
Zealand (see Appendix 4.A). The questions were not related to psychology and economics 
to avoid biases on an individual’s own expertise so as to avoid a relative advantage from 
participants’ different expertise or knowledge (Deaves et al., 2009; Michailova, 2011). I 
counterbalanced for the hard–easy effect, and the questions consisted of an equal number of 
three levels (difficult, medium and easy). The hard–easy effect refers to the tendency to 
increase overconfidence as the difficulty of a task increases (Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 
1977). People tend to overestimate their ability in solving a difficult task, and yet they tend 
to under-estimate their ability in solving an easier task. If the questionnaire consists of 
difficult questions only, people are more likely to be overconfident. If the questionnaire 
consists of easy questions only, more people will be showing under-confidence. The 
questions were also controlled for gender bias, and excluded gender-specific questions, for 
examples, sports, and fashion-related questions. Each question had three possible answers; 
the participants could choose only one. Participants were asked to state their level of 
confidence in the accuracy of their answer to each corresponding question between 33% 
(totally guessing) to 100% (absolute certainty). Work on probability evaluation procedure 
demonstrates reliable test–retest consistency and internal consistency when measuring 
miscalibration (Jonsson & Allwood, 2003). Also, Bruin, Parker and Fischhoff, (2007) 
found, when using probability evaluation technique to assess calibration, that the outcome 
correlates with various decision-making competency measures, and the ability to resist 
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reversal of preference under framing. If the average self-reported accuracy is higher than the 
average accuracy of their answer in the questions, the participant is considered to be 
overconfident. 
Section 2 (Appendix 4.B) and 3 (Appendix 4.C) measured the positive illusion 
construct in overconfidence. Section 2 also aimed to measure self-efficacy of the 
participants. The General Self-Efficacy scale (Jerusalem & Schwarzer, 1992) is a 10-item 
scale developed to assess optimistic self-beliefs to cope with a variety of difficulties in life. 
It captures one’s belief that one is able to complete a novel or a difficult task. Evidence 
suggests that the General Self-Efficacy scale has high reliability, stability, and construct 
validity (Schwarzer, Mueller & Greenglass, 1999). The scale has been found to be reliable 
across different ethnic groups and countries, and it measures only one global dimension 
(Leganger, Kraft, & Røysamb, 2000; Scholz, Doña, Sud, & Schwarzer, 2002). Cronbach 
alpha ranges from 0.75 to 0.94 across different language versions (Rimm & Jerusalem 1999; 
Luszczynska et al. 2005). The General Self-Efficacy Scale is positively associated with 
other social cognitive constructs, for example, intention and outcome expectations, which 
further demonstrated high validity on the scale (Luszczynska et al. 2005). Section 3 focuses 
on participants' depression tendencies. Empirical study shows that mentally healthy 
individuals tend to exhibit psychological biases that encourage optimism, collectively 
known as “positive illusions” (Peterson, 2000). People who score higher on the depression 
scale are not likely to be overconfident/overoptimistic about their ability and expertise. The 
Quick Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology (Rush et al., 2003) is a 16-item self-rating 
scale and provides each item with four possible answers describing symptoms of increasing 
severity associated with a score from 0 to 3. The Quick Inventory of Depressive 
Symptomatology scale showed high reliability with the Cronbach's alpha of 0.86 (Trivedi et 
al., 2004) and 0.72 correlations with the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (Rush et al., 
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2005). The Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (Hamilton, 1960) is perceived to be the most 
widely used scale for controlled clinical trials in depression (Cusin, Yang, Yeung, & Fava, 
2009).  
The fourth section (Appendix 4.D) elicited demographic information and previous 
histories regarding the experience of the participants in selling or purchasing houses and 
hiring employees. 
4.3 RESULTS 
In this section, I first consider the average results obtained from the experiment. 
Then I examine the correlation between self-confidence and the search behaviours. I also 
ask to what extent the participants followed the classical stopping rule suggested by the 
analysis of the secretary problem outlined above. I then consider whether deviation from the 
classical stopping rule produced markedly poorer performance in the experiment. Next, I 
present results related to individual differences. Finally, I present a regression analysis to 
examine the factors that influence decisions priors to making.  
There were two important dependent variables for each frame. For the house selling 
frame, these were the position in the sequence where the participant accepts the offer and 
the price obtained by accepting the offer at this position in the sequence. Results relating to 
these two dependent variables are shown in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 respectively. Similarly, 
for the secretary-hiring frame, statistics relating to the position in the sequence at which 
the secretary is hired are shown in the bottom half of Table 4.1 and the average candidate 




Position in the sequence at which the offer was accepted as a function of round number for 
low and high delay for the house-selling and secretary-hiring frame. 
   Low  High  
Round Best*  Mean %Best % 20th %3/20  Mean  %Best % 20th %3/20 
House-selling:       
1 6   12.2 30 30 48 8.5 29 18 76 
2 17   7.4 12 3 39 5.3 5 3 37 
3* 14   11.4 18 6 27 9.7 24 3 24 
4 14   9.8 42 6 79 4.8 8 3 84 
5 9   6.3 24 3 27 6.5 3 0 3 
6 12   6.6 6 3 33 5.4 3 0 39 
7 4   9.5 21 12 55 3.2 34 3 68 
8 13   11.9 36 3 42 10.4 5 3 11 
9 6   11.2 42 18 73 7.5 45 5 84 




Secretary-hiring:        
1 6   7.3 36 9 73 4.7 50 3 87 
2 15   11.1 6 12 58 9.6 3 5 66 
3 18   5.6 3 0 67 5 0 0 71 
4 10   5.3 18 0 39 4.3 8 3 13 
5 1   13.7 0 6 52 13.3 0 3 45 
6 6   15.1 15 42 24 9.4 34 13 42 
7 4   11.3 21 3 70 9.3 34 0 76 
8 6   3.8 15 0 61 2.4 5 0 39 
9 18   6.5 0 0 55 4.7 0 0 61 
10 8   8.2 27 15 64 5.7 39 0 68 
Notes. Best = position at which the best offer appears; % Best = percentage of participants 
choosing the best offer; % 20
th =  
percentage of participants accepting the 20
th 
offer; % 
3/20 = percentage of participants choosing one of the best three offers. 
 
*For all but one round in the house-selling frame, the optimal stopping position suggested by 
theory is either on the best offer or on the twentieth offer (if the best offer is in the first 
seven), except for Round 3 where it is on offer 9. Fifty-five percent of the respondents in the 
low-delay treatment and 53 % of those in the high-delay treatment accepted this ninth offer. 
For the hiring-secretary frame, in Rounds 3 and 9, the candidates predicted by the classical 
stopping rule are candidate 13 and 16 respectively; 18% of participants chose candidate 13 




Table 4.2  
Offer prices in the house-selling frame for each round. The table shows the actual average offer 
(averaged over the 20 offers), the actual best offer, the average and standard deviation used to 
generate the price offer sequence, the offer that would be accepted under the classical theory, 
and the average offers accepted for the two delay treatments. All results are in NZ$(000). 
 















        
1 426 522 383 52 365 458 477 
2 632 687 638 41 687 649 639 
3 382 437 383 32 415 414 413 
4 604 631 601 19 631 623 623 
5 362 547 383 97 547 420 341 
6 440 538 445 85 538 485 493 
7 573 646 567 32 523 602 610 
8 500 538 502 23 538 525 517 
9 451 564 445 64 525 527 534 
10 474 633 502 93 633 618 618 
Av. 484 574 484.9 53.8 540 532 527 





Candidate scores in the secretary frame for each round. The table shows the actual average 
candidate score (averaged over the 20 applications), the actual best candidate, the average 
and standard deviation used to generate the candidate score, the score of the candidate that 
would be hired under the classical theory, and the average score of the candidate accepted for 
the two delay treatments. 
      












1 418 489 420 45 404 473 480 
2 448 463 450 13 463 460 460 
3 513 671 490 93 662 595 589 
4 453 565 450 86 565 512 500 
5 116 287 310 22 255 229 213 
6 421 444 420 18 393 416 429 
7 300 331 310 19 295 323 327 
8 555 708 560 87 620 600 546 
9 515 608 490 64.1 605 552 548 
10 367 457 370 43 457 409 425 
Av. 410.6 502.3 427 49.01 471.9 456.9 451.7 




4.3.1 AVERAGE RESULTS 
Analysis of variance was used to examine the effect of the frame (housing or secretary), 
the delay (low or high) and earlier (first five) or later (second five) rounds on the average 
positions in the sequence where the participant accepts the offer. Participants chose to stop at a 
significantly later position in the sequence (M = 9.1) under the low-delay than the high-delay 
(M = 6.8) treatment (F(1, 69) = 18.9, MSerror =  36.5, p < .0001, partial ƞ
2 = 0.215). There was 
also a significant interaction (F(1, 69) = 4.22, p = .044, partial ƞ2 = .038) between the frame 
and the delay, by which the effect of increased delay was a little more pronounced in the 
secretary than the housing frame. This interaction might be due either to differences between 
the frames or differences in the sequences used in the frames. There were no other statistically 
significant (p < .05) main or interactive effects. 
Separate analyses were used to investigate factors (delay and early or later round) 
affecting the average house selling price and an average score of the successful secretary 
candidate. For house selling, the average price obtained from averaging across low- and high-
delay treatments rose between the early (M = $505,588) and the later rounds (M = $552,723; 
MSerror = 78.4 × 10
9
; F(1,69) = 257.9, p < .0001). There was also a significant interaction 
between rounds and the delay (F(1, 69) = 8.90, MSerror =  2.71 × 10
9
, p < .004), with the 
difference between early and later rounds greater for the longer delay. There was no main effect 
of delay. For secretary hiring, the corresponding analysis produced no significant main or 
interactive effects, although there was a slight suggestive tendency for candidates to have a 
higher score in the later (M = 457) than the earlier rounds (M = 451; F(1,69) = 3.51, 




Perhaps the key result emerging from these analyses is that, consistent with previous 
research, participants reviewed fewer offers when the time cost of looking at each offer rose. 
However, the decrease in offers viewed was not reflected in the quality of the offer accepted. 
4.3.2 DOES SELF-CONFIDENCE CORRELATE WITH SEARCH BEHAVIOURS? 
The overconfidence rate of each participant was calculated by taking the average 
percentage of correctly answered questions minus the percentage of self-estimate in correctly 
answered questions. The percentage of correctly answered questions was obtained by taking the 
number of correctly answered question and dividing by the number of questions they needed to 
answer; that is, 21 questions for each participant. The self-confidence in correctly answering 
the questions is obtained by averaging across 21 questions for each participant. For example, if 
a participant was correct 71% of the time, that is, answered 15 out of 21 question correctly, and 
estimated himself or herself as being correct 77% of the time, then the participant is 
overestimating with 6%. If a participant answered the questions 71% of the time, yet they 
estimated themselves as correct 60% of the time, they were under-estimating their ability and 
their scored was expressed as negative 11%. Therefore, a positive score in percentage means 
the person is overconfidence and negative score is under-confidence. Participants were found, 
on average, to be more overconfident under the low (M = 7.96%, t(63.34) = 12.67, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 2.96) than the high (M = − 40.12%) delay treatment. Summary statistics are 
reported in Table 4.4. In fact, 95% of the participants in the high-delay treatment reported being 
under-confident about correctly answering the general knowledge quiz. Yet, only 24% of people 
reported being under-confident in the low-delay treatment. There is no significant difference 
found between the low (M = 31.8) and high (M = 30.8) delay treatments in the self-efficacy 
scores according to t-test (p = .24). T-test also shows there is also no significant difference 





The correlation analysis shows that the overconfidence rate of both low-delay (r = 
− .189, p = .292) and high-delay treatment (r = − .119, p = .475) did not significantly correlate 
with their average stopping positions. In the low-delay condition, both the self-efficacy score (r 
= − .040, p = .827) and the depression score (r = .131, p = .468) were uncorrelated with the 
average stopping positions. However, in the high-delay treatment, the self-efficacy score was 
found to positively and significantly correlated with their average stopping positions (r = .355, 
p = .029) but not the depression scores (r = − .167, p = .317). 
Table 4.4 
Summary statistics of overconfidence, self-efficacy and depression scores.  
 




























Note: SD refers to the standard deviation. The total score of self-efficacy scale is range from 10 
to 40. The higher the score, the higher the self-confidence. The total score of depression scale is 
in the range from 0 to 27. The higher the score on the depression scale, the higher the risk of 
being depressed. 
4.3.3 DO PARTICIPANTS FOLLOW THE “CLASSICAL STOPPING RULE”? 
If the classical stopping rule for finding and selecting the best offer were employed then 
participants should have invariably used the first seven offers to establish a reserve price or 
candidate score, and then accepted the next offer that was higher than the highest of the initial 
seven. If, as happened in three of the house-selling and five of the secretary-hiring rounds, the 




twentieth offer. As the sequences turned out, for all the other rounds but three (Round 3 of 
house selling and Round 3 and 9 of secretary hiring), the best offer was either in the first seven 
or the best offer was the first offer higher than any offer in the first seven. Thus, if the classical 
stopping rule was followed by participants, they should have accepted the twentieth offer on 
eight of the total of 20 rounds and the best offer on nine of the remaining 12. But in fact, 
examination of Table 4.1 shows quite clearly that very few participants did this. Indeed, the 
only round for which the majority of participants pick the offer predicted by the classical 
stopping rule is Round 3 of the housing frame. 
Given that the participants were not following the classical stopping rule, one might ask 
whether they followed some variant of it. For example, they might follow a strategy of 
attempting to find one of the best three offers. However, as Table 4.1 shows, relaxing the 
criterion to one of the best three shows that the participants fulfil this criterion only about half 
the time (even though on only one round – Round 1 of the secretary frame – were all of the 
best three offers inside the first seven). 
4.3.4 WHAT WERE THE PARTICIPANTS DOING? 
Table 4.5 shows the percentages of accepted offers, taken over all participants and both 
frames and delay treatments, after increasing or decreasing runs in price or score of 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
The remainder accepted the very first offer. Most acceptances followed increasing runs, but 
many participants accepted offers that were less than the previous offer. The large majority of 






Percentages of accepted offers following increasing or decreasing sequences of 0, 1, 2 or 3. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Accepted first offer     11.2% 
After increasing run of 1    46.3% 
After increasing run of 2    30.1% 
After increasing run of 3    5.4% 
After increasing run of 4    0.2% 
After decreasing run of 1    3.6% 
After decreasing run of 2    1.4% 
After decreasing run of 3    0% 
After decreasing run of 4    0.4% 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Brief statements about the strategy they had used in the house-selling frame were 
collected from the participants. (Most said they used similar strategies in the secretary-hiring 
frame.) Thirty-six of the 71 participants claimed to have used a strategy in which they refused 
to accept the initial offers and only considered offers after that. Fifteen of these participants 
described the size of the initially rejected set as a “few” or “some” offers; the rest gave 
numbers. These ranged from 1 (6 participants) to 10 (2 participants), with the others in the 




from a candidate population was frequently followed although the size of the information-
gathering set was generally smaller than seven. Six participants stated that as the number of 
offers increased they lowered their threshold for acceptance; for two this was lowered after 10 
offers, for one after 15. Some participants actually made use of their knowledge of the housing 
market in deciding on initially acceptable offers, but no evidence suggested that this resulted in 
finding more rounds of optimal offer. 
If the participants used different strategies, then different participants should, on 
average, differ in the number of offers they reviewed before choosing. Figure 4.1 shows that 
this is what happened. There are consistent differences between participants in the same 
treatment and these differences are substantial. Note incidentally, that if all participants were to 
follow the same strategy, there would be no variation at all. For example, if participants were 
all using the classical stopping rule, they would accept exactly the same offers and candidates. 







Figure 4.1. Frequency distribution of the average stopping positions (averaged across 10 
selling houses and 10 hiring secretary rounds) of the participants in the low- and high-
delay treatments. 
4.3.5 WHAT WAS THE PENALTY FOR NOT FOLLOWING THE CLASSICAL STOPPING RULE? 
On average, the participants accepted offers earlier in the sequence than the 
classical stopping rule indicate they should, particularly in the high-delay treatment. For 
both the house selling and secretary-hiring frames, participants who viewed more offers 
ended up with, on average, higher house prices, or secretaries with higher scores. For the 
low-delay treatment, the Pearson correlation between the mean (of 10) stopping positions 
(for the housing-frame rounds) and mean house price accepted was 0.39, and that between 

























correlations for the high-delay treatment were 0.54 and 0.66. (All four correlations 
significantly differ from zero, p < .05.).  
Column 3 in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 shows the expected outcome, in terms of 
house selling price or secretary candidate score respectively, of following the classical 
stopping rule in the different rounds of the experiment, that is, to reject the first 7 offers 
and accept the next highest offer (37% of 20 offers is 7.4 offers in the information set). 
These results illustrate the point made in the introduction: Following the classical stopping 
rule can leave you stuck with a regrettable final offer. That this consideration was actually 
taken into account by the participants is evident from the strategies used by a few of them 
and, more importantly, by the low frequency of acceptance of the twentieth offer. 
Columns 4 and 5 in Table 4.3 and 4.4 show the average results actually obtained 
by the participants. The results illustrate that while, on average, these results are slightly 
worse than those that would have been obtained by following the classical stopping rule, 
there are rounds on which the average participant does better than this strategy. Note, too, 
that the average results are almost always considerably better than those obtained by 
choosing randomly, and that, as pointed out above, although participants in the higher 
delay treatment chose earlier in the sequence, they paid no significant penalty for doing so. 
Thus, in general there was a penalty for not following the classical stopping rule in 
this experiment, but it was not high. 
4.4 DISCUSSION 
The participants generally stopped their search earlier than would be predicted by 
the classical stopping rule and this search was shortened by adding an extra variable time 




different rounds indicate that only a minority of participants accepted the particular offer 
that was predicted by the classical stopping rule. The departure from the behaviour 
predicted by the classical stopping rule was most marked for those rounds in which the 
best offer occurred early on, within the information set predicted by the classical stopping 
rule. The classical stopping rule should force the offer of the last option. In practice, in all 
but the very first round, selecting the twentieth offer was rare. In the first round, people 
were probably learning and attempting to develop the best strategy, and thus here it may 
have made more sense for them to review all 20 offers.  
A large amount of evidence indicates that participants shortened the initial 
information set compared with the classical stopping rule. However, over and above that, 
some participants stated that they revised their threshold for acceptance downwards as they 
neared the end of the offer sequence, and examination of the data indicates a number of 
instances where many participants did not simply use a short initial information set and 
then refuse to accept any offer that did not exceed one in that shorter set (e.g., round 7 of 
house selling; rounds 5 and 8 of secretary hiring).  
A number of criteria could be used to evaluate the performance of the participants. 
One such is whether they chose the best offer, and on average they did not, and they chose 
the best offer less often than they would have done by using the classical stopping rule. 
Another criterion is whether the average price chosen is close to the offers they might have 
obtained by following the classical stopping rule. On average, the offers accepted were 
earlier than those that might have been obtained under the classical stopping rule, but the 
payoffs in terms of house cost or secretary excellence were not very much lower. Thus, as 
has been found previously in other research (e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996), the 




produced quite reasonable outcomes in a rather shorter time than the classical stopping 
rule. Moreover, unless the participants had either been versed in the mathematics of the 
secretary problem or had been forced to observe a large number of sequences, it is not 
clear how they might have arrived at a better solution.  
Finally, the experiment produced results indicating that participants tried to reduce 
their regret. Participants avoided being left with a potentially poor forced offer on the last 
price and acted so as to minimize the possibility for regret by missing out on reasonable 
early prices. Evidence for the influence of regret on the decisions made is also provided by 
the demonstration that overall price is earlier, both in this and previous research, than is 




5. DECISION MAKING IN SMALL GROUPS. 
EXPERIMENT FOUR. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
This experiment investigated whether groups make a better decision than 
individuals in the sequential search problem. Decisions regarding selling houses and hiring 
employees are often made in a group. For houses, it is most likely a joint decision of the 
couple who own the house or the family. As for hiring employees, a committee is often 
involved in deciding which candidate to hire. It is therefore critical to investigate whether 
groups are more effective than individuals in making these kinds of decisions. Group 
decision making is more costly and time-consuming than individual decision making. It 
costs more to hire expert boards or think tanks to make a decision than to have one person 
do it. Group decision making also requires spending time in discussion and exchanging 
information prior to making decisions. Is this extra cost worthwhile?  
Most critical decisions are now made by groups, on the assumption that groups can 
make better decisions than individuals. In the decision-making process of a sequential 
search problem, group members discuss their preferences and exchange opinions about the 
problem at each stage and discuss whether to accept or reject the current candidate or 
offer, until they reach a consensus decision among the group members. This decision-
making process of exchanging opinions and information is perceived to overcome some of 
the shortcomings in individuals’ decision making; for example, insufficient knowledge or 
information to make a good decision. The issue of whether groups make a better decision 
than individuals in these commonly found sequential decision-making scenarios (selling 
houses or hiring employees) is as yet unexplored. In this experiment, I investigate the 




sequential search task that presents offers one by one in a random order, with an 
immediate decision and no re-call.  
5.1.1 THEORIES OF GROUP DECISION MAKING 
Levin (2009) defines group dynamics as two or more people within a social group 
or between groups, for longer than a few moments, behaviourally and psychologically 
interact with and influence one another and perceive one another. This definition via group 
dynamics argues that all groups have one thing in common, which is that their members 
interact. (Consider, for example, a group of people jogging together every morning.) 
However, a few students working individually in a computer room is not a group, because 
they are only a collection of unrelated individuals in a common place rather than an 
interacting group.  
There are some known advantages of group decision making over individual 
decision making. For example, group decisions increase the perception of fairness and the 
acceptance of the decision made. Also, higher identification with the group decision is 
found, resulting in a higher commitment to the decision made by the group. (see 
Moscovici & Doise, 1994;Vroom & Jago, 1988 for reviews). Group decisions are able to 
aggregate information and preferences compared with individual decisions. Group 
decision making, in theory, can have a broader scope and synergy for solving a problem. 
Every individual group member may contribute unique information and expertise through 
discussion. Sharing information facilitates understanding, clarifies issues and avoids 
mistakes (e.g., Hollenbeck et al., 1995). 
There are two main theories in psychology and sociology that attempt to explain 




wholistic theory predicts that a group makes a better decision than an individual, due to an 
interaction between group members, and further, results in the whole being greater than the 
sum of the individuals. Researchers with a wholistic viewpoint proposed that interaction 
and discussion with others leads people to perform tasks better than by themselves (see 
Pavitt, 1998 for a detailed review), make a higher quality decision (Postmes, Spears & 
Cihangir, 2001) and solve more problems (Stasser & Stewart, 1992). Shaw (1932) found in 
a series of accuracy tasks of solving a puzzle that four-person groups had a higher 
proportion of accurate solutions than the individuals. The wholistic theory implies that 
interacting with people is the underlying rationale for why groups’ performances are better 
than individuals’.  
In contrast, reductionism theory suggests that the group is at best only equal to the 
sum of its parts if group interaction goes smoothly, otherwise, a group’s performance will 
be less than the sum of what each individual member can achieve. The larger the group, 
the less well it can perform compared with the aggregate performance of individuals with 
the same number. The Ringelmann effect describes the inclination for individuals in a 
group to become less and less productive with more people. Ringelmann (1913) found that 
when group members work jointly on a task, for example, pulling a rope, they exert less 
effort than when individuals combine separately. The group becomes increasingly 
inefficient with more group members. This violates the assumption of wholistic theory: 
that joint effort can lead to a better outcome than that produced by individuals. 
The two theories propose contradicting predicted outcomes of group performance. 
A model has been proposed to evaluate and compare groups’ performances and individual 
aggregate performance on problem solving (Lorge-Solomon, 1955). The simple form of 




PG = 1 − (1 − Pi)n 
where PG denotes the probability that a group of size n will be able to solve the problem, 
and Pi denotes the probability that a given individual by themselves can solve the problem. 
(1 − Pi) is the complement of Pi and denotes the probability that an individual is unable to 
solve the problem. (1 − Pi)
n denotes the probability that no one in a group of size n can 
solve the problem, assuming that, if one person in the group can solve the problem, the 
problem is considered solved for the group. Say you has a 37% chance of solving a 
problem, the Lorge-Solomon model suggests that there is a 60% chance that you and 
another person together will solve the same problem. If the group of two has solved the 
problem more than 60% of the time, then the group performance has supported the 
wholistic theory that interaction enhances group performance compared with the 
aggregation of individuals’ performances. By contrast, if groups solved the problem less 
than 60% of the time, reductionism theory is supported. If the groups have solved the 
problem exactly 60% of the time, group interaction has no effect in enhancing or reducing 
the performance of group, and therefore, neither wholistic or reductionism theory is 
supported.  
5.1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Group interaction has been found to have a polarising effect on a participant’s 
individual choices (e.g., Stoner, 1968; Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Bray & Noble, 
1978). The decision shifts towards the extreme after-group discussion. People may choose 
a riskier choice or a more cautious choice after discussion. The group polarising effect is 
not only found in risk-related choices. Myers and Bishop (1970) found that a group of 




prejudiced. The unprejudiced students shifted towards less prejudiced attitudes. Value 
theories are believed to best explain the polarising effect with group discussion (e.g., 
Pruitt, 1971; Moscovici, & Zavalloni, 1969). These theories describe the assumed 
decision-making process by which individuals tend to polarise their decisions towards the 
value held by the group. The predictions of value theories are supported by a positive 
significant correlation found between the individual participants’ original risk attitudes and 
the extent of a shift towards the risk attitude of the group (Clark & Willems, 1969; Teger 
& Pruitt, 1967), because the original risk attitude can be perceived as the baseline of the 
attitude scale. Value theories emphasise the most dominant human value the individual 
holds. The stronger the attitude, the stronger the shift. Value theories assume that groups 
shift in the direction that the individual members already favour. It is an intensification of 
attitude and preference against other alternatives. Apart from polarising attitudes, groups 
also make decisions differently than individuals in experimental tasks. People working in a 
group need to coordinate their activities with each group member. The greater the number 
of group members, the harder it is to coordinate. Even for a simple task of pulling on a 
rope, it can be difficult to coordinate to achieve the best result. Ingham et al. (1974) 
explain the Ringelmann effect as due to coordination and motivation. They showed that 
people were less motivated when working in a group. Participants put in more effort when 
they believe they work alone, and they refer to this reduced effort as social loafing. 
Social loafing occurs when the individuals’ efforts cannot be clearly distinguished 
from each other in a group. If the members of the group are not punished or called out for 
insufficient effort, the individual members are likely to reduce their effort and the group 
produces a poor performance. Social loafing was found to be influenced by the size of 




However, for tasks like an accuracy task, social loafing may be reduced, where 
performance depends on the most competent group member. If one member of the team 
knows the answer, the group has success as a whole. This leads to the conclusion that the 
group's performance depends upon the groups' most competent member. The group’s 
performance is therefore enhanced, and higher than the average individual’s performance.  
Previous research is inconclusive about whether groups perform better than 
individuals, but one common finding is that groups behave differently to individuals and 
there are diverse outcomes when comparing group and individual behaviours. To the best 
of my knowledge, group performance in a sequential search task has not been tested 
experimentally, although groups are often used to make decisions in sequential search 
tasks. Previous research mostly supports the reductionism theory that the individuals 
perform more poorly in a group setting than they would if they were working alone. In line 
with this previous research, I hypothesised that (1) groups do not conduct more searches 
than individuals, and (2) groups will find less optimal prices than individuals.  
5.2 METHOD 
Seventy-nine undergraduate students from the University of Canterbury, 
participated in the decision-making experiment. Participants were from a third-year 
psychology course on judgment and decision making. The participants were rewarded with 
course credits as an incentive to participate.  
This experiment used a within-subject design, and the participants were asked to 
participate in both individual and group decision making. Participants were randomly 
selected to be in one of the three experimental sessions. In the first session, the participants 




of two or three. In the second session, the participants started the hiring task individually 
and then the selling-houses task in a group. The third session began with the group 
experiment on the hiring task and was followed by the individual selling-houses task. In 
the group task, participants needed to discuss the decision with their team member prior to 
decision making. The grouped participants also needed to rotate controlling the mouse 
between the group members. There were a total of 45 people in the individual selling-
houses task and 25 people in the individual secretary task; 42 people participated in the 
group hiring task (21 groups) and 25 people (12 groups) in the group selling-houses task. 
Other details of the experimental procedural were as in Experiment Three. 
5.3 RESULTS 
5.3.1 STOPPING POSITION AND TREATMENTS 
The average stopping position for each participant was computed across all 10 
rounds in both tasks (selling houses and hiring secretaries), and compared between the 
group and individual treatments. Figure 5.1 depicts the frequencies in the percentage of the 
average stopping position for both treatments. There was no obvious difference in the 
search pattern between the group and individual treatments. Most of the people in the 
group (45%) and individual (38%) treatments stopped their search in position 9 and 10. 
Only 21% of people in the group and 22% of people in the individual treatment searched 
beyond the 10th offer.  
An independent t test showed no significant difference (t(110) = − .06, p = .96), in 
stopping positions between the group (M = 8.78, SD = 2.53), and individual treatments (M 
= 8.30, SD = 2.37). A Mann-Whitney U test also confirmed the no significant difference 






Figure 5.1. The average stopping position in the group and individual treatments. 
5.3.2 EVIDENCE OF LEARNING 
A repeated-measures ANOVA with treatments (group and individual) as a 
between-subjects factor and halves (first vs. second five offers) as a within-subjects factor, 
detected no significant effect of treatments (F(1,110) = .003, p = .96), but there was a 
significant main effect of halves (F(1,110) = 11.6, p < .001, partial ƞ2 = .095). The 
interaction effect between stopping position in halves and treatments was also not 
significant (F(1,110) = .79, p = .37, see Figure 5.2 for more details). So there was no 


























Figure 5.2. The half session average stopping position in the first (rounds 1–5) and second 
half (rounds 6–10) of the session for both group and individual treatments. 
5.3.3 LORGE-SOLOMON ANALYSIS 
The average probability of successfully solving the task for each participant was 
computed across all 10 rounds in both tasks (selling houses and hiring secretaries), and 
compared between the group and individual treatments. The average probability of 
successfully solving the task in the group treatment is 18.7%; that is, 1.87 rounds out of 10 
rounds, and 18.0% in the individual treatment. The t test showed no significant difference 
between the treatments (t(110) = − .64, p = .52). The Lorge-Solomon model predicts a 
32.8% chance that an aggregate of two people should solve the same problem if 
individuals solve the problem at 18.0% of the time, and yet the groups solved fewer tasks 

































On average, there was no difference found in the length of search between the 
group and individual treatments, nor was there a great difference in the decision pattern 
between groups and individuals. In both treatments, the participants tended to accept an 
offer with a higher value than the previous one. However, there was some support for the 
reductionist view that the performance of a group of two is actually worse than two 
individuals combined, if they solve the task individually.  
In this experiment, participants were asked to make decisions both in a group of 
two and as an individual. However, if neither person knows how to solve the task, a group 
will not perform better than an individual solving the task. Due to the complexity of this 
particular task, group decision making may only perform better than individuals if at least 
one person in the group knows how to solve the problem. Perhaps, due to the nature of the 
secretary problem, it requires a larger group to increase the odds of any group member 
proposing an accurate or close-to-accurate strategy to solve the problem. Some participants 
reported that they had to alter their strategy in making a decision during the group 
experiment so that the other group member would agree to employ it. Because there are 
only two members in a group, they cannot use voting or another method in disagreement, 
and it may be that sometimes they ultimately employ a less efficient strategy after 
discussion and produce poorer performance than they would have done individually. It is 




6. ALL MONEY IS NOT CREATED EQUAL: HOW 
ACTUAL AND OPTIMAL BEHAVIOUR VARIES 
WITH THE INCENTIVE STRUCTURE. 
EXPERIMENT FIVE. 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Do all monetary incentive structures enhance performance? Money has the ability 
to fulfil basic needs such as buying food, shelter, and clothing, but also it signals one’s 
worth and competence to other people (DeVoe, Pfeffer, & Lee, 2013). Monetary 
incentives are commonly used in the workplace and laboratory experiments to motivate 
performance. The rationale for providing an incentive is that people will exert more effort 
and an increase in effort can result in a higher performance, for example, a better outcome 
for a given task. However, empirical evidence has found that the effect of monetary 
incentives on performance is inconclusive (e.g., Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 1998; 
Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Bonner, Hastie, Sprinkle & Young, 2000; Hsieh, Li, & Tsai, 
2010; Mir, Trender-Gerhard, Edwards, Schneider, Bhatia, & Jahanshahi, 2011). Factors 
like skill, knowledge and experience, the complexity of the task and incentive structure are 
all potential reasons that an incentive-induced increased effort does not necessarily lead to 
a higher performance (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002). For example, Fryer (2011) conducted 
randomized incentive experiments in over 250 schools and found that incentives offered 
for academic performance (better grades) were not effective, but incentives offered for 
effort, such as attendance, good behaviour and so on, were in fact effective. Note that the 
students can control how much effort they put into school work with increased attendance 




transferring effort into better performance, that is, the grades. The way to effectively 
motivate performance in such tasks is as yet unknown.  
Neuroscientists and biologists have found that expectations of an event or outcome, 
imposed externally by the other people, environment or situation, can influence one’s 
physiological response. For example, participants have a higher level of endorphins and 
experience less pain in a placebo treatment than without it (Lipman, Miller, Mays, Miller, 
North, & Byrne, 1990), and neuron activity can be shaped. For example, an fMRI study 
found that expectation enhances performance on a task, through reducing the activity 
(sharpening) of potentially distracting ambiguous neuronal activation in the brain region 
associated with performing the task (Kok, Jehee, & de Lange, 2012). It is possible that 
expectations of one’s performance can be signalled by the incentive structure.  
In this experiment, I tested whether an incentive structure that signals an 
expectation of performance to the participants might improve performance in a task that 
requires more skill to perform. The secretary problem is employed to test this conjecture, 
as this is a task for which exerting effort without skill does not necessarily result in a better 
performance in making optimal decisions. Most simply, as we have seen, an individual 
who searches through 20 offers during the task, and thus exerts more effort, will not 
normally choose more optimal prices than an individual who only searches through 10 
offers. As the optimal theorem of the secretary problem dictates, the key to maximising the 
probability of finding the optimal price is estimating the size of the information set, which 
is the number of offers one needs in order to learn about the price distribution. Conducting 
more searches without knowing the size of the information set does not necessarily result 




This experiment randomly assigned participants to one of three monetary incentive 
structures: the commission base, best only, and no incentive. There were two different 
frames for each: house-selling and no context. In the commission base structure, the 
participants receive an earning for their decisions according to the exchange rate 
announced in the instructions. For the best only structure, a fixed amount of positive 
earnings is available, but only when the optimal price is selected. The no incentive 
structure offers a fixed amount of earnings regardless of the selected price. The main 
contribution of this experiment is identifying how the different incentive structures 
influence behaviour and extend the empirical analysis of effort-enhancing monetary 
incentive structures to the domain of performance enhancement. Since monetary payments 
are the most commonly used tool in incentivising behaviours and performance, it is crucial 
to understand the link between how the incentive is set up and its effect on performance in 
tasks that require more skill to perform.  
6.1.1. WHY THE EFFECT OF MONETARY INCENTIVE MATTERS 
The rationale for providing monetary incentives is to motivate individuals into 
exerting more effort by associating effort with earning: the higher the effort, the higher the 
earning. A higher level of effort is assumed to result in a better performance of the task 
(Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein & Mazar, 2009). There are two general beliefs about 
incentive on performance. First, people who receive earnings based on their performance 
are expected to perform better than people who receive a fixed earnings regardless of their 
ability, e.g., people who receive $0.5 when correctly recognizing an item in an item 
recognition task will perform better than participants who receive a $10 flat fee for the 
same task. Second, people who get paid more for completing a task are expected to 




receive $2 when correctly solved a puzzle, will solve more (or even harder) puzzles than 
people who only receive $1 per puzzle. However, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) reviewed 
79 laboratory experiments and found that the effect of a monetary incentive on 
performance is, in fact, inconclusive. This is because factors such as the skills and 
cognitive abilities required to perform well differ with the tasks. Arguably, every task 
requires both skill and effort to perform. However, some tasks have a steeper learning 
curve that requires fewer skills, and people can learn to perform it quickly, for example, an 
item-recognition task; but some tasks have a flatter learning curve, requiring more skill to 
perform, for example, finding the optimal prices in the secretary problem. In such tasks it 
is often difficult for people to learn the required skills in the duration of an experiment. 
The type of task that has a steeper learning curve is, therefore, an effort-dominant task. 
The type of task requiring more skill to perform is referred to as a skill-dominant task. 
Monetary incentives are generally found to have an effect on performance with mundane 
tasks that are effort-dominant, and which people lack intrinsic motivation to perform, for 
example, clerical tasks (Riedel, Nebeker & Cooper, 1988), and item recognition and re-call 
tasks (e.g., Kahneman & Peavler, 1969, Libby & Lipe. 1992). As they derive no 
satisfaction or enjoyment from doing the task, the monetary incentive provides extrinsic 
motivation to perform. There are also tasks that people are intrinsically motivated to 
perform; in particular, tasks that are skill dominant and require more cognitive abilities due 
to their complexity (see Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002, for the framework of monetary 
incentives on effort and performance). In these cases, the monetary incentive is mostly 
found to have no effect on performance; for example, probability judgements using 
numerical or verbal expressions (Wallsten, Budescu & Zwick, 1993), a variant of the 
secretary problem task (Hey, 1987), trading and bidding tasks (Camerer, 1987) and 




cases, monetary incentives have been found to impede performance; for example, in tasks 
predicting outcomes (e.g., Hogarth, Gibbs, McKenzie, & Marquis, 1991; Ashton, 1990), 
the Monty Hall problem (Friedman, 1998) and the Luchins water jar problem-solving task 
(McGraw & McCullers, 1979). Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein, & Mazar (2009) also found 
that, when offering a performance-contingent payment that varied in amount from small to 
very large (one month’s salary) over different tasks, higher payments surprisingly 
produced worse performance than lower ones in tasks that required basic cognitive skills. 
This finding is compatible with the idea that high incentives can lead people to choke 
under pressure. Excessive incentives can lead to a decrement in performance (Yerkes & 
Dodson, 1908).  
6.1.2. HOW DO MONETARY INCENTIVES MOTIVATE BEHAVIOUR? 
Across human experiences, previous research commonly found that positive or 
negative expectation of the upcoming event suggested by the current situation helps to 
guide human behaviour to obtain reward or to avoid harm (Scott et al., 2007). Incentives 
like food, money and drugs motivate behaviours and activate the reward system through 
the release of dopamine to several brain regions, mainly the pleasure centre of the brain 
(see Schultz, 2000, for a review on how reward works in the brain and influences 
behaviour). Scott et al. (2007) found that expecting a monetary reward increased synaptic 
activity similar to placebo-induced dopamine release. An expectation of an event or 
outcome can also shape the perception and experience of events. For example, 
expectations were found to be modulators of pain (Montgomery & Kirsch, 1997; see 
Colloca & Benedetti, 2005, for a detailed review) and emotion (Petrovic et al., 2005) in 
placebo studies, and can also alter visual awareness (Sterzer, Frith & Predrag, 2010). 




stressful events as functional and adaptive when watching a video, exhibited lower 
vascular resistance, increased cardiac efficiency and decreased attentional bias compared 
with those who did not hold such expectations during a stressful task. Their physiological 
responses, measured using electrocardiography (ECG), impedance cardiography (ICG), 
and blood pressure monitor, returned to baseline faster after the stressful task when they 
had such an expectation (Jamieson, Nock, & Mendes, 2013). Furthermore, the expectation 
improves task performance. Kok, Jehee, and de Lange (2012), using fMRI, found that 
prior expectations in visual perception facilitated performance in a visual orientation task 
by reducing the neural response in the primary visual cortex (V1). The reduced activity of 
distracting ambiguous neuron activation and sharpening neuron activity improves stimulus 
representation in the area. The improvement of the stimulus representation is then 
correlated with improved performance in the visual task when the grating orientation was 
expected, but not when it was unexpected.  
6.1.3. HOW DO INCENTIVE STRUCTURES WORK? 
People often use information from the situation and environment to work out how 
they are expected to behave. Consider, for example, the framing effect (Tversky, & 
Kahneman, 1981) and anchoring bias (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998). The environment or 
situation often signals an explanation of an event or behaviour. For example, when 
someone says that they are in a movie theatre, we infer that they are watching a movie. 
When people are served food with a large bowl, they consume more food compared with 
when they are served with a small bowl (Wansink & Cheney, 2005; Wansink, Van 
Ittersum & Painter, 2006). It is possible that people infer from the size of the bowl how 
many calories are appropriate to consume. This behavioural response is likely formed from 




smaller plate. The size of the plate gets bigger when we are served with a larger portion of 
food as we grow older. Over time, the brain links the size of the plate to the portion of food 
that we are supposed to consume. The bowl used to serve the participants’ food may be 
perceived as an indicator of how much food is appropriate for the individuals to consume. 
It may be similar with monetary incentives, as people can infer information about the task 
from the incentives. When people in a community were offered a large monetary reward 
for allowing the building of a nuclear waste site nearby, the willingness to support the 
nuclear site was lower than without such a reward (Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). The 
authors suggested that the presence and size of the monetary incentive signal that the risks 
involved for having such a waste site are high. Ariely, Brach and Meier (2009) found, in 
both laboratory and field experiments, that incentives are effective when people participate 
in charity events in private, but not in public. Receiving a monetary incentive for attending 
a charity event signals to other people that they are doing it for the money rather than 
trying to help others. Furthermore, people may also infer information about the task from 
the incentive structure rather than just the presence of a monetary incentive. Cole, Kanz, 
and Klapper (2015) conducted a field experiment with loan officers who were in charge of 
assessing risk and issuing loans in commercial banks. The loan officers were randomly 
assigned to one of three performance compensation structures: (a) the officers earned an 
origination bonus for successfully getting a loan approved; (b) the officers received a small 
bonus for loans that performed well, and a small penalty for loans that did not; (c) the loan 
officers received a large bonus for loans that they approved and which performed well, and 
a large penalty for loans they approved and which performed poorly. The loan officers in 
the large bonus/penalty group rejected more bad loan applications, exerted more effort and 
thus increased profit more for each loan they originated. The loan officers who received an 




reward/penalty group. It is possible that the large bonus/penalty loan officers performed 
better after inferring a high expectation of their ability to perform the task from the 
incentive structure: “If I am getting paid a lot to make such decision, the decision must be 
a difficult one. I must be very good in making decisions to be trusted in making such a 
decision.” Furthermore, Cole et al. (2015) found that the loan officers who received an 
origination bonus rated the application significantly less risky in all loans, both those 
approved and those not, than those loan officers whose bonus was tied to a loan's success.  
6.1.4. HYPOTHESES 
The following experiment was set up to examine how incentive structures motivate 
performance in variants of the secretary problem. Measures of performance were the 
number of the optimal (best possible) prices found, total earnings, and stopping position. 
In the experiment by Kok et al. (2012), participants were hypothesised to perform better 
when the expectation that the best was possible was signalled. When monetary incentives 
are implemented in the laboratory setting, it is assumed that the participants aim to 
maximise their utilities. However, maximising utility is not always the same as 
maximising earnings. If a skill-dominant task such as this task, requires too great a 
cognitive load, one may perceive exerting cognitive load as an increased cost and therefore 
be more willing to settle for non-optimal earnings. The commission base structure signals 
that the participants can maximise their earnings through finding the optimal prices, yet it 
is also acceptable to not find the optimal decision, as positive earnings are still available 
for decisions other than the optimal. Hence, they are more likely to maximise their utilities 
in various ways, not necessary through earnings, for example, by choosing a good enough 
price that requires less cognitive load. The no incentive structure may also elicit similar 




In contrast, the best only structure may signal that finding the optimal price is 
expected and possible, at least on occasion, and this is why earnings are only being offered 
when the optimal price is chosen. Furthermore, people in the best only structure may also 
be more willing to search longer, as a monetary incentive is only available on finding the 
optimal price. They are unlikely to stop searching until they have (or believe they have) 
found the optimal price.  
In line with the previous research, I hypothesised (1) that the best only incentive 
structure would yield more rounds of optimal prices than the other incentive structures; (2) 
in line with the previous hypothesis, participants in the best only incentive structure would 
have higher overall earnings because they find more optimal prices; (3) in line with the 
information signalled by the incentive structures, the best only incentive structure will 
encourage participants to search longer than the other incentive structures; (4) in line with 
the findings from Experiment Two, the house-selling frame will encourage participants to 
search longer and choose higher prices; (5) in line with general incentive theory, the 
commission base structure would find more optimal prices and choose higher total prices 
than the no incentive structure. 
6.2 METHOD 
6.2.1 PARTICIPANTS 
A total of 178 undergraduate students from the University of Canterbury 
participated individually in the experiment. They were recruited by advertisements on 
the Department of Psychology research pool website (ucpsyc.sona-systems.com). All 
the participants received two 100-level course credits for participating in the 




incentives: The participants earned 10.50 NZD on average. The search task was 
implemented using E-Prime software (pstnet.com/products/e-prime). There was an age 
range from 18 to 40 years old, and median in the range 18 – 21 years old. The 
experiments lasted on average one hour. 
6.2.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
The experiment consisted of two parts, the first of which was the search task, the 
second a survey to elicit demographic information. The experimental procedures were 
similar to Experiment One. The experiment was a 2 × 3 across-subject design, with two 
frames, house selling and no context, and three monetary incentive structures, commission 
base, the best only, and no incentive. Participants performed their entire experiment in one 
treatment only. The number of participants that participated in each treatment is 
summarised in Table 6.1. In the house selling frame treatments, the participants were 
asked to accept price offers for 10 houses, a total of 20 price offers for each house 
(Appendix 6.A – 6.C present instructions of the three incentive structures in the house 
selling frame). In the no context frame, the participants were asked to accept numbers for 
10 rounds (Appendix 6.D – 6.F present the instructions under no context frame). Table 6.2 
presents summary information on the prices in each round. All treatments had two practice 
rounds prior to the 10 paid rounds.  
In the commission base structure, the instructions explained their earnings are 
calculated by adding the 10 prices (presented in experimental currency units, henceforth 
ECUs) that the participants have selected. Then the total chosen price was converted into 
New Zealand Dollars using the conversion rate of 735 ECU to 1 New Zealand Dollar. The 
instructions for how the commission base payment was calculated in the house selling 




“The payoffs will be denoted in experimental currency units (ECUs). 
         735 ECUs = 1 NZD 
Your ECUs will be converted into NZD at this rate, and you will be paid in NZD 
when you leave the lab. The more ECUs you earn, the more NZD you earn.  
Your payoffs are determined as follows: 
Total ECUs you earn 
 =  
Accepted price offer for House 1 + Accepted price offer for House 2 + ….+ 
Accepted price offer for House 10 
Example: Suppose you accepted the price offer 450 for House 1, 260 for House 2, 
380 for House 3…... 658 for House 10. The total amount of ECUs you earn is 
450+260+380+…. +658.” 
The wording in the no context frame of the commission base structure was exactly 
the same, except there was no mention of the house selling frame, Appendix 6.D presents 
detailed instructions. The participants in the best only treatments received NZD 4.60 for 
each round in which they selected the optimal price (the offer with the highest value in 
each round). The overall payment they received on completing the experiment was NZD 
4.60 multiplied by the number of rounds they selected the optimal price. The instructions 
for how the best only payment calculated in the house selling frame are as follows 
(Appendix 6.B shows more details): 




Your payoffs are determined as follows: 
Total NZD you earn  
 = number of houses that you have selected the highest price offer * NZD 4.60 
Example: Suppose you accepted the highest price offer for House 1, House 3 and 
House 10. The total amount of NZD you earn is $4.60 * 3 = 13.80.” 
The best only structure under no context frame was identical to the house selling 
frame, without the house selling context; full instructions are in Appendix 6.E. The 
participants in the no incentive treatments simply received $9.50 for their participation; 
Appendix 6.C and Appendix 6.F for house selling and no context frames respectively.  
For this experiment, the cash reward for the participants was set to be 
approximately NZD 10. The tuition fee for a Psychology 100-level course at the 
University of Canterbury was NZD 719. The two course credits thus might be worth 
approximately 719 × 2% = NZD 14.4. Thus, the overall incentive was approximately NZD 
24.4. This is 64% higher than the hourly rate of minimum wage in New Zealand3. In short, 
the participants were reasonably well incentivised in this experiment. Considering the 
participants were mostly 18-year-old, first-year college students, they were unlikely to earn 
this much money from other sources.  
The conversion rate in the commission base treatments, the cash earning for 
selecting an optimal price in the best only structure and the cash payment in the no 
incentive structure were based on the results of previous findings. So, all treatments were 
                                                 





intended to yield roughly the same earning on average, regardless of the incentive 
structures, which was set to be NZD 10. In the commission base structure, the conversion 
rate was calculated by taking the selected total price per participant from the no cost 
treatment in Experiment One and dividing by $10. As for the best only structure, the 
payment amount for finding an optimal price was obtained by taking $10 and dividing by 
the average number of rounds the optimal price was chosen in the no cost treatment in 
Experiment One. However, the average earnings in the best only structure in this 
experiment yielded higher earnings than predicted (due to the treatment effect of the 
incentive structure). The actual average earnings in the different treatments are presented 
in Table 6.2. More analysis regarding the actual earnings is available in the results, Section 






Participant data for the treatment groups.  




House-selling frame   
Commission base 26 9.9 
Best only  30 13.2 
No incentive 31 9.5 
   
No Context   
Commission base 31 9.4 
Best only  29 11.4 


















Round 1 848 8 509.6 276  165.4 
Round 2 875 10 469.2 2  284.4 
Round 3 708 10 437.6 207  147.2 
Round 4 733 20 518.5 267  145.5 
Round 5 578 13 331.2 186  114.4 
Round 6 1574 10 714.3 89  447.4 
Round 7 581 19 369.2 197  128.1 
Round 8 966 3 636.4 250  234.4 
Round 9 1740 14 756.4 105  396.2 
Round 10 625 4 440.4 250  101.3 
Note: All the prices are presented in ECU, which is in the same format the participants see 
in the experiment. 
*Optimal price refers to the highest price in each round, also known as the maximum price 
in each round.  
**Optimal position is the position at which the optimal price was presented in that round. 
***Average price was obtained by averaging across the 20 prices in each round. 






In this section, I first consider the average results obtained from the experiment. 
The average results examine dependent variables that are measures of overall subject 
decision making. Then I examine the correlation between the incentive structures and the 
search behaviours. Finally, I present results related to the actual earnings made by 
participants with respect to incentive structures.  
There were three dependent variables. To examine the number of search activities 
exerted in the task for different incentive structures, the position in the sequence where the 
participant accepted the offers (henceforth stopping position) was evaluated. To examine 
the decision-making performance, the cumulative sum of the 10 chosen prices obtained by 
accepting the offers (henceforth chosen price) was used. Finally, the number of rounds the 
optimal price was selected (henceforth optimal count) was calculated. The results relating 





The summary statistics of position in the sequence at which the offer was accepted 
obtained after averaging across 10 rounds (panel A), the sum of 10 chosen prices in ECUs 
(panel B) and the number of rounds the optimal price is selected (the offer with the highest 
value in the sequence; panel C) for the treatments.  
Panel A. Stopping position (position) 




House selling    
Commission base 8.3 6 6.2 1–20 
Best only  9.4 8 6.9 1–20 
No incentive 7.6 5 6.0 1–20 
No context     
Commission base 8.6 6 7.1 1–20 
Best only  10.1 8 7.2 1–20 
No incentive 9.1 8 6.4 1–20 
Sequence optimal* 11.1   3–20 





Panel B. Total chosen price (ECU) 




House selling    
Commission base 7252.5 7416.5 563.8 4905–7951 
Best only  7244.4 7265.5 495.6 5515–8320 
No incentive 6983.5 7007 687.1 4833–8476 
No context  
   
Commission base 6929.7 7038 605.8 5254–7709 
Best only  6947.2 7103 665.2 4960–7729 
No incentive 7081.5 7094 260.4 6638–7620 
Sequence optimal* 9228 
   
Classical optimal** 7930    
Panel C. Optimal price count (round) 




House selling   
Commission base 2.0 2 1.2 0 – 5 
Best only  2.9 3 1.5 0 – 6 
No incentive 1.6 2 1.2 0 – 4 
No context  
  
Commission base 1.9 2 1.2 0 – 4 
Best only  2.5 3 1.5 0 – 5 
No incentive 1.6 2 0.8 0 – 3 
Sequence optimal* 10 
   
Classical optimal** 4    
*Sequence optimal refers to the actual optimal price from the sequences used in the 





6.3.1 STOPPING POSITION 
Table 6.3. Panel A shows that participants in the best only structure searched 
the longest in both house-selling (M = 9.4) and no context frames (M = 10.1) 
compared to the commission base structure (M = 8.3, 8.6 respectively) and no 
incentive (M = 7.6, 9.1 respectively). Because there are two frames for each incentive 
structure, I refer to structures instead of treatments when referring to the average result of 
two treatments (frame and no context) in the same structure. Figure 6.1 graphically 
presents the average stopping position of incentive structures averaged across frames  
(house-selling and no context frames) in each round. The best only structure 
consistently produced a longer search than the commission base and no incentive 
structures, except in rounds 5 and 7. Analysis of variance results showed a significant 
main effect of the incentive structures on the average stopping positions averaged 
across 10 rounds for each participant, (F(2, 172) = 4.55, MSerror = 8.08, p = .012, 
partial ƞ2 = .50). Participants in the best only structure chose to stop at a significantly 
later position (M = 9.7) than the commission base (M = 8.4) and no incentive (M = 
8.3) structures. Tukey HSD post hoc tests showed that there was a significant (p 
< .05) difference between the commission base and best only structures (p = .038), as 
well as between the best only and no incentive structures (p = .019). But there was no 
significant difference between the commission base and no incentive (p = .978) 
structures. This suggests participants searched longer when only the optimal price 
yields a positive payoff. Note, too, that the amount of searching activities in the best 
only structure is closer to the sequence optimal (M = 11.1) in the experiment than the 




Analysis of variance results also showed that participants chose to stop at a 
significantly later position in the sequence (M = 9.3) under the no context frame than 
the house-selling (M = 8.4) frame (F(1, 172) = 4.08, p = .045, partial ƞ2 = .023). 
However, there was no statistically significant (p = .524) interactive effect of frame 
and incentive structure.  
 
Figure 6.1. The average stopping position of incentive structures averaged across frames 
(house-selling and no context frames) in each round. 
6.3.2 TOTAL CHOSEN PRICE 
Analyses of variances found a significant main effect of the frames (F(1, 172) 
= 4.227, MSerror = 3.18 × 10
5, p = .012, partial ƞ2 = 4.23). There were no other 
statistically significant (p < .05) main or interactive effects. However, the interaction 
effect was close to being significant (F(2, 172) = 2.64, p = .074, partial ƞ2 = .03). 

































immediately dependent on the price selected in the commission base structure. This 
further suggests that in the commission base structure, people maximise their utilities, 
not all through earnings. Table 6.3 Panel B shows more descriptive results on the total 
chosen price. 
6.3.3. OPTIMAL PRICE COUNT  
Participants in the best only structure selected the highest number of optimal 
prices on average (M = 2.7) compared with the commission base structure (M = 1.95) 
and no incentive (M = 1.6). Analyses of variance were again used to investigate the 
effect of incentive structure (the commission base, best only or no incentive), the 
frame (house-selling or no context) on the average number of rounds the optimal price 
was selected. The average number the optimal price was selected was calculated by 
averaging across each participant within the treatment. There was a significant main 
effect of the incentive structures on the number of optimal prices chosen,  
(F(2, 172) = 12.45, MSerror = 1.51, p < .001, partial ƞ
2 = .126). The Tukey HSD post 
hoc test confirmed significant differences between the optimal count in the best only 
and commission base (p = .002), and the best only and no incentive (p < .001) 
structures. There was no significant difference between commission base and no 
incentive (p = .306) structures. There were no other statistically significant (p < .05) 
main or interactive effects. Detailed results are shown in Table 6.3 Panel C. Taken 
over both frames, 30.6% of the participants in the best only structure performed better 
or as well as the classical theorem in finding the optimal price (by finding 4 or more 
optimal prices), and 10.2% of them outperformed the classical theorem (by finding 5 
or more optimal prices); 5.2% of the commission based structure participants 




3.2% of the no incentive participants performed as well as the classical theorem and 
0% outperformed. Figure 6.2 graphically presents the frequency distribution of the 
number of rounds the optimal price is selected in the incentive structures.  
 
Figure 6.2. Percentage distribution of the number of rounds the optimal price is selected 
(averaged across house-selling and no context frames) of participants in the commission 
base, best only and no incentives structures. 
6.3.4. CORRELATION RESULTS 
Pearson correlation analysis was used to examine the relationship between the 
three dependent variables: the average stopping positions, the sum of 10 chosen prices and 
the number of rounds the optimal price is selected. The average stopping positions were 
obtained by averaging 10 stopping position across each participant. The sum of 10 chosen 
prices was obtained from each participant by adding up the 10 prices they selected. The 
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optimal prices that each participant has selected. The correlation results are 
summarised in Table 6.4.  
Table 6.4 
Pearson correlation coefficient with the position in the sequence at which the offer was 
accepted, the number of rounds the optimal price is selected, and the sum of 10 chosen 
prices in the treatments. 
 










 < 0.001 
0.58 
(0.50–0.73) 
 < 0.001 
Stopping position  
 0.56 
(0.27–0.83) 
 < 0.001 
*Coefficient shows the correlation analysis results of three dependent variables in the six 
treatments. 
*Range show the lowest correlation coefficient and the highest coefficient in the six 
treatments. 
In general, there is a large positive and significant correlation between the 
length of the search and the number of rounds in which the optimal price is selected  
(r = .547, p < .001). The longer the participants searched the higher their chosen price 
(r = .560, p < .001). The more optimal prices the participant selected, the higher the 
overall price they selected (r = .583, p < .001).  
Another correlation analysis was conducted within each incentive structure by 
averaging across frames (house selling and no context) with respect to the three 
dependent variables. The commission base structure had a strong correlation between 




only (r = .441, p < .001) and no incentive (r = .541, p < .001). The strong correlation 
in the commission base structure shows that some people searched longer, so earned a 
higher payoff, and some people searched less and earned a lower payoff. The weaker 
correlation in the other two treatments suggests the amount of search was similar but 
earnings varied between individuals within the structure. This suggests that the 
amount of search activities in the commission base structure is more inconsistent than 
in the other structures. The average stopping position was approximately 8 in the 
commission base structure and the likelihood of finding a better price by continuing 
their search was quite high (60% chance of finding a higher price). The longer their 
search, the higher the price they will find and vice versa.  
6.3.5. ACTUAL EARNINGS 
The actual earnings in the commission base structure were calculated by taking 
the total chosen price (ECU) in 10 rounds divided by the conversion rate (735 ECU to 
1 NZD). Also, see the actual average earning for each treatment in Table 6.1. In the 
best only structure, it is found by multiplying $4.60 by the number of rounds they 
selected the optimal price. The participants in the no incentive structure received 
$9.50 regardless of the price they selected. The average actual earnings of the 
incentive structures were obtained by averaging across the house-selling and no 
context frames. The average actual earning in the best only structure (M = $12.3) is 
the highest compared with the commission base (M = $9.70) and no incentive 
structure (M = $9.50). Analyses of variances found a significant main effect of the 
incentive structures (F(2, 172) = 9.65, MSerror = 15.56, p < .001, partial ƞ2 = .099). 
The Tukey HSD post hoc test showed there was a significant difference in the actual 




between the best only and no incentive structures (p < .001). But no difference is 
found between the commission base and no incentive structures (p = .983). There were 
no other statistically significant (p < .05) main or interactive effects. Thus, the best 
only structure had a higher earning than predicted from the previous experiment. The 
actual earnings in the commission base structure were the same as in the previous 
experiment.  
6.4 DISCUSSION 
This study investigated the effect of different incentive structures in a 
sequential search task which required some skill to perform well. The experiment 
found different performance with the different monetary incentive structures. 
Performance was measured by three dependent variables: the number of rounds that 
the optimal price was selected, the cumulative sum of the chosen price, and the search 
length. The best only structure found the most rounds of optimal prices and produced 
longer search, whereas there was no difference between the commission base and no 
incentive structures. However, there was no significant difference found in the total 
price chosen between the incentive structures. The house selling frame was found to 
have an effect in choosing a higher total price.  
People employed different search strategies under the different incentive structures. 
In the best only structure, their searches were worthless if they did not select the optimal 
price; thus they persisted longer until they reached the optimal price. When they had (or 
believed they had) missed the optimal, they stopped their search even if the price was poor, 
as it was pointless to continue searching. A decision to choose poor prices in these 
circumstances could potentially contribute to the finding that the total chosen price in the 




more optimal prices. One might argue that the cost of continued searching would be 
minimal given that the best only structure only receives a payoff when they found the 
optimal price, so they might be likely to search through all the offers when they are 
uncertain if they have passed the optimal or not. This was not found in the experiment, as 
the average stopping positions were earlier than the sequence optimal. In fact, the 
participants stopped their search prior to the optimal prices in all treatments including the 
best only. Also, even if the participants in the best only structure continue searching after 
the optimal price, the probability of choosing a high price decreased with more searches, 
and hence they would not have a higher total price. 
There are at least two possible limitations in this experiment. First, the no 
incentive structure received NZD 9.5 instead of NZD 10. The original design was to 
avoid participants in the no incentive structure receiving a higher average earning than 
the other two structures. The average payoff for the other two structures was set to be 
approximately NZD10. Considering that the participants were all first-year students 
with no experience in buying or selling houses, they might be expected to perform 
more badly than predicted (from results found in the previous experiment) but this 
was not found in this experiment. Second, the earnings of the best only structure were 
presented in NZD directly, but in the commission base structure they were presented 
in ECUs first, then converted to NZD. The use of ECUs may lead to a money illusion 
effect and increase incentives (Fehr & Tyran, 2001), and yet the best only structure 
still outperformed the commission base structure. Furthermore, Drichoutis, Lusk, and 
Nayga (2015) reported that the use of ECUs does not have an effect on influencing 




To conclude, the experiment showed, firstly, that having a commission base, 
proportional incentive did not produce a better performance than simply having a flat 
payment for any of the different dependent variables considered. However, paying only for 
the best did lead to longer (although still not optimal) searches and (reasonably enough) to 
more frequently obtaining the best price. It is plausible that the effect of the best only 
condition arose because the condition itself signaled to participants that obtaining the best 
was possible (as indeed it often was). A more general implication is simply that the 





7. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The results of the five experimental studies presented here indicate the broad range 
of factors that humans consider in their decision-making process. The general discussion 
first presents a summary of the findings from Experiments One to Five. Second, I discuss 
the implications of these experiments. Third, I discuss the limitations of the studies and 
present future directions of research for the secretary problem and sequential decision 
making in general. 
7.1 SUMMARY OF RESULTS  
CHAPTER 2. THE EFFECT OF TIME COST ON SEARCH BEHAVIOURS. EXPERIMENT ONE. 
Result 1: People searched less when paying a monetary or time cost for each new offer. 
Time cost had a smaller shortening effect than monetary cost 
Result 2: People chose lower prices when incurring monetary cost  
Result 3: People adjust their search behaviour with time delay even when the delay was 
not pre-announced.  
Result 4: Search behaviour changes drastically when paying monetary cost. 
CHAPTER 3. A HOUSE-SELLING CONTEXT IMPROVES DECISION MAKING FROM A SEQUENCE OF 
OFFERS. EXPERIMENT TWO. 
Result 1: People conducted less search without a context, but the amount of search in the 
housing context was similar with or without house information. 
Result 2: Having a context helped people achieve higher prices. But people had the same 
earnings with or without information.  




Result 4: People without a context chose lower prices from the start and this persisted over 
time.  
CHAPTER 4 WHY DO PEOPLE SEARCH TOO LITTLE? NOT ENOUGH TIME, OR TRYING TO AVOID 
REGRET? EXPERIMENT THREE.  
Result 1: The search behaviour suggested regret aversion. 
Result 2: There was similar search shortening with the time delay, as in Experiment One.  
Result 3: Self-confidence has little influence on search behaviour. 
CHAPTER 5 DECISION MAKING IN SMALL GROUPS. EXPERIMENT FOUR.  
Result 1: The group did not search longer than individuals.  
Result 2: Two-person groups found fewer optimal prices than the aggregate performance 
of individuals. 
CHAPTER 6 ALL MONEY IS NOT CREATED EQUAL: HOW ACTUAL AND OPTIMAL BEHAVIOUR VARIES 
WITH THE INCENTIVE STRUCTURE. EXPERIMENT FIVE. 
Result 1: People searched for longer when they were rewarded only for finding the 
optimal price. 
Result 2: People chose higher prices when the task has a house-selling frame, 
whereas an incentive structure had little effect on price choice.  
Result 3: People found a greater number of optimal prices when they were being 
rewarded when finding the optimal price only than with other types of reward. 
Results 4: When people were being rewarded with a commission on the price, they 
had a similar amount of search and found similar number of optimal prices as the 




Result 5: People earned more money when they were rewarded only for finding the 
best. 
Result 6: When people were being rewarded with a commission on the price, search 
behaviour varies between individuals. 
7.2 IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS  
Throughout this dissertation, a number of factors that contribute significantly to 
one’s sequential search decisions have been identified. These include the search costs, 
contexts, regret aversion and incentives. Although these underlying causes have been 
found to influence decisions, to date they have not been accounted for in the theoretical 
optimal solution. Experiment One examined the effect of time and monetary search costs, 
as search costs play a critical role in every search decision. The time people spend to 
evaluate price offers can be otherwise spent in getting one’s own work done. When the 
time search cost equalled one percent of the optimal price offer, people’s search 
behaviours aligned with the theoretical optimal solution (Seal & Rapoport, 1997). Even 
when time cost was not present in Seal and Rapoport’s (1997) experiment, people would 
always incur time cost, whether decisions were being made in the laboratory or outside 
world. Experiment One found that time and monetary costs shortened the amount of 
search, but monetary cost shortened people’s search by approximately 45%; the time cost 
shortened by approximately 14%. Despite a shortening effect with different magnitude 
being found between time and monetary costs, the effects of money and time on decisions 
do differ in various ways. For example, people settled for lower prices with monetary cost 
compared to no cost and time cost conditions. Also, people who incurred monetary cost 
had a narrow and shorter term perspective than those who incurred time costs. People were 




rather than being concerned about the highest price seen in the time cost or no cost 
conditions. Monetary cost appears to affect behaviours and decisions in more ways than 
time cost, although theoretically the effects of monetary and time cost are qualitatively 
equivalent.  
Several other studies also suggest that people do treat time and money differently 
(e.g., Lee, Lee, Bertini, Zauberman & Ariely, 2015; Gino, & Mogilner, 2014). Very often, 
a monetary cost has a more adverse effect on decisions, as found in Experiment One, than 
time. For example, it appears to make people more prone to bias (Soman, 2001), less moral 
(Gino & Mogilner, 2014), and more risk-seeking (Okada & Hoch, 2004). One way to 
mitigate the adverse effect is perhaps to remind oneself of the underlying purpose of the 
task and shift the focus away from the incurred monetary costs. Ariely, Kamenica and 
Prelec (2008) asked their participants to build Lego Bionicles in their experiment. During 
the experiment, the participants were paid $2 for building the first one, $1.89 for the 
second, $1.67 for the next and so on. The participants decided when to stop building. In 
the meaningful treatment, the completed Bionicles were placed on the desk in front of the 
participant and accumulated on the desk. In the Sisyphus treatment, once the participant 
finish the first Bionicle, and start working on the second one, the experimenter would 
immediately undo the first Bionicle into its pieces and return the pieces back into the box. 
In the meaningful treatment, people built a total of 10.6 Bionicles and received an average 
of $14.4, whereas, in the Sisyphus treatment, people only built 7.2 Bionicles and earned an 
average of $11.52. The authors claim that when people find the task meaningful and obtain 
fulfilment or satisfaction from doing the task, they are more productive than when only 
doing it for the money. Therefore, when selling a house in reality, for example, people may 




cost. This may mitigate the adverse effect of monetary costs and enhance the probability of 
selling the house to the best buyer.  
However, when we are selling houses, we may have more information than the 
assumptions in the secretary problem suggested. We generally have an idea of how much 
the house is worth now from official government valuation, and we also have access to 
information about the housing market in a suburb and an entire city. In this case, we likely 
know the price range of the offer prior to the search, and perhaps something about the 
likely distribution of the offers within that range. Christian and Griffith (2016) proposed 
that, for a uniform distribution and a known price range, the optimal solution for the 
acceptable price that maximises earnings is p ≥ 1 − √2c, where p is the acceptable offer 
and c the cost of the search. Let us say, you know the offers are between $400,000 and 
$500,000. The search cost for an additional offer is $1. Then you should search until you 
receive an offer of $499552.79 or more. However, if the search cost is $10,000, the offer 
should be accepted if the price is $455,279 or more. In a case where the search is very 
expensive and costs $50,000 per search, an offer over $400,000 should be accepted. 
Clearly, even in the case where information about offers is available to the decision maker 
when selling houses, search cost remains a significant factor, if not the most critical factor, 
in determining the amount of search.  
Experiment Two expanded on the findings of Experiment One and examined 
whether contexts would influence search behaviour. Experiment Two showed that not only 
search costs but also the contexts presented in decision making are linked with the amount 
of search and the prices people choose in the task. It is well known that we make different 
decisions in different contexts, for example, the framing effect (e.g., Tversky & 




Smith, 1994; Dufwenberg, Gächter & Hennig-Schmidt, 2011). The effect of context is not 
present in the optimal theorem previously mentioned. Experiment Two found that people 
performed better in a house-selling context than without. The amount of information 
presented in the context did not influence the ability to make superior decisions. In fact, 
simply stating the context of a decision without providing detailed house information 
seemed sufficient to facilitate better performance. People without a context performed 
worse from the start and this effect persisted, even worsening over time. The results may 
arise because an existing schema that enhances our decision-making ability may only be 
activated when a context is presented. Furthermore, experiments without a context may not 
necessarily represent the actual decision-making behaviours in life, where no decision is 
made without a context.  
The secretary problem can also be found in many contexts in our lives apart from 
selling houses, one of which is finding a partner. As people mostly likely would date one 
person at a time, and we cannot evaluate all potential candidates in our lifetime 
simultaneously, the quality of the future candidates cannot be known ahead of time. The 
question then becomes: How can one choose the best person to settle down with, without 
having the information on every candidate that one might want to marry? Re-calling a 
previously rejected candidate is often unlikely in most circumstances. If we apply the 
classical optimal theorem to this context, we should reject the first 37% of the people that 
we date, and choose the next best one. However, the total number of candidates is never 
known ahead of time, a modified version of the optimal stopping rule is found, which can 
be applied to time rather than people (Fry, 2015). Say you start dating at sixteen years old 
and would expect to get married by the age of forty. In the first 37% ([40 − 16] × 37% = 




his/or her quality; after 25, marry the first person who is better than everyone that you have 
dated. But how would you compare the candidates? Unlike in the house-selling context, 
where information about the price offer range, search cost, and so on, are often readily 
available and can be objectively determined, a better candidate for marriage often cannot.  
Christian and Griffith (2016) suggest that, for the best chance of success in the 
quest of finding the best partner, one should evaluate the candidates based on objective 
criteria, for example, their wealth percentile, rather than on subjective criteria, for 
example, feelings, that cannot be easily and objectively evaluated. Suppose that the 
decision maker has information about the distribution of the criteria being evaluated when 
finding a partner (as when selling houses), and the candidates’ qualities can be evaluated 
with an objective measure. Suppose, too, that one knows the approximate wealth 
distribution of the candidates, such as 500,000 is above average, 700,000 is in 75th 
percentile, and so on. In this case, the decision maker would know immediately when a 
good candidate is presented, for example, above the 98th percentile, without needing to 
first gather information as the classical optimal theorem suggested. The optimal strategy, 
therefore, becomes a threshold rule, where a candidate will be accepted if he/she is above a 
certain threshold, such as the 95th percentile. This implies that even if the candidate is 
presented early on, he/she can still be accepted. The chance of choosing the best candidate 
is drastically increased when full information is available. When there is no information, 
the probability of finding the best is approximately 37% (see Lindley, 1961; Gilbert & 
Mosteller, 1966 for more details) and with full information, it is approximately 58% as n 
→ ∞ (Gilbert & Mosteller, 1966). Therefore, when making sequential search decisions in 




It is possible that the commonly found early stopping bias in the sequential search 
task is at least in part caused by the regret aversion. As there is a higher possibility of 
feeling regret after a long search, it might be optimal to shorten the search to avoid regret 
and reduce the psychological cost in one’s decisions. Participants shortened the 
information set compared with the classical theorem, and this potentially suggests regret 
aversion. Strong evidence for regret aversion comes from the finding that only rather 
rarely did participants choose – or were forced to choose – the final offer. The 
overconfidence bias was another psychological factor considered. The results show that 
search behaviour was similar regardless of the level of self-confidence. However, the 
participants tended to stop their search in an increasing sequence rather than decreasing 
sequence, suggesting a tendency to loss aversion. While the non-incentivised procedure 
made the experiment a more theoretical exercise, it provided an opportunity for the 
participants to set their own goals (as they probably would in real life), and, in the process, 
provided data that indicate what other forces might be at work besides the logic of the 
experiment itself. This is an important consideration because there are a vast number of 
different ways in which an experiment of this kind could be incentivised (some are 
investigated in Experiment Five).  
A good situation to apply findings from Experiment Three in life is another 
example of the secretary problem: finding a car parking space. Assume that you are 
driving on a long road with the parking spaces (both free and occupied) evenly distributed, 
approaching your destination. Your goal is to minimise the walking distance to your 
destination, and the occupancy rate – the probability of how many car parking spaces – is 
known. Once the decision is made to pass an empty space, it is not likely to be available 




a highly occupied parking street. DeGroot (1970) found the optimal solution to this 
problem is to take the first empty spot less than – log2/log (1 – p) spots from the 
destination, where p is the probability of any given space being available, i.e., the 
occupancy rate. So, if the occupancy rate of the parking space is 50%, you should wait 
until 1 parking space away from your destination then take the next free spot; basically, 
drive up to the last space before the destination. If the occupancy rate is 90%, then you 
should wait until 7 spaces away from the destination then consider parking the car. 
However, if the occupancy is 99%, then wait until 69 parking spaces away. If the 
occupancy rate is 99.9%, then you should start looking for parking space at 693 spaces 
away from the destination. From this example, we can easily see that when the occupancy 
rate is high, a small increase in the occupancy rate changes the result drastically. Also, 
finding a space requires time, attention and fuel, all of which are scarce resources; taking a 
spot early on, and avoiding regret at having to spend more time and effort to find one later 
on, may not be a bad strategy to employ. 
Very often, when selling or buying houses, the decision is made jointly by the 
couple or the family who own the house. When hiring employees, a committee is often 
involved in deciding which candidate to hire. We often believe that two heads are better 
than one; groups can make better decisions than individuals. I explored whether group 
decision making can outperform individual decision making in solving the secretary 
problem. It is often assumed that group decision making may allow the group to avoid 
more cognitive biases than individuals, through discussion, and thus groups come up with 
better solutions. This was not found in solving the secretary problem. Although the 
problem can be solved when one member of the group knows how to solve the problem, 




feedback in the experiment. Furthermore, group discussion can have the effect of shifting 
decisions away from the optimal or towards the optimal strategy. Experiment Four found 
that the group does not choose more optimal offers than individuals, and hence it provides 
evidence that supports the reductionist view in group decision making, where the group of 
two solves fewer problems than the aggregate performance of individuals. Group decision 
making in life can be found more often in some contexts, such as buying or selling houses, 
than others, such as finding partners or parking spaces. As Experiment Four demonstrated, 
having more people will not contribute to higher success, but, as previously mentioned, 
having more information would. “Two heads are better than one” is only true in solving 
sequential search problems when the other head knows more.  
In addition to information and knowledge, there is also evidence that the incentive 
structure influences search behaviour. We often overlook how the expectation of an event 
or outcome helps to prepare us for the acquisition of a reward. In Experiment Five, the 
incentive structure that rewarded only finding the best resulted in finding more optimal 
prices than the other two structures. Both Experiments Two and Five included treatments 
with both a house-selling and a no context frame. I did not find people conducted less 
search without a context in Experiment Five. There can be at least three potential 
underlying causes for this. First, it may be due to a different population of students. In 
Experiment Two, the participants were mostly commerce majors whereas, in Experiment 
Five, the participants were mostly psychology majors. The difference in finding could be 
driven by self-selection into majors. Second, the incentive structure was different. The 
participants in Experiment Two received a cash-only reward in New Zealand Dollars, 
whereas people received a mixture of cash (NZD) plus course credits in Experiment Five. 




Third, the overall value of the incentive was higher in Experiment Five. As previously 
mentioned, the cash value of NZD 10 plus two course credits is approximately NZD 25.4. 
This was higher than the maximum earning of NZD 15 in the Experiment Two design.  
Experiment Five found that the commission base structure had very similar results 
to the no incentive structure. These two treatments gave rise to the same amount of search 
and a similar number of optimal offers. This was unexpected, as often an incentivised 
procedure can better motivate behaviour than a non-incentivised procedure. There are at 
least three potential underlying reasons for what I found. First, people in the no incentive 
structure may be intrinsically motivated to perform even when the extrinsic motivation, a 
monetary reward, was lacking. For example, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) found that in a 
field experiment where high school students were collecting charity donations door-to-
door, students collected more donations when there was no monetary incentive for them 
than with a monetary reward. Second, Gneezy, Meier and Rey-Biel (2011) suggested that 
when an extrinsic incentive is available, it signals to the participants that the experimenter 
perceives them to lack intrinsic incentive to perform, and people in the commission base 
structure may have had some performance decrement due to lack of trust. Third, as 
previously mentioned, participants may have already been inclined to work hard for the 
course credits, and both the commission base and no incentive structures offered the same 
course credits for completing the experiment. 
The best only treatment was able to outperform the commission base and no 
incentive treatments in Experiment Five. They conducted longer searches and found more 
optimal prices than the other treatments, despite the expected earnings having been 
designed to be the same as the other two treatments. However, participants in the best only 




treatments. People continue searching even when they pass the optimal until they reach the 
last offer. The last offer tends to have an average payoff or a lower payoff when search 
cost is taken into account. As a result, people in the best only treatment had the same total 
chosen price as the commission base treatment, even when they found more optimal offers.  
Not knowing when to stop can sometimes turn out to be problematic in life, where 
the number of offers is often infinite if there is no time constraint. Theoretically, if one is 
willing to wait, the search can last for a long time, as an offer will eventually arise, 
regardless its quality. There is a sequential decision-making problem for which there is no 
optimal solution, for example, the game of triple or nothing (Christian & Griffihs, 2016). 
Suppose you are given an endowment of $10 to play a game, and you can play as many 
times as you want. But the rule of the game is that you need to bet all the money each time 
and you would have a 50% chance of tripling the money and 50% chance of losing your 
entire stake. How many times should you play this game to maximise the earnings? 
Theoretically, infinitely many times; you should never stop playing. But, following this 
strategy will only result in you eventually losing the entire stake. Knowing when to stop, 
when solving sequential search problems, can be as tricky as knowing how to choose 
optimally. 
Overall, this dissertation examined specific cases of people confronting a 
sequential search problem and it is clear that these kinds of problems present themselves 
often in one form or another in our lives. Whether it involves buying or selling houses, 
hiring employees, finding partners or car parking spaces, the most critical question that we 
wish to answer is how one should make optimal decisions. To answer this question, we 
must determine what factors contribute to the optimal solution. As the experiments have 




making process. The combination of these has not yet been captured by any 
mathematically derived optimal solution. The claim that we make suboptimal decisions is 
thus, in fact, often inaccurate and superficial. Instead, the decisions we make may be 
optimal when the effect of these factors that we consider to be critical and crucial to our 
desired outcome are taken into account, allowing us to maximise utilities, as the 
economists would say. In general, these findings suggest that when we buy or sell real 
houses we face the choice between spending time or monetary cost, and opting for time 
cost may avoid the adverse effect of monetary cost. These experiments would suggest that 
we should always take heed of the context while making decisions, as decisions do depend 
on the context. If possible, when comparing between offers, use measures that can be 
objectively determined to enhance the chance of success: More information allows higher 
quality decisions, as suggested by the optimal stopping rule. When all offers yield a 
payoff, aim for the second or third best to save time and effort, as the earnings will not be 
much different than when aiming for the best. Most importantly, as Christian and Griffith 
(2016) have stated, always be ready to stop, as the time and effort already spent are sunk 
costs that need to be disregarded. Exhausting and exploring all offers is never the optimal 
choice, as time spent can never be regained, nor can the rejected offers. The basic 
assumptions of the secretary problem have suggested that the secretary problem is, in fact, 
the study of the time itself, which represents the journey of human life. We only pass this 
journey of life once; we should make decisions wisely and timely and live without regrets. 
7.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCHES 
The experiments in this dissertation provided important findings regarding human 
decision making. Nevertheless, there are limitations to the experimental designs that might 




motives behind different perceptions of time and money. The underlying cause of the 
different behaviours between the time and monetary search costs remains unclear. This 
opens the possibility of future extensions and robustness checks, as identification of the 
reason for this difference would require a design different from the current one.  
Second, in everyday life situations, re-calling a previously rejected offer can 
sometimes be possible. There is some evidence (Zwick et al., 2003) that people are willing 
to search longer when a re-call is allowed, both with and without monetary search costs. 
Experiments can, therefore, be conducted to examine whether the different effects of time 
and monetary costs on search behaviour persist after allowing for re-call. In a similar 
fashion, the impact of time search cost could vary with the opportunity cost of time, which 
presumably differed for different participants in my experiments (Knowles & Servátka 
2015). I leave these explorations for future theoretical and experimental studies. 
Third, Experiment Two adapted a house-selling context to explore the change in 
decision-making behaviours, and yet, to date, there is no definite theory explaining the 
effect of context framing, or what type of framing one should use to achieve an intended 
change, for example, higher earnings. From that perspective, the results of a house-selling 
frame may not generalise to other contexts, such as the context of buying houses, selling or 
buying cars, choosing life partners, and so on. One should also test the robustness with 
respect to other types of context framing, to gain insights on the issues above. 
Furthermore, although Experiment Two found that people with no context had fewer 
searches than people with context, this result did not generalise to Experiment Five. A 
theory about the context of framing would be useful for this future research.  
Fourth, a clear limitation in exploring the psychological insights on the early 




Experiment Five people found similar performance in the non-incentivised procedure as 
one of the incentivised procedure (the commission base incentive structure). In Experiment 
Three, participants were asked to choose the best offer (highest price offer and the 
candidate with the highest score in each round), but there were no earnings associated with 
the quality of their decisions. Goette and Stutzer (2010) showed that noncash incentives 
such as T-shirts, lottery tickets, or gift cards could have a positive effect on blood 
donation, whereas a cash incentive often has a negative effect. Some participants only 
receive course credits in Experiment Three, which is also a type of noncash incentive; 
previous literature has shown that a noncash incentive has a different effect to cash 
incentives. Also, incentivised procedures may motivate decision-making behaviours in 
ways that non-incentivised procedures do not. Future research on how the decisions are 
made under different types of incentive in the secretary problem should also be considered. 
Fifth, one of the limitations of Experiment Four was the size of the group. The 
groups consisted of just two group members, where, given a disagreement, the more 
dominant or assertive member may be more likely to make the decision, regardless of the 
accuracy of his or her decision. This is less likely to occur with a larger group, for 
example, three or more people. Some common approaches for making decisions in a 
group, such as voting, cannot really be carried out in a group of two. Varying group size is 
recommended for a future experiment.  
Sixth, the total chosen price was similar regardless of its incentive structures in 
Experiment Five. It appears that the best only incentive structure motivated behaviours that 
were specific to the incentive structure when the reward was given but did not affect 
another aspect of performance, the overall price value, and yet choosing a higher price 




needed to explore the possibility of incentive structure in performance regarding price 
value and optimal prices, for example, a commission base incentive structure that also 
provides a bonus when people found the optimal prices.  
The findings in this dissertation have important implications for research in 
psychology and economics decision making. The fact that most of the tested factors were 
not included in prior theories provides evidence for gaps between existing theories and 
actual decision-making behaviours. In addition to exploring behaviours experimentally, 
formulating a theory to better explain and predict behaviours should be carried out in the 
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Instructions for the no cost and unannounced time cost treatments (the instructions 
were identical in both cases; the treatments differed only in the 5-second time delay 




You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. If you follow these 
instructions carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to 
you in cash at the end of the experiment. If you have a question at any time, please raise 
your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. 
We ask that you not to talk otherwise during the experiment. Also, please turn off your cell 
phone and do not use the computer for any other purpose than your participation in the 
experiment requires. If you break these rules, we will have to exclude you from the 







You will participate in 10 scenarios, in which you will be selling houses. In each scenario, 
you will be asked to decide whether to accept or reject a price offer for a particular house. 
You will be given a brief description of the house that will be followed by a series of price 
offers. The price offers are randomly generated by the computer and available one at a 
time. Once a price offer is presented, you can either accept or reject it. If you accept the 
price offer, the house will be sold at the price you accepted. All sales are final. If you reject 
the price offer, the offer will disappear; you cannot go back to the previously rejected 
offer. In total there are 20 price offers available for each house; if you have not accepted 
an offer prior to the 20th offer, you will be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the final) offer. 
Therefore, make your decisions carefully. 
There is no time limit on how long the price offers will be available for, so take as long as 
you need to evaluate each offer. 
Practice scenarios 
There will be two practice scenarios. These practice scenarios are there to help you 
become familiar with the software. You will not be paid for the decisions you make in 
these two practice scenarios. 
How payoffs are determined 
The payoffs will be denoted in experimental currency units (ECUs). 
1000 ECUs = 1 NZD 
Your ECUs will be converted into NZD at this rate, and you will be paid in NZD when 
you leave the lab. The more ECUs you earn, the more NZD you earn.  
Your payoffs are determined as follows: 
Total ECUs you earn 
= 
Accepted price offer for House 1 + Accepted price offer for House 2 + ….+ Accepted 
price offer for House 10 
 
Example: Suppose you accepted the price offer 450 for House 1, 260 for House 2, 380 for 
House 3,…, 658 for House 10. The total amount of ECUs you earn is 450+260+380+…. 
+658. 
Do you have any questions? 
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice scenarios, 
with no money payoffs. Then, you will make decisions in 10 scenarios with money 





Instructions for the announced time cost treatment. 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Overview 
You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. If you follow these 
instructions carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to 
you in cash at the end of the experiment. If you have a question at any time, please raise 
your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. 
We ask that you not to talk otherwise during the experiment. Also, please turn off your cell 
phone and do not use the computer for any other purpose than your participation in the 
experiment requires. If you break these rules, we will have to exclude you from the 
experiment and from all payments. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
You will participate in 10 scenarios, in which you will be selling houses. In each scenario, 
you will be asked to decide whether to accept or reject a price offer for a particular house. 
You will be given a brief description of the house that will be followed by a series of price 
offers. The price offers are randomly generated by the computer and available one at a 
time. There is a five-second waiting time before presenting each offer. Once a price offer 
is presented, you can either accept or reject it. If you accept the price offer, the house will 
be sold at the price you accepted. All sales are final. If you reject the price offer, the offer 
will disappear; you cannot go back to the previously rejected offer. In total there are 20 
price offers available for each house; if you have not accepted an offer prior to the 20th 
offer, you will be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the final) offer. Therefore, make your 
decisions carefully. 
There is no time limit on how long the price offers will be available for, so take as long as 
you need to evaluate each offer. 
Practice scenarios 
There will be two practice scenarios. These practice scenarios are there to help you 
become familiar with the software. You will not be paid for the decisions you make in 
these two practice scenarios. 
How payoffs are determined 
The payoffs will be denoted in experimental currency units (ECUs). 
1000 ECUs = 1 NZD 
Your ECUs will be converted into NZD at this rate, and you will be paid in NZD when 




Your payoffs are determined as follows: 
Total ECUs you earn 
= 
Accepted price offer for House 1 + Accepted price offer for House 2 + ….+ Accepted 
price offer for House 10 
Example: Suppose you accepted the price offer 450 for House 1, 260 for House 2, 380 for 
House 3,…, 658 for House 10. The total amount of ECUs you earn is 450+260+380+…. 
+658. 
Do you have any questions? 
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice scenarios, 
with no money payoffs. Then, you will make decisions in 10 scenarios with money 





Instruction for the monetary cost treatment. 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Overview 
You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. If you follow these 
instructions carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to 
you in cash at the end of the experiment. If you have a question at any time, please raise 
your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. 
We ask that you not to talk otherwise during the experiment. Also, please turn off your cell 
phone and do not use the computer for any other purpose than your participation in the 
experiment requires. If you break these rules, we will have to exclude you from the 
experiment and from all payments. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
You will participate in 10 scenarios, in which you will be selling houses. In each scenario, 
you will be asked to decide whether to accept or reject a price offer for a particular house. 
You will be given a brief description of the house that will be followed by a series of price 
offers, denoted in experimental currency units (ECUs). The price offers are randomly 
generated by the computer and available one at a time. Once a price offer is presented, you 
can either accept or reject it. If you accept the price offer, the house will be sold at the 
price you accepted. All sales are final. If you reject the price offer, the offer will disappear; 
you cannot go back to the previously rejected offer. In total, there are 20 price offers 
available for each house; if you have not accepted an offer prior to the 20th offer, you will 
be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the final) offer. For inspecting each price offer you will 
incur a cost of 20 ECUs. Therefore, make your decisions carefully. 
There is no time limit on how long the price offers will be available for, so take as long as 
you need to evaluate each offer. 
Practice scenarios 
There will be two practice scenarios. These practice scenarios are there to help you 
become familiar with the software. You will not be paid for the decisions you make in 
these two practice scenarios. 
How payoffs are determined 
The payoffs will be denoted in experimental currency units (ECUs). 
1000 ECUs = 1 NZD 
Your ECUs will be converted into NZD at this rate, and you will be paid in NZD when 




Your payoffs are determined as follows: 
Total ECUs you earn 
= 
(Accepted price offer for House 1- 20 ECUs * the number of inspected offers for House 1) 
+ (Accepted price offer for House 2 – 20 ECUs * the number of inspected offers for House 
2) + …. + (Accepted price offer for House 10 – 20 ECUs * the number of inspected offers 
for House 10) 
Example: Suppose you accepted the 3rd price offer for House 1 and the price offer has a 
value of 450, the 4th price offer for House 2 with a value of 260, the 1st offer for House 3 
with a value of 500,….., the 5th price offer for House 10 with a value of 658.  
The total amount of ECUs you earn is (450 - 20*3) + (260 - 20*4) + (500 - 20*1) +…. + 
(658 - 20*5). 
Do you have any questions? 
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice scenarios, 







The price offer sequences used in Experiment One, Two and Five. 
        Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Offer          
1 388 739 310 420 292 494 522 252 789 341 
2 488 803 290 637 264 225 252 709 829 459 
3 683 221 637 727 344 272 562 966 996 453 
4 321 729 372 561 266 994 255 885 241 625 
5 625 159 619 643 396 602 370 737 799 504 
6 744 150 207 663 445 987 292 449 722 387 
7 279 299 455 568 266 523 533 910 1088 250 
8 848 818 400 636 241 683 237 250 876 308 
9 276 585 251 422 370 1400 262 933 503 492 
10 678 875 708 336 484 1574 343 491 650 455 
11 408 130 452 414 264 1413 220 450 890 353 
12 435 795 516 479 186 184 460 394 1264 588 
13 679 481 420 332 578 1081 294 899 645 438 
14 465 2 607 494 244 558 535 372 1740 408 
15 393 525 410 546 189 273 297 505 1179 481 
16 397 429 324 724 565 1182 452 608 250 467 
17 588 62 214 411 271 305 284 827 840 418 
18 358 459 480 267 235 661 436 712 272 273 
19 644 748 463 357 350 785 581 838 449 554 






Simulations and Hypotheses 
The simulations are run using Processing 3 (version 3.02) software. Processing was 
initiated by Ben Fry and Casey Reas. It is developed by a small team of volunteers. It is 
free to download at https://processing.org/. 
Each simulation cycle generates a set of 20 random offers from a standardized 
normal distribution, using the mean and standard deviation for each house. A total of 20 
stopping rules containing all possible stopping positions (0 to 19) is evaluated. Once a set 
of the offer has been generated, the rank associated with each offer is calculated. These 
offers and ranks for each offer are recorded to test each stopping rule. Stopping rule 0 is to 
accept the first offer regardless of the value; stopping rule 1 means to reject the first offer 
and choose the next highest offer, stopping rule 2 refers to reject the first two offers and 
choose the next highest offer and so on. Stopping rule 19 is to accept the 20th/final offer 
regardless of the value. The simulation runs separately for each house (using the mean and 
the standard deviation specific for each house) with 2 million iterations.  
The simulation yields the average payoffs in ECUs of each stopping rule when 
there is 0 ECUs and 20 ECUs. The average payoff gives an indication of which stopping 
rule is the optimal, i.e., yields the highest payoff, when all offers yield a positive payoff. 
The simulation results of the average payoff show that in 0 ECU, the optimal stopping rule 
is stopping rule 4, which is to reject the first 20% of offers. The overall payoff starts to 
decrease if one chooses a decision rule after stopping rule 4. The optimal stopping rule is 
to accept the first offer when there is 20 ECUs, accept the first offer yields the highest 





Instruction for the house frame treatment. 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Overview 
You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. If you follow these 
instructions carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to 
you in cash at the end of the experiment. If you have a question at any time, please raise 
your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. 
We ask that you not to talk otherwise during the experiment. Also, please turn off your cell 
phone and do not use the computer for any other purpose than your participation in the 
experiment requires. If you break these rules, we will have to exclude you from the 
experiment and from all payments. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
You will participate in 10 scenarios, in which you will be selling houses. In each 
scenario, you will be asked to decide whether to accept or reject a price offer for a 
particular house. You will be given a series of price offers for each scenario. The price 
offers are randomly generated by the computer and available one at a time. Once a price 
offer is presented, you can either accept or reject it. If you accept the price offer, the house 
will be sold at the price you accepted. All sales are final. If you reject the price offer, the 
offer will disappear; you cannot go back to the previously rejected offer. In total there are 
20 price offers available for each house; if you have not accepted an offer prior to the 20th 
offer, you will be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the final) offer. Therefore, make your 
decisions carefully. 
There is no time limit on how long the price offers will be available for, so take as long as 
you need to evaluate each offer. 
Practice scenarios 
There will be two practice scenarios. These practice scenarios are there to help you 
become familiar with the software. You will not be paid for the decisions you make in 
these two practice scenarios. 
How payoffs are determined 
The payoffs will be denoted in experimental currency units (ECUs). 




Your ECUs will be converted into NZD at this rate, and you will be paid in NZD when 
you leave the lab. The more ECUs you earn, the more NZD you earn. 
Your payoffs are determined as follows: 
Total ECUs you earn 
 =  
Accepted price offer for House 1 + Accepted price offer for House 2 + ….+ Accepted 
price offer for House 10 
Example: Suppose you accepted the price offer 450 for House 1, 260 for House 2, 380 for 
House 3….., 658 for House 10. The total amount of ECUs you earn is 450+260+380+…. 
+658. 
Do you have any questions? 
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice scenarios, 
with no money payoffs. Then, you will make decisions in 10 scenarios with money 





Instruction for the no context treatment. 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Overview 
You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. If you follow these 
instructions carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to 
you in cash at the end of the experiment. If you have a question at any time, please raise 
your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. 
We ask that you not to talk otherwise during the experiment. Also, please turn off your cell 
phone and do not use the computer for any other purpose than your participation in the 
experiment requires. If you break these rules, we will have to exclude you from the 
experiment and from all payments. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
You will participate in 10 rounds. In each round, you will be asked to decide whether to 
accept or reject a number. The numbers are randomly generated by the computer and 
available one at a time. Once a number is presented, you can either accept or reject it. If 
you accept the number, you receive the amount represented by the number (in 
experimental currency units, as will be explained below). All decisions are final. If you 
reject the number, the number will disappear; you cannot go back to the previously 
rejected number. In total there are 20 numbers available; if you have not accepted a 
number prior to the 20th number, you will be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the final) 
number. Therefore, make your decisions carefully. 
There is no time limit on how long the numbers will be available for, so take as long as 
you need to evaluate each number. 
Practice rounds 
There will be two practice rounds. These practice rounds are there to help you become 
familiar with the software. You will not be paid for the decisions you make in these two 
practice rounds. 
How payoffs are determined 
The payoffs will be denoted in experimental currency units (ECUs). 
1000 ECUs = 1 NZD 
Your ECUs will be converted into NZD at this rate, and you will be paid in NZD when 




Your payoffs are determined as follows: 
Total ECUs you earn 
 =  
Accepted number for Round 1 + Accepted number for Round 2 + ….+ Accepted number for 
Round 10 
Example: Suppose you accepted the number 450 for Round 1, 260 for Round 2, 380 for 
Round 3….., 658 for Round 10. The total amount of ECUs you earn is 450+260+380+…. 
+658. 
Do you have any questions? 
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice rounds, 





Summary prediction results of three dependent variable after applying the decision 
rules to the sequences in the experiment. The chosen price (in ECUs) is the sum of 10 
price selected by applying each decision rule, the optimal count is the number of rounds 
selected the optimal price after applying each decision rule and the average stopping 
position is the nth position obtained by averaging across 10 rounds after applying the 
decision rules.  








Decision rule    
Pick First Offer 4547 0 1 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 1 6629 0 2.6 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 2 7352 2 3.7 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 3 7228 4 10.3 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 4 7562 3 12.4 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 5 7611 3 12.5 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 6 7754 4 13.1 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 7 7930 4 13.6 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 8 7634 4 15 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 9 7808 5 15.1 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 
10 
5825 3 18.4 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 
11 
5825 3 18.4 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 
12 
6301 4 18.6 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 
13 
6096 3 19.3 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 
14 
4461 2 19.9 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 
15 
4461 2 19.9 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 
16 




Choose the next biggest after seeing 
17 
4461 2 19.9 
Choose the next biggest after seeing 
18 
4461 2 19.9 






Summary of statistical findings for the comparison between the no context and 
house frame, no context and house with info, and house frame and house with info 
treatments.  
 
No context and house frame 




Z p – value 
Average stopping 
position of 10 
rounds 
No context 9.81 1.05 .22 
 
(3.55)   
House Frame 11.24   
 
(2.80)   
Sum of 10 chosen 
price (round 1-10) 
No context 6880.28 1.38 .045 
 
(749.99)   
House Frame 7269.51   
 
(361.37)   
 
No context and house with info 




Z p – value 
Average stopping 
position of 10 
rounds 
 
No context 9.81 1.39 .04 
 
(3.55)   
House with info 11.58   
 
(2.77)   
Sum of 10 chosen 
price (round 1-10) 
 
No context 6880.28 1.73 .005 
 
(749.99)   
House with info 7338.85   
 





HousefFrame and house with info 




Z p – value 
Average stopping 
position of 10 
rounds 
 
House Frame 11.24 .64 .80 
 
(2.80)   
House with info 11.58   
 
(2.77)   
Sum of 10 chosen 
price (round 1-10) 
 
House Frame 7269.51 .95 .33 
 
(361.37)   
House with info 7338.85   
 







General Knowledge and Probability Evaluation Task 
Please choose one answer for each question, and move the pointer to indicate the percentage 
of self-assessed accuracy 
 *Correct answer is in bold letter    
 
Easy Questions   
  
1 The capital of New Zealand is...? 
 
1. Wellington 2. Auckland 3. Christchurch 
  
 
What is the probability that you answered question 1 accurately? 
 
33%    100% 
2 Who is the current Prime Minister of New Zealand?  
 




What is the probability that you answered question 2 accurately? 
 
33% 
   
100% 
3 Which city in New Zealand recently suffered a series of devastating earthquakes? 
 




What is the probability that you answered question 3 accurately? 
 
33% 
   
100% 
4 The highest point in New Zealand is …? 
 
1. Mount Cook 2. Mount Tasman 3. Mount Hamilton 
  
 
What is the probability that you answered question 4 accurately? 
 
33% 






5 What is the third official language in New Zealand? 
 
1. English 2. New Zealand Sign Language 3. Maori 
  
 
What is the probability that you answered question 5 accurately? 
 
33% 
   
100% 
6 What is the name of the national cricket team? 
 
1. Black Stars 2. All Blacks 3. The Black Caps 
  
 
What is the probability that you answered question 6 accurately? 
 
33% 
   
100% 
7 Who is the director of the Lord of the Rings trilogy 
 
1. Tim Burton 2. Peter Jackson 3. Oliver Stone 
  
 
What is the probability that you answered question 7 accurately? 
 
33% 
   
100% 
 Medium Questions  
8 The largest lake in NZ is …? 
 
1. Lake Taupo 2. Lake Victoria 3. Lake Wakatipu 
  
 
What is the probability that you answered question 8 accurately? 
 
33% 
   
100% 
9 The first capital of New Zealand is    ? 
 
1.Auckland 2. Russell 3. Wellington 
  
 
What is the probability that you answered question 9 accurately? 
 
33% 
   
100% 




2. James Cook 3. Abel Tasman 
  
 
What is the probability that you answered question 10 accurately? 
 
33% 






11 What city is the Art Deco capital in New Zealand? 
 
1. Dunedin 2. Napier 3. Wellington 
  
 
What is the probability that you answered question 11 accurately? 
 
33% 
   
100% 
12 Who is on $100 New Zealand Dollar note? 
 
1. Elizabeth II. 2. Edmund Hillary. 3. Ernest Rutherford 
  
 
What is the probability that you answered question 12 accurately? 
 
33% 
   
100% 
13 The northernmost tip of NZ is called... 
 
1. North Cape 2. Cape Reinga 3. Cape North 
  
 
What is the probability that you answered question 13 accurately? 
 
33% 
   
100% 
14 What was the name of Captain Cook's ship that first landed in New Zealand 
 
1. The Endurance 2. The Empira 3. The Endeavour 
  
 
What is the probability that you answered question 14 accurately? 
 
33% 
   
100% 
 




15 What year was the Treaty of Waitangi signed 
 
1. 1820 2. 1840 3. 1860 
  
 
What is the probability that you answered question 15 accurately? 
 
33% 
   
100% 
16 Who founded the Women's Franchise League to fight for votes for women  
 
Jean Batten Katherine Mansfield Kate Sheppard 
  
 
What is the probability that you answered question 16 accurately? 
 
33% 






17 What was Sir Edmund Hillary's original job in NZ 
 
1. Beekeeper 2. Air Force NZ 3. Mountaineer 
  
 
What is the probability that you answered question 17 accurately? 
 
33% 
   
100% 
18 The Longest river in New Zealand is …? 
 
1. Whanganui River  2. Waikato River 3. Clarence River 
  
 
What is the probability that you answered question 18 accurately? 
 
33% 
   
100% 
19 The prime minister who refused to have nuclear weapons in New Zealand is…? 
 
Geoffrey Palmer David Lange Mike Moore 
  
 
What is the probability that you answered question 19 accurately? 
 
33% 
   
100% 
20 The Largest glacier in New Zealand is …? 
 




What is the probability that you answered question 20 acurately? 
 
33% 
   
100% 
21 Who wrote the national anthem of New Zealand? 
 
1. Fleur Adcock 2. Thomas Bracken 3. Rewi Alley 
  
 
What is the probability that you answered question 21 accurately? 
 
33% 








The Self-efficacy scale 
Please read each statement carefully, and circle just one answer per question that 
best describes you.  
 
1) I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough. 
 Not at all true Hardly true Moderately true Exactly true 
 1 2 3 4 
2) If someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what I want. 
 Not at all true Hardly true Moderately true Exactly true 
 1 2 3 4 
3) It is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals. 
 Not at all true Hardly true Moderately true Exactly true 
 1 2 3 4 
4) I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events.  
 Not at all true Hardly true Moderately true Exactly true 
 1 2 3 4 
5) Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen situations. 
 Not at all true Hardly true Moderately true Exactly true 
 1 2 3 4 
6) I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort. 
 Not at all true Hardly true Moderately true Exactly true 
 1 2 3 4 
7) I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my coping 
abilities 
 Not at all true Hardly true Moderately true Exactly true 
 1 2 3 4 
8) When I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several solutions. 
 Not at all true Hardly true Moderately true Exactly true 
 1 2 3 4 




 Not at all true Hardly true Moderately true Exactly true 
 1 2 3 4 
10) I can usually handle whatever comes my way. 
 Not at all true Hardly true Moderately true Exactly true 






The depression scale 
Please read each statement carefully, and circle one response to each question that 
best describes you for the past 7 days.During the Past 7 Days... 
1. Falling asleep 
A - I never take longer than 30 min to fall asleep. 
B - I take at least 30 min to fall asleep, less than half the time. 
C- I take at least 30 min to fall asleep, more than half the time. 
D - I take more than 60 min to fall asleep, more than half the time. 
2. Sleep during the night 
A - I do not wake up at night. 
B - I have a restless, light sleep with a few brief awakenings each night. 
C - I wake up at least once a night, but I go back to sleep easily. 
D - I awaken more than once a night and stay awake for 20 min or more, more than 
half the time.  
3. Waking up too early 
A - Most of the time, I awaken no more than 30 min before I need to get up. 




C - I almost always awaken at least 1 hour or so before I need to, but I go back to 
sleep eventually. 
D - I awaken at least 1 hour before I need to, and can’t go back to sleep. 
4. Sleeping too much 
A - I sleep no longer than 7 – 8 hours/night, without napping during the day. 
B - I sleep no longer than 10 hours in a 24-hour period including naps. 
C - I sleep no longer than 12 hours in a 24-hour period including naps. 
D - I sleep longer than 12 hours in a 24-hour period including naps. 
5. Feeling sad 
A - I do not feel sad. 
B - I feel sad less than half the time. 
C - I feel sad more than half the time. 





Please complete either 6 or 7 (Not Both) 
6. Decreased appetite 
A - There is no change in my usual appetite. 
B - I eat somewhat less often or lesser amounts of food than usual. 
C - I eat much less than usual and only with personal effort. 
D - I rarely eat within a 24-hour period, and only with extreme personal effort or 
when others persuade me to eat.  
-Or- 
7. Increased appetite 
A - There is no change from my usual appetite. 
B - I feel a need to eat more frequently than usual. 
C - I regularly eat more often and/or greater amounts of food than usual. 
D - I feel driven to overeat both at mealtime and between meals. 
Please complete either 8 or 9 (Not both) 
8. Decreased weight (Within the Last 2 Weeks) 
A - I have not had a change in my weight. 
B - I feel as if I’ve had a slight weight loss. 




D - I have lost 5 pounds or more. 
-Or- 
9. Increased weight (Within the last 2 weeks) 
A - I have not had a change in my weight. 
B - I feel as if I’ve had a slight weight gain. 
C - I have gained 2 pounds or more. 
D - I have gained 5 pounds or more. 
10. Concentration/decision making 
A - There is no change in my usual capacity to concentrate or make decisions. 
B - I occasionally feel indecisive or find that my attention wanders. 
C - Most of the time, I struggle to focus my attention or to make decisions. 
D - I cannot concentrate well enough to read or cannot make even minor decisions. 
11. View of myself 
A - I see myself as equally worthwhile and deserving as other people. 
B - I am more self-blaming than usual. 
C - I largely believe that I cause problems for others. 
D - I think almost constantly about major and minor defects in myself. 




A - I do not think of suicide or death. 
B - I feel that life is empty or wonder if it’s worth living. 
C - I think of suicide or death several times a week for several minutes. 
D - I think of suicide or death several times a day in some detail, or I have made 
specific plans for suicide or have actually tried to take my life. 
13. General interest 
A - There is no change from usual in how interested I am in other people or 
activities. 
B - I notice that I am less interested in people or activities. 
C - I find I have interest in only one or two of my formerly pursued activities. 
D - I have virtually no interest in formerly pursued activities. 
14. Energy Level 
A - There is no change in my usual level of energy. 
B - I get tired more easily than usual.  
C - I have to make a big effort to start or finish my usual daily activities (for 
example, shopping, homework, cooking or going to work). 
D - I really cannot carry out most of my usual daily activities because I just don’t 
have the energy. 




A - I think, speak, and move at my usual rate of speed. 
B - I find that my thinking is slowed down or my voice sounds dull or flat. 
C - It takes me several seconds to respond to most questions and I’m sure my 
thinking is slowed.  
D - I am often unable to respond to questions without extreme effort. 
16. Feeling Restless 
A - I do not feel restless. 
B - I’m often fidgety, wring my hands, or need to shift how I am sitting. 
C - I have impulses to move about and am quite restless. 







The demographic questionnaire 
Please read each statement carefully and circle one most appropriate answer per 
question for you. 
 
1) Have you ever purchased a house before?    
 Yes No     
2) Have you ever hired an employee before?  
 Yes No     
3) Have you ever sold a house before?    






Please indicate the price range of the house you expected to own ultimately 
(ultimately refers to after some post-graduation period of career development) 
 
 Under $350,000  $350,001- $500,000  $500,001 - $650,000  
 $650,001 - $800,000  $800,001- $950,000  Above $950,001  
5) Please indicate the annual salary range of the job you expected to get ultimately 
(ultimately refers to after some post-graduation period of career development) 
 
 Under $20,000  $20,001 – $40,000  $40,001- $60,000  
 $ 60,001 - $80,000  $80,001- $100,000  Over $100,001  
6) What is your age?      
 Under 20  21 - 30  31 - 40  
 41 - 50  51 - 60  Above 61  
7) What is your gender?     




8) What is your annual income?    
 A) Under $20,000 
 
D) $60,001- $80,000 
B) $20,001- $40,000 
 
E) $80,001- $100,000 
C) $40,001- $60,000 
 







The commission base treatment instruction with the house selling frame. 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Overview 
You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. If you follow these 
instructions carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to 
you in cash, and 2 course credits at the end of the experiment. If you have a question at any 
time, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your 
question in private. We ask you not to talk otherwise during the experiment. Also, please 
turn off your cell phone and do not use the computer for any other purpose than your 
participation in the experiment requires. If you break these rules, we will have to exclude 
you from the experiment and from all payments. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
You will participate in 10 scenarios, in which you will be selling houses. In each scenario, 
you will be asked to decide whether to accept or reject a price offer for a particular house. 
You will be given a brief description of the house that will be followed by a series of price 
offers. The price offers are randomly generated by the computer and available one at a 
time. Once a price offer is presented, you can either accept or reject it. If you accept the 
price offer, you receive the amount represented by the offer (in experimental currency 
units, as will be explained below). If you reject the price offer, the offer will disappear; 
you cannot go back to the previously rejected offer. All decisions are final. In total there 
are 20 price offers available for each house; if you have not accepted an offer prior to the 
20th offer, you will be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the final) offer. Therefore, make your 
decisions carefully. 
There is no time limit on how long the price offers will be available for, so take as long as 
you need to evaluate each offer. 
Practice scenarios 
There will be two practice scenarios. These practice scenarios are there to help you 
become familiar with the software. You will not be paid for the decisions you make in 
these two practice scenarios. 
How payoffs are determined 
The payoffs will be denoted in experimental currency units (ECUs). 
735 ECUs = 1 NZD 
Your ECUs will be converted into NZD at this rate, and you will be paid in NZD when 
you leave the lab. The more ECUs you earn, the more NZD you earn.  




Total ECUs you earn 
 =  
Accepted price offer for House 1 + Accepted price offer for House 2 + ….+ Accepted 
price offer for House 10 
Example: Suppose you accepted the price offer 450 for House 1, 260 for House 2, 380 for 
House 3….., 658 for House 10. The total amount of ECUs you earn is 450+260+380+…. 
+658. 
Do you have any questions? 
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice scenarios, 
with no money payoffs. Then, you will make decisions in 10 scenarios with money 




Appendix 6.B  
The best only treatment instruction with the house selling frame.  
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Overview 
You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. If you follow these 
instructions carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to 
you in cash, and 2 course credits at the end of the experiment. If you have a question at any 
time, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your 
question in private. We ask you not to talk otherwise during the experiment. Also, please 
turn off your cell phone and do not use the computer for any other purpose than your 
participation in the experiment requires. If you break these rules, we will have to exclude 
you from the experiment and from all payments. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
You will participate in 10 scenarios, in which you will be selling houses. In each scenario, 
you will be asked to decide whether to accept or reject a price offer for a particular house. 
You will be given a brief description of the house that will be followed by a series of price 
offers. The price offers are randomly generated by the computer and available one at a 
time. Once a price offer is presented, you can either accept or reject it. If you accept a price 
offer and that offer is the highest of the 20 price offers; you will receive NZD 4.60. 
Otherwise you receive nothing from that scenario. If you reject the price offer, the offer 
will disappear; you cannot go back to the previously rejected offer. All decisions are final. 
In total there are 20 price offers available for each house; if you have not accepted an offer 
prior to the 20th offer, you will be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the final) offer. Therefore, 
make your decisions carefully. 
There is no time limit on how long the price offers will be available for, so take as long as 
you need to evaluate each offer. 
Practice scenarios 
There will be two practice scenarios. These practice scenarios are there to help you 
become familiar with the software. You will not be paid for the decisions you make in 
these two practice scenarios. 
How payoffs are determined 
You will earn NZD 4.60 if you have chosen the highest price offer for each house.  
Your payoffs are determined as follows: 
Total NZD you earn  




Example: Suppose you accepted the highest price offer for House 1, House 3 and House 
10. The total amount of NZD you earn is $4.60 * 3 = 13.80. 
Do you have any questions? 
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice scenarios, 
with no money payoffs. Then, you will make decisions in 10 scenarios with money 




Appendix 6.C  
The no incentive treatment instruction with the house selling frame  
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Overview 
You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. If you follow these 
instructions carefully you will be paid $9.50 in cash and 2 course credits at the end of the 
experiment. If you have a question at any time, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. We ask you not to 
talk otherwise during the experiment. Also, please turn off your cell phone and do not use 
the computer for any other purpose than your participation in the experiment requires. If 
you break these rules, we will have to exclude you from the experiment and from all 
payments. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
You will participate in 10 scenarios, in which you will be selling houses. In each scenario, 
you will be asked to decide whether to accept or reject a price offer for a particular house. 
Your aim is to try to accept the highest price you can. You will be given a brief description 
of the house that will be followed by a series of price offers. The price offers are randomly 
generated by the computer and available one at a time. Once a price offer is presented, you 
can either accept or reject it. If you accept the price offer, you will move on to the next 
scenario. If you reject the price offer, the offer will disappear; you cannot go back to the 
previously rejected offer. In total there are 20 price offers available for each house; if you 
have not accepted an offer prior to the 20th offer, you will be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. 
the final) offer. Therefore, make your decisions carefully. 
There is no time limit on how long the price offers will be available for, so take as long as 
you need to evaluate each offer. 
Practice scenarios 
There will be two practice scenarios. These practice scenarios are there to help you 
become familiar with the software.  
Do you have any questions? 
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice scenarios. 





The commission base treatment instruction with the no context frame. 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Overview 
You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. If you follow these 
instructions carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to 
you in cash, and 2 course credits at the end of the experiment. If you have a question at any 
time, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your 
question in private. We ask you not to talk otherwise during the experiment. Also, please 
turn off your cell phone and do not use the computer for any other purpose than your 
participation in the experiment requires. If you break these rules, we will have to exclude 
you from the experiment and from all payments. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
You will participate in 10 rounds. In each round, you will be asked to decide whether to 
accept or reject a number. The numbers are randomly generated by the computer and 
available one at a time. Once a number is presented, you can either accept or reject it. If 
you accept the number, you receive the amount represented by the number (in 
experimental currency units, as will be explained below). If you reject the number, the 
number will disappear; you cannot go back to the previously rejected number. All 
decisions are final. In total there are 20 numbers available; if you have not accepted a 
number prior to the 20th number, you will be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the final) 
number. Therefore, make your decisions carefully. 
There is no time limit on how long the numbers will be available for, so take as long as 
you need to evaluate each number. 
Practice rounds 
There will be two practice rounds. These practice rounds are there to help you become 
familiar with the software. You will not be paid for the decisions you make in these two 
practice rounds. 
How payoffs are determined 
The payoffs will be denoted in experimental currency units (ECUs). 
735 ECUs = 1 NZD 
Your ECUs will be converted into NZD at this rate, and you will be paid in NZD when 
you leave the lab. The more ECUs you earn, the more NZD you earn. 
Your payoffs are determined as follows: 




 =  
Accepted number for Round 1 + Accepted number for Round 2 + ….+ Accepted number 
for Round 10 
Example: Suppose you accepted the number 450 for Round 1, 260 for Round 2, 380 for 
Round 3….., 658 for Round 10. The total amount of ECUs you earn is 450+260+380+…. 
+658. 
Do you have any questions? 
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice rounds, 





The best only treatment instruction with the no context frame 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Overview 
You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. If you follow these 
instructions carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to 
you in cash, and 2 course credits at the end of the experiment. If you have a question at any 
time, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your 
question in private. We ask you not to talk otherwise during the experiment. Also, please 
turn off your cell phone and do not use the computer for any other purpose than your 
participation in the experiment requires. If you break these rules, we will have to exclude 
you from the experiment and from all payments. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
You will participate in 10 rounds. In each round, you will be asked to decide whether to 
accept or reject a number. The numbers are randomly generated by the computer and 
available one at a time. Once a number is presented, you can either accept or reject it. If 
you accept the number and that number is the highest of the 20 numbers, you will receive 
NZD4.60. Otherwise you receive nothing from that round. If you reject the number, the 
number will disappear; you cannot go back to the previously rejected number. All 
decisions are final. In total there are 20 numbers available for each round; if you have not 
accepted a number prior to the 20th number, you will be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the 
final) number. Therefore, make your decisions carefully. 
There is no time limit on how long the numbers will be available for, so take as long as 
you need to evaluate each number. 
Practice rounds 
There will be two practice rounds. These practice rounds are there to help you become 
familiar with the software. You will not be paid for the decisions you make in these two 
practice rounds. 
How payoffs are determined 
You will earn NZD 4.60 if you have chosen the highest number for each round 
Your payoffs are determined as follows: 
Total NZD you earn 
 = number of rounds that you have selected the highest number * NZD 4.60 
Example: Suppose you accepted the highest number for Round 1, Round 3 and Round 10. 




Do you have any questions? 
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice rounds, 





The no incentive treatment instruction with the no context frame  
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Overview 
You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. If you follow these 
instructions carefully you will be paid $9.50 in cash and 2 course credits at the end of the 
experiment. If you have a question at any time, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. We ask you not to 
talk otherwise during the experiment. Also, please turn off your cell phone and do not use 
the computer for any other purpose than your participation in the experiment requires. If 
you break these rules, we will have to exclude you from the experiment and from all 
payments. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
You will participate in 10 rounds. In each round, you will be asked to decide whether to 
accept or reject a number. Your aim is to try to accept the highest number you can. The 
numbers are randomly generated by the computer and available one at a time. Once a 
number is presented, you can either accept or reject it. If you accept the number (in 
experimental currency units, as will be explained below), you will move on to the next 
round. If you reject the number, the number will disappear; you cannot go back to the 
previously rejected number. In total there are 20 numbers available for each round; if you 
have not accepted a number prior to the 20th number, you will be forced to accept the 20th 
(i.e. the final) number. Therefore, make your decisions carefully. 
There is no time limit on how long the numbers will be available for, so take as long as 
you need to evaluate each number. 
Practice rounds 
There will be two practice rounds. These practice rounds are there to help you become 
familiar with the software.  
Do you have any questions? 
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice rounds. 
Then, you will make decisions in 10 rounds.  
